Public sector unions are the fastest-growing sector of organized labor in the US, and are key players to be considered by a wide variety of elected and appointed public officials. This case, in contrast to most in both public management and business school collections, is told through the eyes of a labor leader, the executive director of the Ohio state government branch of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. It traces the evolution of an emerging union philosophy aimed at improving the long-term lot of members through increased productivity and efficiency, goals articulated in Ohio State government through a variation of total quality management techniques. The sense of steady, incremental progress and labor-management cooperation is disrupted, however, when a legislative demand for cost savings turns the state's Department of Administrative Services into a budget battleground. AFSCME executive director Paul Goldberg must decide how to respond to the immediate crisis in a way that preserves the "quality management" approach in which he believes but also convinces members that the union will continue to stand up for them.

During his successful 1991 bid for the indianapolis mayoralty, Stephen Goldsmith is clear about his preference for privatizing city services. Once in office, however, Goldsmith decides on a different, more complex approach. The inefficiency of publicly-provided services, he reflects, may not be the result of their being public but rather a reflection of the lack of competition over who will provide them. In that light, Goldsmith undertakes a bold experiment: to force city departments to bid against private providers. This case focuses on the first stages of the Goldsmith experiment, a time in which city public works crews must, for the first time, compete against private firms for a pothole repair contract. The case raises core questions as to how to structure public-private competitions to ensure that valid comparison will be possible, as well as how to determine the exact nature of public costs. In addition, it allows for discussion of more theoretical questions as to whether some functions must always be public, while others should be private and still others privately-provided but publicly-financed. HKS Case Number 1270.0

During his successful 1991 bid for the indianapolis mayoralty, Stephen Goldsmith is clear about his preference for privatizing city services. Once in office, however, Goldsmith decides on a different, more complex approach. The inefficiency of publicly-provided services, he reflects, may not be the result of their being public but rather a reflection of the lack of competition over who will provide them. In that light, Goldsmith undertakes a bold experiment: to force city departments to bid against private providers. This case focuses on the first stages of the Goldsmith experiment, a time in which city public works crews must, for the first time, compete against private firms for a pothole repair contract. The case raises core questions as to how to structure public-private competitions to ensure that valid comparison will be possible, as well as how to determine the exact nature of public costs. In addition, it allows for discussion of more theoretical questions as to whether some functions must always be public, while others should be private and still others privately-provided but publicly-financed. HKS Case Number 1270.1