Initially, the dilemma seemed to be centered on how to respond to the bad news about delayed building renovations due to government red tape, which would continue to have a negative impact on the museum. However, this was a mere symptom of the real dilema of how to further develop an institution within a society lacking institutions or with very weak institutions. The case then proceeds to outline the major periods in the museum's institutional development: Building a Past: 1954-1968 The museum was founded within a specific social and historical context which served as the foundation from which later developments emerged. Its mission was identified, a network of trustees was established, the building was secured, and perhaps most importantly, its permanent collection was acquired. Storm and Stress: 1968-1993 Major benefactors suffered economically, left the country, or both. In the 1980s, political violence and economic instability added to the challenges. During this time, the museum adapted itself to the context. Starving for revenues, it offered art classes, which contributed to its economic survival (at worst), and enabled it to achieve a modicum of self-sufficiency (at best). MALI´s Rise and Institutional Questioning: 1993-2002 The museum began to emerge in fuller form in the 1990s under the leadership of Walter Piazza, drawing support from a younger generation. In parallel with the country's rising fortunes, the museum began to broaden its support and diversify its revenues. In addition, foreign companies joined in to sponsor activities. Institutional Strengthening and the Next Five Years: 2003-2013 New activities were started and the museum gradually revived, culminating in its rebranding as MALI. However, this institutionalization process occurred within a healthy economic context. With a slowdown on the horizon and its potential subsequent pressures, would MALI as an institution be able to withstand the strain?

On February 23, 2012, a special commission appointed by Peru's Labor Ministry submitted a technical report on how to consolidate the country's national labor regulations into a single law, as had been done in other Latin American countries. The commission was known as the National Council for Labor and Employment Promotion (CNTPE, in Spanish) and was responsible for drafting the new law. The goal of the report was to engage business associations, unions, non-profit organizations focused on labor issues, and Government stakeholders in order to rekindle an initiative that had started a decade earlier but had lost momentum. Instead of bringing the sides together, however, drafting of the new law had ended up widening the gap between stakeholders. How should such a consensus be built? Should labor rights be increased or reduced? What role should each key stakeholder play?

On Friday, May 24, 2013, Peru's President, Ollanta Humala Tasso, had one week left to decide whether he would finally sign into law a bill that had fueled a heated debate among the nation's public and private sectors for nearly 18 months. Commonly known as the "Junk Food Act," the proposal stirred as many passions as the country's cuisine, which itself had risen to global prominence, alongside Peru's steady economic growth. The law's enactment would force thousands of Peruvian kiosks and school cafeterias to change their offerings, doing away with processed foods, while advertising of these goods to children would require revision. Many feared -while others hoped- that Humala would sign the bill. Multiple stakeholders -producers, retailers, advertisers, trade associations, the press, politicians, and the government- spent the weekend with unanswered questions on their minds. On Monday, they would need to revisit their positions, clarifying their arguments and assessing the bill's legal and ethical ramifications, in order to prepare a strategic response to Humala's decision, uncertain as they were of whether he would sign the bill. There was a lot of food for thought.

Starting in 2007 Milwaukee leaders from different areas (large established companies, civic organizations, public sector, academia, and entrepreneurs) negotiated a path for converting the region into a global water hub to address economic and environmental concerns. The leaders with various stakes in the change managed to work together to re-arrange and support existing pieces to maximize the collective potential. Their actions exemplified "advanced leadership" in a complex social system such as a community or region. There was no central leader; instead there was a collection of coalitions and collaborative activities that contributed to the end result.

The CEO of a private and growing national network of specialty care hospitals focusing on advanced-stage and complex cancer treatments reflects on the firm's past phase of growth before meeting with the company's Chairman and founder to discuss how to further scale what they call the Mother Standard of Care and, in the process, change the face of cancer care.

A new CEO steps into the shoes of his long-serving predecessor who had created the U.S. telecommunications giant via a series of acquisitions and, before departing, had initiated the company's strategic repositioning. The new CEO reflects on Verizon's recent successes, some of which he led, and considered how to ensure the team would continue to rise to new challenges. He knew change was both energizing and difficult and that every victory had to be followed by the next play. He paused in his New York City office to think about how his team handled recent challenges and whether the culture was in place to continue Verizon's transformation from a traditional telecommunications provider to a global services and technology firm.

After 18 months as the deputy managing director of a global technology company's Russia subsidiary, a young and upcoming French executive prepared to hand over leadership. The executive reflected on what he had achieved and how as he considered next steps. He wanted to return to his native France, but the company requested that he go turn around another emerging market subsidiary. Should he go to India, ask for another assignment, or look at other opportunities outside the company?

After several months into his turnaround of a global technology company's Russia subsidiary, a young and upcoming French executive reflected on how to institutionalize the subsidiary's transformation by further driving cultural change and breaking down internal silos. He realized that to complete the change he may need to continue into a second year. Yet the physical separation from his family had begun to take a toll. Had the executive done enough to institutionalize change or was it still too dependent on his personal relationships and the ability to build an internal coalition and exchange favors?

A young and upcoming French executive in a global technology company is sent to Moscow as deputy managing director to turn around the Russia subsidiary. He must report to the subsidiary's managing director (a large reason for the organization's underperformance) and to corporate. In his first three months, he took steps to prepare the organization for change. Yet the lack of more tangible actions and results leaves him open to criticism from subsidiary employees and pressure from corporate executives. How can the young executive unfreeze the situation and get movement?

Jorge Tarasuk, VP of Operations and Supply Chain for PepsiCo South America Foods, and his team had worked for 10 years to realize their dream of creating an agro research center in Peru that could provide more productive and healthier varieties of potatoes for the Frito-Lay businesses in PepsiCo's tropical regions, including Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Thailand, and Vietnam, where much of its future growth would come. They were denied several times but kept the idea alive through other projects until conditions presented themselves. But now that they had secured initial funding for the center, the hard work would begin.