Launched in May 2013, Patreon was the leading subscription-based platform in the online crowdfunding market. For over five years, the company operated successfully and expanded its large base of artists and content providers (known as “creators” on Patreon) and their fans and contributors (known as “patrons” on the platform). Patreon charged its content creators a standard 5 per cent fee, plus transaction costs, offering the artists over 90 per cent of the crowdfunded amounts. However, the founder and chief executive officer of Patreon realized that the company could not survive by maintaining the current uniform pricing and services structure. Patreon had to develop a set of more advanced tools to attract new content creators to the platform and enhance the experience of the contributing patrons. Patreon had to revise its pricing strategy to pay for the development of new services, grow its customer base, and improve the company’s profitability.
Launched in May 2013, Patreon was the leading subscription-based platform in the online crowdfunding market. For over five years, the company operated successfully and expanded its large base of artists and content providers (known as "creators" on Patreon) and their fans and contributors (known as "patrons" on the platform). Patreon charged its content creators a standard 5 per cent fee, plus transaction costs, offering the artists over 90 per cent of the crowdfunded amounts. However, the founder and chief executive officer of Patreon realized that the company could not survive by maintaining the current uniform pricing and services structure. Patreon had to develop a set of more advanced tools to attract new content creators to the platform and enhance the experience of the contributing patrons. Patreon had to revise its pricing strategy to pay for the development of new services, grow its customer base, and improve the company's profitability.
The Canadian brand manager of Zelboraf had to decide how to introduce and price Zelboraf in the Canadian market. Zelboraf was a breakthrough discovery in treatment for melanoma cancer patients. Hoffmann-La Roche (Roche) began developing Zelboraf in 2005. During the clinical trials, the drug yielded such positive results in targeting late-stage (metastatic) melanoma cancer that Roche ended clinical trials early in order to expedite FDA approval and market launch. A competitor was developing a drug—Dabrafenib—that targeted the same segment of patients with B-RAF genes. It was unclear if this specific market segment could support two similar products. It was also unclear whether Dabrafenib’s Canadian market launch would affect the likelihood that Zelboraf got on the approved drug list to secure government reimbursement. The brand manager and her team also needed to determine the right price point for Zelboraf. Roche had to set a price that ensured profitability, but did not compromise Zelboraf’s competitive position.
The Canadian brand manager of Zelboraf had to decide how to introduce and price Zelboraf in the Canadian market. Zelboraf was a breakthrough discovery in treatment for melanoma cancer patients. Hoffmann-La Roche (Roche) began developing Zelboraf in 2005. During the clinical trials, the drug yielded such positive results in targeting late-stage (metastatic) melanoma cancer that Roche ended clinical trials early in order to expedite FDA approval and market launch. A competitor was developing a drug-Dabrafenib-that targeted the same segment of patients with B-RAF genes. It was unclear if this specific market segment could support two similar products. It was also unclear whether Dabrafenib's Canadian market launch would affect the likelihood that Zelboraf got on the approved drug list to secure government reimbursement. The brand manager and her team also needed to determine the right price point for Zelboraf. Roche had to set a price that ensured profitability, but did not compromise Zelboraf's competitive position.
In January 2014, the chief executive officer of AutoTherm, a small smart-thermostat design company located in Toronto, Canada, was considering the company’s future in light of the uncertainties and fast changing dynamics of the industry. As an incumbent and small engineering firm, AutoTherm’s plans to sell its first product, B133, through partnership with a large electronics company had not been quite successful. Given the dire state of the company’s financial resources, how can AutoTherm be rescued and go forward?
In January 2014, the chief executive officer of AutoTherm, a small smart-thermostat design company located in Toronto, Canada, was considering the company's future in light of the uncertainties and fast changing dynamics of the industry. As an incumbent and small engineering firm, AutoTherm's plans to sell its first product, B133, through partnership with a large electronics company had not been quite successful. Given the dire state of the company's financial resources, how can AutoTherm be rescued and go forward?
Employees are faced each day with important decisions that they need to make, which force them to evaluate potential benefits and risks and act accordingly. Organizations depend on the successful decisions that business leaders make. Unfortunately, business students do not spend as much time as they should studying decision-making risk and how to evaluate it. Recent organizational failures, such as the collapse of Enron and Lehman Brothers, exhibit a fundamental lack of understanding.<br><br>Decision-making risk (DMR) is, quite simply, the risk associated with making a decision. With each decision, there are risk variables that interact with one another to create an overall risk profile. It is this interaction that is arguably under-observed in business schools. Furthermore, it is contended that a lack of focus on this interaction often leads to poor decision-making.<br><br>In this note, we use the Bear Stearns collapse and the Maple Leaf Foods listeria outbreak as timely examples of miscalculated decision-making risk. After examining these cases, it is quite clear that the associated risks in both were quite high. This raises a number of questions. Why didn’t the decision-makers at the time realize the risks that their organizations were facing? How can business leaders learn from these failures to ensure similar mistakes are not made in the future? In particular, this note was written to answer the question: Is there a comprehensive framework that can be used to assess decision-making risk?
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. For too long, people have made unwarranted but detrimental assumptions about pricing. Changing prices, for example, has been looked on as an easy, quick, and reversible process, and new technologies have only reinforced that way of thinking. Similarly, extracting value from a product by pricing it correctly has been seen as relatively uncomplicated; the hard part is creating the valuable product in the first place. But these dismissive attitudes toward pricing miss the mark. Pricing is complex, and it's only growing more so as new tools and techniques become available. The ability to set the right price at the right time, any time--the very definition of a pricing capability--is also becoming increasingly important. In fact, in the course of working with dozens of companies in the past couple of years, the authors have spoken with several executives who believe that developing a pricing capability is essential to their business' survival. And they are backing up their views by investing in three areas: human capital, systems capital, and social capital. The authors explain the nature of these investments and how they come together to form a pricing capability that competitors will have a hard time imitating. Building such a capability requires an effort that some companies may not be in a position to undertake. Those that do take a comprehensive approach, however, can make superior pricing decisions that fit with their positioning, customers, suppliers, and evolving market conditions for years to come.