In September 2021, Adam Demuyakor (MBA 2017) was faced with decisions about how to launch his venture capital (VC) investment firm. His previous investment activities were a series of angel investments and special purpose vehicles alongside two part-time general partners (GPs). After hearing investor feedback that the firm was not institutional enough, Demuyakor created a successor firm on his own, Wilshire Lane Capital (WLC), and sold a GP stake to private equity firm Nile Capital to help with operational expenses, infrastructure support, and fundraising. Under WLC, Demuyakor sought to raise a $75 million fund mainly focused on Series A PropTech deals. However, he received conflicting advice on three strategic decision vectors-fund size, stage of deals, and subsector area of focus. Some potential investors were also concerned about Demuyakor running the fund as a solo GP instead of with a full-time partner. While the characteristics of the new fund were based on Demuyakor's background, preferences, and goals, he knew he had to align his strategy with the approach that would earn the confidence of investors. Thus, he had some decisions to make.
Sarah Kunst knew the elements of a successful startup from her tenure at venture capital firms. In April 2018, however, her own app - Proday, a home fitness platform featuring exercises filmed by professional sports stars - was floundering. Kunst theorized that Facebook algorithm changes had ruined her marketing plan, but needed to be confident in her diagnosis before allocating resources to a solution. She thought back to Proday's launch two years earlier to see if she could pinpoint where it all went wrong.
Nicole Blank has bootstrapped her functional beverage company, Sunomi Switchel, to contracts with leading grocery retailers. She is now faced with a series of choices for if and how to continue to grow the business.
Ample Hills Creamery started in 2010 as a temporary ice cream pushcart in Brooklyn, New York City. On the strength of inventive flavors and clever marketing, husband-and-wife founders Brian Smith and Jackie Cuscuna built a premium, artisanal dessert empire of 16 retail locations in four states. However, some decisions that fueled their rapid growth were double-edged swords. Licensed partnerships with Disney raised the brand's profile, but necessitated expanding production. The factory they built was expensive and introduced new logistical challenges. And the native New Yorkers were unhappy with a pricey West Coast expansion. In March 2020, they filed for bankruptcy, disappointing the venture capital investors they had attracted and the legions of fans who did not understand why the popular brand was not turning a profit. The protagonists' story continues in The Social (HBS No. 822-074), which tells the story of their second ice cream venture.
This case features the same protagonists as Ample Hills Creamery (HBS No. 822-073), and can be used as a continuation of that story. Ample Hills Creamery started in 2010 as a temporary ice cream pushcart in Brooklyn, New York City. On the strength of inventive flavors and clever marketing, husband-and-wife founders Brian Smith and Jackie Cuscuna built a premium, artisanal dessert empire of 16 retail locations in four states. However, some decisions that fueled their rapid growth were double-edged swords, and the couple filed for corporate and personal bankruptcy in 2020. After ruminating on their mistakes, Smith and Cuscuna decided to start another premium ice cream brand, at a much smaller scale, using the lessons they learned in their Ample Hills experience.
Agora was a civic technology (civic tech) startup founded by Elsa Sze, who wanted to enhance the connection between political officials and their constituents by facilitating virtual "town halls," making underrepresented voices heard and benefiting elected and appointed leaders who often struggled to collect meaningful feedback. Despite success in startup accelerator programs, challenges and complexities with government sales cycles led Sze to pivot the company multiple times, until she was selling customer service software to corporations and pondering whether she still wanted to build and sell Agora. A short financial runway meant she had to quickly decide where to invest her energy.
This is the conclusion to Agora (A), where founder Elsa Sze decides if she wants to continue investing energy in her civic technology startup. Agora was a civic technology (civic tech) startup founded by Elsa Sze, who wanted to enhance the connection between political officials and their constituents by facilitating virtual "town halls," making underrepresented voices heard and benefiting elected and appointed leaders who often struggled to collect meaningful feedback. Despite success in startup accelerator programs, challenges and complexities with government sales cycles led Sze to pivot the company multiple times, until she was selling customer service software to corporations and pondering whether she still wanted to build and sell Agora. A short financial runway meant she had to quickly decide where to invest her energy.
In 2015, the co-founders of Dating Ring, an online dating startup that relied on human matchmakers to arrange dates between its members, were deciding whether to either shut down the service or instead manage Dating Ring as a "lifestyle company," ramping down growth expectations, abandoning plans to raise more venture capital, and keeping tight control over costs. Dating Ring's founders originally aimed to achieve a billion dollar valuation, and their participation in the elite Y Combinator accelerator has stoked their ambitions. However, growth had subsequently sputtered and the founders had not been able to raise more venture capital.
In April 2020, Katerra executives struggled with a series of decisions that would determine the fate of one of the best-funded construction startups in history. Katerra was founded in 2015 by technology-industry executive Michael Marks and commercial real estate developer Fritz Wolff to "redefine the construction industry." Over the next four years, Katerra raised $2.5B in venture capital investment and grew to 7,500 employees. Focused on creating a fully integrated commercial real estate development process, Katerra built and operated factories manufacturing building components ranging from pre-fabricated wood panels to windows, acquired architecture and general contracting firms globally, and developed a series of proprietary software systems to design and manage construction projects. Management touted a project pipeline filled with eager commercial real estate developers and multifamily housing projects, but actual revenue was lacking. Katerra would soon run out of money without additional investment. Customer complaints about Katerra's ability to deliver on promised time and cost savings, coupled with the departure of one of the company's co-founders, call into question the company's strategy and Marks' leadership. Investors must decide whether the company's vision is salvageable, and if so, what steps they should take to construct a pathway to profitability.
In May 2020, SoftBank executives, having invested nearly $2 billion in Katerra, decided the vision of an end-to-end, vertically-integrated construction process was worth saving-with some major changes to company structure. The SoftBank Vision Fund invested $200 million in Katerra as part of a company restructuring in which cofounder Michael Marks stepped down as CEO, and former oil industry executive Paal Kibsgaard was promoted from chief operating officer to CEO. However, by June 2021, Katerra had initiated the bankruptcy process. Should Katerra's failure be attributed to mistakes made by the company's management team? Or did the company encounter a series of misfortunes that made it impossible to continue forward?
Six months after the August 2018 launch of Troverie, a U.S.-based online retailer of luxury watches, the average cost of acquiring a customer is much higher than originally projected, and the startup is incurring a substantial loss on each sales transaction. Could customer acquisition costs be reduced through optimization of marketing messages and channels, or did high marketing costs presage a fundamental problem with Troverie's business model? Troverie was an authorized retailer of 17 luxury watch brands, and had partnered with brick-and-mortar jewelry retailers that would drop ship the watches from their inventory in exchange for a share of Troveries's revenue. The brands were authorizing online sales for the first time, to combat "grey market" outlets that sold their watches without the manufacturer's warranty.
Resolves the questions raised in Troverie (A); recounts pivots and efforts to raise capital from strategic investors and sell Troverie; and shares the founder's post-mortem reflections on what went wrong and what he might have done differently.