In late 2014, the deputy minister of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence joined the public service, six months after Ukraine’s revolution and change of government. He joined the ministry as part of the new government’s attempt to reform a bureaucracy crippled by corruption, inefficiencies, and dysfunction. In six months, he had already made notable changes. However, by March 2015, the changes were not resulting in better outcomes where they were urgently needed—in the eastern regions, supporting a tactically and logistically crippled military that was resisting Russian attempts at incursion. What more could the deputy minister do to initiate and lead change?

In late 2014, the deputy minister of Ukraine's Ministry of Defence joined the public service, six months after Ukraine's revolution and change of government. He joined the ministry as part of the new government's attempt to reform a bureaucracy crippled by corruption, inefficiencies, and dysfunction. In six months, he had already made notable changes. However, by March 2015, the changes were not resulting in better outcomes where they were urgently needed-in the eastern regions, supporting a tactically and logistically crippled military that was resisting Russian attempts at incursion. What more could the deputy minister do to initiate and lead change?