As the 1998-99 school year began in the state of Kerala, India, state education officials were setting out to bring radical change to government schools. A new approach-designed to be child-friendly and to de-emphasize rote learning and textbook-based teacher lectures in favor of "guided learning and playful interaction"-would, in the words of Education Secretary K. Jayakumar, be no less than "an affirmation of the rights of the child." But as the extension of the so-called District Primary Education Program (DPEP) began to reach all school districts in Kerala, the approach was embroiled in controversy. The leader of the political opposition called for it to be halted. Newly-organized protest groups, charged that reform threatened to dilute education standards and create two tiers of Kerala students. It would fall to Mr. Jayakumar and other state officials to convince the public that the DPEP plan was best for the nearly three million school children of Kerala. Their task required officials to defend the concept of the program, even as they continued to oversee the details of its implementation. The approach they chose would leave some convinced that DPEP had been successfully institutionalized in Kerala, while some of the reform's strongest proponents believed that DPEP had been profoundly compromised. HKS Case Number 1573.0

In the early 1980s, The Ford Foundation, among other funders, help create a new type of organization designed to finance the renewal of older, inner city neighborhoods, both through housing renovation and other investments. The Local Initiatives Support Corporation will not undertake projects itself but, instead, will serve as a sort of bank, choosing among proposals submitted by nonprofit development entities. But LISC was by no means making no-strings-attached grants. Instead, it wanted to assure itself -- and those providing its capital -- that it was getting a return on its investment. When a team of consultants is called in to measure LISC's return on investment, it must first consider how such a return might even be defined. Should LISC consider only financial data as regards the repayment of the loans it makes? Or should it consider the catalyzing effects of the organizations it supports on their surrounding neighborhoods? How or should such effects be measured? HKS Case Number 1370.0

This case focuses on the contractual relationship between a state's office charged with forestalling child abuse and neglect and one non-profit provider of social services for those purposes. The case points out the reasons the state of Massachusetts decided to contract for services and how it chose to define that contractual relationship. At the same time, the case also allows for discussion of whether the non-profit provider La Alianza Hispana would be well-advised to take on the work proffered by the state, given its organizational mission and capacity. Ultimately, the final part of the case reveals the disastrous end to which the Massachusetts-Alianza contract led. [See also High Stakes and Frightening Lapses: DSS, La Alianza Hispana and the Public-Private Question in Child Protection Work (C16-94-1265.0).]

During his successful 1991 bid for the indianapolis mayoralty, Stephen Goldsmith is clear about his preference for privatizing city services. Once in office, however, Goldsmith decides on a different, more complex approach. The inefficiency of publicly-provided services, he reflects, may not be the result of their being public but rather a reflection of the lack of competition over who will provide them. In that light, Goldsmith undertakes a bold experiment: to force city departments to bid against private providers. This case focuses on the first stages of the Goldsmith experiment, a time in which city public works crews must, for the first time, compete against private firms for a pothole repair contract. The case raises core questions as to how to structure public-private competitions to ensure that valid comparison will be possible, as well as how to determine the exact nature of public costs. In addition, it allows for discussion of more theoretical questions as to whether some functions must always be public, while others should be private and still others privately-provided but publicly-financed. HKS Case Number 1270.0

During his successful 1991 bid for the indianapolis mayoralty, Stephen Goldsmith is clear about his preference for privatizing city services. Once in office, however, Goldsmith decides on a different, more complex approach. The inefficiency of publicly-provided services, he reflects, may not be the result of their being public but rather a reflection of the lack of competition over who will provide them. In that light, Goldsmith undertakes a bold experiment: to force city departments to bid against private providers. This case focuses on the first stages of the Goldsmith experiment, a time in which city public works crews must, for the first time, compete against private firms for a pothole repair contract. The case raises core questions as to how to structure public-private competitions to ensure that valid comparison will be possible, as well as how to determine the exact nature of public costs. In addition, it allows for discussion of more theoretical questions as to whether some functions must always be public, while others should be private and still others privately-provided but publicly-financed. HKS Case Number 1270.1

Whether as analyst or deputy director at the federal Office of Management and Budget, or as the chief executive of Alcoa, Paul O'Neill has sought to inspire those working for him to approach their tasks with vision and without preconceptions. In considering how he has applied disciplined, analytical techniques to different organizations, O'Neill dismisses the assertion of significant distinctions between the public and private sectors.