In 2020, Henrique Dubugras and Pedro Franceschi, co-founders and co-CEO's of the fintech company Brex, needed to determine how to balance their vision with the desires of their investors. They intended to expand Brex's offerings to include other products that served the financial needs of their startup, but some of their investors believed the focus should be on improving existing features to meet customer base needs. While Dubugras and Franceschi oversaw development of existing products and considered new ones, they were also trying to raise a Series D round from the same investors who voiced concerns on expansion. How should they balance their vision of a one-stop financial shop for businesses, with the investors' desire to be cautious and offer features to keep up with the competition?

The Dutch company Adyen was founded in 2006 to provide online merchants with smooth online payments, regardless of currency, country, or payment method. Its services had attracted large online merchants, which struggled to reconcile different payment methods across countries. Adyen's technology made online payments easier, and faster, and with increased online payment transaction success rates. In 2013, Adyen started providing point-of-sale payment devices to stores and became attractive to companies with store networks. Multinational enterprises with online and offline sales channels, such as the sportswear Nike and the fashion firm H&M, were those that appreciated Adyen's services the most. However, since 2018, Adyen had tried to attract the mid-market with little success. Adyen's management was analyzing different strategies to reach out to such a segment.

This case addresses the events that took place following the conclusion of the case "Facebook's Libra (A): The Privatization of Money?" In October 2019, several months after the conclusion of the A case, multiple members of the Libra Association announced that they were leaving the project. Observers speculated that the departures were due to Libra's inability to meet regulatory scrutiny. Nevertheless, the Libra Association formed a board and formalized its governance structure with 21 founding members. Through the remainder of 2019 and 2020, Libra made significant changes to its product in an attempt to win regulatory approval. It also changed its name to Diem to distance itself from the controversies surrounding the original Libra product. By December 2020, the proposed cryptocurrency was a stablecoin pegged to the U.S. dollar. The Diem Association planned to launch the new currency in early 2021; however, it had yet to secure regulatory approval, even as political skepticism toward the product endured.

In June 2020, XP and Itaú faced intensified competition and tension in their partnership, with the latter owning a minority stake at XP. Two years earlier, in May 2017, Itaú had announced it would acquire 49.9% of XP for $1.8 billion, followed by three additional stages leading to company control. Yet in August 2018, Brazil's Central Bank, partially barred the deal, stating Itaú could become a minority shareholder. Tensions surfaced as soon as the deal was formalized, with both companies engaging in public attacks across several marketing campaigns, with Itaú estimated to lose around $27 million a day to XP from client migration. Moreover, XP faced increased competition from emerging investment platforms that were gaining ground in Brazil´s market. By mid-2020, XP´s financial results had skyrocketed, taking in $190 million in net income and $743 million in total revenues. As Guilherme Benchimol, XP´s CEO, looks ahead, he must define what strategies they should pursue to achieve further growth, considering competitive forces and market opportunities at hand.

XP, an investment platform, was on the verge of defining whether to do an IPO or selling off a majority stake to Itaú Unibanco, Brazil´s largest financial conglomerate. Under the leadership of Guilherme Benchimol, XP´s co-founder and CEO, XP had risen to become the largest independent investment platform in Brazil in 2017, reshaping the country's financial investment landscape by marketing itself as a "financial supermarket." The company offered digital seamless investment alternatives at low fees, pioneering a model leveraged across a wide network of independent financial advisors and disrupting a market dominated by large incumbent banks. By late 2016, XP raked in $71 million in net income, boasting over 340,000 clients and $20 billion in assets under custody. In turn, Itaú recorded $415 billion in total assets and net profits above $6.7 billion in 2016, serving over 55 million clients. Benchimol believed the game was just starting: Brazil presented an enormous market opportunity to offer more financial services to millions of new investment clients, but future growth would require additional funding. By the end of 2016, Brazil´s stock market began to show signs of recovery after a two-year performance slump, enticing XP to go public. Yet, Martin Escobari-an XP board member and partner at General Atlantic, the firm that owned 49% of the company by then-felt XP should explore the possibility of finding a potential buyer for XP, shortlisting Itaú among candidates. Although Benchimol openly criticized Brazil´s top banks and their treatment of clients, he realized Itaú´s privileged market position could provide XP with more credibility and, ultimately, more clients. Did it make sense to sell XP to Brazil´s biggest bank? Or should XP go public?

The case opens in 2019 as Raja Al Mazrouei, executive vice president of FinTech Hive (the Hive) at the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), the first and largest financial technology accelerator in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia region, contemplates her and the Hive's option to support the fintech ecosystem in Dubai as the accelerated startups face funding challenges in the market. The case chronicles Al Mazrouei's efforts to set up the Hive in 2016 to create a fintech ecosystem in the region in line with the Kingdom's National Agenda to help financial institutions engage with technology to remain relevant to the region's evolving customer and market needs. The case provides a detailed overview of the model the Hive was based on and its growth story that led the Hive to rank as the 10th largest Global Fintech Hub and the 3rd biggest Global Islamic Fintech Hub in 2019. Having successfully "graduated" two classes of startups, in 2019 the Hive had signed partnerships with accelerators and incubators around the world and had announced a $100 million dedicated fund to support fintech companies globally. Yet, Al Mazrouei knew that she had just scratched the surface and there was a lot to be done. The investment mentality in the region was still quite conservative, and there were only a few venture capital funds and angel investors were virtually non-existent. The continued success of the startups depended on their access to funding and Al Mazrouei was concerned about the Hive's ability to support the increasing number of fintech startups the Hive had lured to Dubai. One such startup that had successfully graduated from the Hive's 2018 accelerator program was in the market raising funds. Would they succeed? Would the Hive's funds be enough to encourage VCs, financial institutions, and angel investors to join in and invest in early-stage fintech startups to keep them going?