The product recommendation website BeM was launched in 2020 in Brazil to explore the significant and untapped potential of the country's online reviews market. Inspired by US models, BeM's webpages featured expert-generated reviews of products in four categories: air fryers, headphones and earbuds, Bluetooth speakers, and irons. Its revenue model centered on participating in affiliate marketing programs: BeM's website included links to various online merchants' pages, and the group earned commissions when users made purchases through these links. After a year of operations, BeM had attracted 186,000 visitors to its webpages, but sales conversion remained a challenge. While over 80% of customers who read BeM's reviews clicked on affiliate links, under 1% completed a purchase immediately or shortly after. The field-based case study features BeM's executive director, Josiane Schunck, as she prepares to discuss the start-up's future with its four cofounders. The key question the group needs to address is whether to keep growing the BeM website or move on to another venture, where they could apply the learnings from this experiment. Should they embrace Silicon Valley's "fail fast, learn faster" mantra, or make adjustments and double down on the BeM bet? If they decide to continue growing the business, what could be the most effective strategies to enhance BeM's financials, reducing costs and boosting revenue generation? Could partnerships with media groups, retailers, or manufacturers help BeM build alternative revenue sources, or would it be better to keep operating independently? And which product categories should BeM focus on next, not only to attract more users but also to improve its sales conversion rates? This case is appropriate for use in an MBA, executive education, or undergraduate course on entrepreneurship, marketing, innovation, digital disruption, or digital businesses.
"The fast-growing educational technology start-up Resilia had successfully initiated its operations in Brazil. It trained full stack developers and connected them with entry-level jobs at unicorn start-up companies such as iFood, Stone, and Nubank, as well as traditional established companies going through a digital transformation process, such as Globo, one of Brazil's largest media conglomerates. After two years of growth between 2019 and 2021, and with evidence for the potential of his start-up idea, the cofounder of Resilia, Bruno Cani, found himself in a challenging position after attracting the investment of XP Investimentos, one of Brazil's largest financial technology firms. As of 2022, Resilia's dilemma was to find a way to scale up the start-up without losing sight of its original purpose, but at the same time to show the potential value of monetizing this initiative in a near future, so that the business could operate without the need for investors' money. Resilia had developed three key major capabilities: (1) acquiring customers (i.e., students) from among the low-income population and selecting the applicants with the most potential, (2) training them and funding their training through a system in which they would pay back the investment based on a percentage of their income once they had completed the program and found work, and (3) connecting with partnering companies to facilitate their employment and career advancement. This case is appropriate for use in an MBA, executive education, or undergraduate course on social entrepreneurship, innovation, marketing, or corporate social responsibility."
In 2021, the world's fourth-largest beauty group, Natura &Co, was in the middle of a digital transformation process. Originally a direct-selling company, Natura transitioned to a multichannel business through online and offline channels, while acquiring strong brands such as Aesop, The Body Shop, and Avon. In the A case, the challenge for Natura CEO João Paulo Ferreira's challenge was to find the right balance between the direct-selling and other channel formats to market Natura, thus enabling it to thrive in the face of intense competition in the beauty and personal care market in Brazil. In the B case, Natura's business was back on the growth track as the company successfully aligned the new digital channels with its door-to-door operations, but the details of the omnichannel transformation and digital transformation were still complex. In this C case, Natura's executive team decided to make progress in its digital ecosystem and undertake a digital transformation process by developing a financial-technology (fintech) business. Their choices were mainly between partnering with an existing fintech, buying a solution created by an existing fintech, or creating their own fintech. Meanwhile, the COVID-19 pandemic was spreading. The case set is appropriate for use in an MBA, Executive Education, or undergraduate course on marketing, digital transformation, financial services, distribution channels, brand management, or marketing metrics, and it would work well in any course module focused on sales management.
Arredondar was a nongovernmental organization (NGO) whose objective was encouraging the culture of donation in Brazil through acts of micro-donations. Any shopper could donate at the retail stores that partnered with Arredondar. The process was simple: customers could round up the total value of their purchase to the next whole value, and the difference in cents would be donated to carefully selected NGOs. Arredondar offered a simple, accessible, and transparent way to donate, which seemed compatible with the characteristics of a country in which the donation culture was not yet strong, and where there was distrust of NGOs. However, there were indications that despite awards and success, the project might not be able to achieve financial sustainability. The case focuses on a common dilemma of social enterprises: how to be financially sustainable while creating a strong social impact. Although Arredondar had already partnered with large retailers, it needed to rethink its operation in order to break even. Arredondar's leadership considered the following strategies: (1) focus on the core through existing retail partners; (2) expand toward new retailers; (3) implement new ways for consumers to donate the money other than through cashiers at partnering retailers; or (4) increase the administrative fee. Would one of these four options help Arredondar be financially sustainable?
Trov is a disruptive startup in the insurance space ("insurtech"). It allows consumers to simply turn on and turn off insurance for each of their possessions on a mobile app with the swipe of a finger. Consumer love the simple, on-demand, single-item coverage product. However, the cost to acquire customers (CAC) for Trov is significantly higher than the total expected contribution margins (CLV) for the single item coverage insurance product that the company is known for. In light of this, what should the CEO of Trov to with the product? How can Trov monetize on-demand insurance?
The CEO of OLX Brazil, an online classifieds platform business, is debating among multiple paths to grow sustainably (i.e., profitably) without the need for investor money. The options under consideration are: (1) penetration growth by focusing on the core, (2) new markets growth by entering adjacencies, or (3) new products growth by developing new services. Each of these options caries a series of benefits and risks. How should OLX's CEO compare the options and choose the best path to grow his platform business?
By late 2017, Brazilian retailer Magazine Luiza's CEO was convinced that the company could significantly grow sales and accomplish its aspirations of digital transformation. What was unclear in his mind was whether he should act as a tech company and grow as fast as possible (e.g., high double digits) or be more conservative and grow sales at a financially healthy rate, like traditional retailers did (e.g., single digits). The primary way e-retailing companies achieved these abnormally high rates of growth was through lowering prices and foregoing profitability. Historically, mass retailing had razor-thin margins. It was thus unlikely that he could have it both ways: grow fast and be profitable. Should Trajano opt for more aggressive growth or proceed more conservatively?
Faced with declining market share and sales, Natura, Brazil's second largest brand in the cosmetics, fragrances, and toiletries market, expanded its customer reach by moving from a direct-sales company to a multichannel company. In 2014, Natura added online catalogs, physical stores, and drugstores to its well-established direct-selling model, but the results were disappointing. Between 2014 and 2016, three different Natura CEOs attempted to lead the company in the strategic transition to focus less on the direct sales consultants and more on reaching the end consumers directly with multiple channels and touchpoints. On October 2016, the company's board appointed its former commercial vice president, João Paulo Ferreira, as the most recent CEO. Ferreira's challenge was to find the right balance between the direct-selling and other channel formats to market Natura, thus enabling it to thrive in the face of intense competition in the beauty and personal care market in Brazil.
Ronaldo Art, brand manager for J&J's Listerine, reflected on the progress he had made in market penetration for the oral hygiene product from the time he started in the position in 2010 to late 2014. He wanted to develop a long-term strategy for the brand rather than stimulating short-term increases in market share, which could compromise the equity of the brand, its profitability, and its long-term competitive advantage. This case has been used in Darden's second-year course "Marketing Metrics and Integrated Marketing Communications" and would work well in any course module focused on brand management and brand strategy.