個案總覽

Simultaneously to creating economic value, the two founders were committed to creating social value and respecting the environment. Social value stemmed from employing mostly women from the poorest segments of the population on a full-time, unlimited basis -while the industry largely employed workers on a temporary basis. Furthermore, wages, benefits, and shared decision-making created a unique organizational culture where fairness, learning, and personal development were paramount. At the same time, hydroponic technology, specialized infrastructure, and internal processes resulted in the industry's lowest environmental impact. By taking up a USD 300k bank loan, the founders had recently purchased a 25-acre lot and set up an up-to-date greenhouse. They had plans to continue growing the company and enlarging their market presence but were unsure of their business skills and if the business' cash-flows would be enough to pull this initiative through. They started looking for investors. Would investors accept their unwavering commitment to their triple bottom-line way of doing business? How would they relate to a purely business-oriented management philosophy? How could the company grow profitably and simultaneously maintain its commitment to the creation of social value without impacting their return on investment? Would the founders and the organizational culture respond satisfactorily to the severe demands of growth?

Domotec was a small company devoted to home automation in Montevideo, Uruguay. Building automation involves a set of control and automation systems that can be used in homes, buildings, offices, etc. providing services related to energy, safety, security, comfort and communications. Case A describes Domotec's history from its creation in 1994 by three partners until a day in 1999 when the partners would meet to formally make the decision to shut down. One of them, Norberto Zejerman, the case protagonist, wondered whether to keep the company and run it alone. A description of the most salient features of the industry at the time in Uruguay, as well as at regional and world levels, is also provided. Case B gives an account of industry and company performance during the 2000-2005 period, when Domotec survived the difficult 2002 crisis but failed to rake in enough sales volume. Finally, case C depicts the growth of the automation market from 2006 to 2011 and presents the dilemma faced by Zejerman presented by the fact that in 2011 alone it sold one third of the total installations the company had carried out during its 15-year history. This case series has been designed to ensure that students understand the complexity of the challenge involved in creating a venture that includes both product and market innovation, exploring the strategic decisions required. In this context, customers still have no clear understanding of the scope of the value proposition, the market gives no hint of potential meaningful segments and the company perceives that it must educate consumers in addition to selling its products.

Domotec was a small company devoted to home automation in Montevideo, Uruguay. Building automation involves a set of control and automation systems that can be used in homes, buildings, offices, etc. providing services related to energy, safety, security, comfort and communications. Case A describes Domotec's history from its creation in 1994 by three partners until a day in 1999 when the partners would meet to formally make the decision to shut down. One of them, Norberto Zejerman, the case protagonist, wondered whether to keep the company and run it alone. A description of the most salient features of the industry at the time in Uruguay, as well as at regional and world levels, is also provided. Case B gives an account of industry and company performance during the 2000-2005 period, when Domotec survived the difficult 2002 crisis but failed to rake in enough sales volume. Finally, case C depicts the growth of the automation market from 2006 to 2011 and presents the dilemma faced by Zejerman presented by the fact that in 2011 alone it sold one third of the total installations the company had carried out during its 15-year history. This case series has been designed to ensure that students understand the complexity of the challenge involved in creating a venture that includes both product and market innovation, exploring the strategic decisions required. In this context, customers still have no clear understanding of the scope of the value proposition, the market gives no hint of potential meaningful segments and the company perceives that it must educate consumers in addition to selling its products.

Domotec was a small company devoted to home automation in Montevideo, Uruguay. Building automation involves a set of control and automation systems that can be used in homes, buildings, offices, etc. providing services related to energy, safety, security, comfort and communications. Case A describes Domotec's history from its creation in 1994 by three partners until a day in 1999 when the partners would meet to formally make the decision to shut down. One of them, Norberto Zejerman, the case protagonist, wondered whether to keep the company and run it alone. A description of the most salient features of the industry at the time in Uruguay, as well as at regional and world levels, is also provided. Case B gives an account of industry and company performance during the 2000-2005 period, when Domotec survived the difficult 2002 crisis but failed to rake in enough sales volume. Finally, case C depicts the growth of the automation market from 2006 to 2011 and presents the dilemma faced by Zejerman presented by the fact that in 2011 alone it sold one third of the total installations the company had carried out during its 15-year history. This case series has been designed to ensure that students understand the complexity of the challenge involved in creating a venture that includes both product and market innovation, exploring the strategic decisions required. In this context, customers still have no clear understanding of the scope of the value proposition, the market gives no hint of potential meaningful segments and the company perceives that it must educate consumers in addition to selling its products.

Founded in 2003 in Uruguay, by 2008 Pay True Solutions had managed to become a relevant player in the Latin American industry of electronic payment solutions. The company offered two suites: PayStudio CPS, providing technological support across the entire electronic payment processing value chain, and PayStudio Risk Center, a fraud detection and prevention solution largely for credit and debit cards. Both suites had been installed at renowned regional companies and boasted excellent reviews in the low-sophistication client segment. The segment encompassing larger clients was characterized by more sophisticated fraud attacks and, as a result, required solutions featuring neuronal models, which PayTrue did not offer. In addition, the software development projects sold by PayTrue had grown increasingly complex dedicating an important part of the internal resources; interestingly, the company generally managed to deliver on time and within budget, unlike some of their competitors. Would the company be able to manage the expected growth in both, products and projects? Was their mixed business model sustainable? And, considering their products, should they go for the bigger and more sophisticated clients? Were the risks of a higher level of investment in innovation worthwhile?