In April 2022, Amita Deshpande, a co-founder of reCharkha EcoSocial Private Limited (reCharkha), was reflecting on the future of her social enterprise during a return flight from a sustainable-development conference. For seven years, the Pune, India–based start-up had utilized labour-intensive upcycling to tackle critical issues such as plastic pollution, environmental degradation, and rural unemployment. Despite receiving accolades for her company’s work, Deshpande now faced a pressing challenge: how to scale the enterprise financially while remaining true to its social mission of environmental conservation and rural empowerment. Rising competition and high production costs limited reCharkha’s ability to expand into new markets. Thus, Deshpande needed to explore strategic options to enhance revenue, reduce costs, and increase market reach without compromising on the core values of sustainability and community impact. Balancing these competing priorities, Deshpande contemplated the start-up’s next steps to ensure its long-term growth and mission-driven success.
On April 23, 2020, Franklin Templeton India Mutual Fund (FT) shocked investors by winding up six of its debt mutual fund schemes, amounting to assets under management of INR 267.79 billion, with over 300000 investors. The decision was based on the liquidity squeeze in the financial markets as COVID-19 forced the world, including India, into lockdown. FT was facing redemption pressures it could no longer meet without making distress sales of its underlying investments. The management deemed a distress sale to be far more detrimental to investor interests than freezing their investments in the fund. The question arises if there were other compelling reasons that brought FT to this unfortunate decision.
In September 2017, news spread of McDonald’s India terminating its franchise arrangement with its joint venture (JV) in India. The termination notice was the newest step in the saga of the conflict between the two JV partners—US-based McDonald’s and the Indian partner Vikram Bakshi of Connaught Plaza Restaurants Limited (CPRL). McDonald’s entered India in 1996 through a JV that was originally seen as the perfect combination to share investments, reduce risks, and succeed. The events between 2013 and 2017 showed that this was not true, and many reasons were suggested in the media for the problems—strategy, team, resources, and a mismatched value system. Did the former franchise holder CPRL have a legal right to use the McDonald’s name anymore? Could the partners resolve their differences?
India’s Economic Survey 2016–17 proposed a gradual implementation of the concept of universal basic income (UBI) as the fastest way of providing a long-term solution to poverty. Large-scale inequality and poverty, along with huge misallocation and wastages in the existing welfare schemes, made India a perfect ground for experimenting with UBI. Though the rapid expansion of Jan Dhan–Aadhaar–Mobile infrastructure was expected to smoothen the execution of UBI in India, there were looming concerns about implementation of the program, fiscal feasibility, and the questionable effectiveness of UBI’s impact on poverty alleviation.
Swadhaar FinServe Private Limited (Swadhaar), a non-banking financial company–microfinance institution (NBFC-MFI), was set up in Mumbai, India in 2008 with the objective of providing the urban poor with increased access to financial services. Swadhaar was a leading provider of financial services to clients in several major states of India. Between 2009 and 2013, there were major changes in the regulatory environment; some of these restricted the scope of MFIs and others opened new business opportunities. Although Swadhaar was able to reach financial sustainability with its existing business model, its founder was always looking at growth strategies to achieve her mission. In late 2014, RBL Bank Ltd. offered to become a strategic investor in Swadhaar. In early 2015, Swadhaar’s founder needed to decide whether or not to accept RBL Bank Ltd.’s proposal.
In early 2015, the chief executive officer and the management team of Groupon India, a subsidiary of U.S.-based Groupon Inc., faced a management buyout decision. Buoyed by a high growth rate and huge market potential in India, they wanted more India-specific product positioning and greater control over technology. They explored growth options available to the company, but faced the constraints of being part of a global conglomerate. The management team had narrowed its options to either starting a new venture or acquiring ownership of the subsidiary through a management buyout. How could they ensure they made the right decision?
This exercise revolves around the rivalry between two financial analysts. Upset by their constant game of one-upmanship, an advisor to the governor of the Reserve Bank of India came up with a challenge for them to prove who was better. He provided them with financial data for the financial year ending March 2014 from 10 anonymous companies and asked them to match the financial data with specific industries given in a list. The challenge was timed, and the winner was to be determined on the basis of who could come up with the right combination first.
Amarnath Gupta and Sons was a distributor of lubricants and owner of a petrol pump based in Alwar, Rajasthan, India. The business was originally set up as a family-owned single petrol pump in 1953. The family member currently in charge of daily operations had expanded the business significantly, especially since the entry of new multinational players in the Indian lubricant market. In 2013, this owner-partner was looking at ways to involve his children—one of whom had finished college (a son), one of whom was in college (a daughter), and one of whom was about to start college (a son)—in the family business. Should three businesses be established for each of the three children, or should they all be part of the same business? How could the next generation enter the business successfully? This case won the 2015 ISB-Ivey Global Case Competition in the entrepreneurship category. The ISB-Ivey case competition was sponsored by ISB.
On June 13, 2013, an online news portal reported on a press conference at which India’s finance minister urged Indians to refrain from buying gold. India was facing a huge economic challenge. Its account deficit had hit a record high of 6.7 per cent of its gross domestic product. This increase was attributed to rising gold imports and was a major cause of concern for the Indian finance minister and the governor of the Reserve Bank of India, India’s central bank. This crisis raised some questions that had come up before: Why was gold such an obsession in India? Why was it seen as a good investment? How could the country’s financial leaders address this situation?