In 2014, seven years after he was appointed CEO of the Danish shipping and oil conglomerate A.P. Møller Maersk (the Maersk Group), Nils Andersen was reexamining the size and role of corporate headquarters in the company he had reshaped as a "premium conglomerate." During his tenure, Andersen had divided what had previously been operated as almost a single entity into separate lines of business, each accountable for its own performance and expected to deal at arms-length with its "sister" businesses, while substantially reducing the size and functions of the corporate headquarters. But as the business units (BUs) and corporate headquarters adjusted to their new roles, new issues surfaced.
In May 2012, Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) founded edX, a new non-profit joint venture that would provide a platform for massive open online courses (MOOCs). edX did not produce original courses or instructional content-it made a web platform through which Harvard and MIT, and subsequently dozens more "partner" universities, could offer their lecture courses as MOOCs. While the future role of MOOCs in higher education remained a topic of public debate, edX needed to answer concrete managerial and strategic questions. For example, what should edX's scope be? Should edX try to develop a consumer brand of its own, or rely on the brands of its partners? And how could edX monetize its services to recoup Harvard and MIT's investments and reward participating universities? This case presented the history of edX and the online education market as background for a discussion about edX's strategic choices.
Tapestry Networks assembled industry leaders and their regulators in small, private meetings to build new frameworks for pressing regulatory challenges. Tapestry's motivating principle was to reimagine solutions to complex problems (e.g., drug-approval standards) in ways that created a win-win for firms and society. Tapestry meetings on bank-governance standards-initiated after the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis-had experienced some success in rebuilding trust between regulators and banks. But, five years on, the initiative faced important challenges. First, as the urgency of the Financial Crisis faded, it was becoming more difficult to show concrete successes, particularly to the meetings' sponsors-one participant described Tapestry as "sculpting fog." Second, participants differed on what they wanted to get out of the meetings-with some participants less focused on the meetings' broader social objectives. Third, Tapestry faced lingering questions about the meetings' legitimacy and whether they facilitated greater "coziness" between regulators and the regulated.
In July 2012, Michael Dell, CEO and founder of Dell, Inc., met with a representative of Silver Lake Partners to explore taking his company private. The company, which he had founded in his dorm room as a college freshman and which had made him the youngest Fortune 500 CEO in history, had been the market leader in PC sales in the early 2000s. In recent years, however, the company had been surpassed by competitors and, worse, the PC market was becoming less lucrative, due to overseas competition, longer turnover rates on PCs, and the rise of tablets and smartphones. Michael Dell hoped to respond to by changing shifting the company form its core to a "new Dell" based around "Enterprise Solutions and Software" (such as servers, consulting, and software-as-a-service) and now claimed he needed to take the company private to do so. By the summer of 2013, the Dell board and its shareholders would have to decide whether to accept his offer to take the company private for $13.65 a share. Meanwhile, Carl Icahn bought a large stake in Dell Inc., accused Dell of trying to steal the company, and urged shareholders to rebel and demand a "leveraged recapitalization" instead. This case presents the information the Dell board worked with as it debated its decision.
Explores the decision faced by AIG's board on whether to join shareholder and ex-CEO Maurice Greenberg's lawsuit against the U.S. government. The suit, argued by super-lawyer David Boies (of Bush v. Gore and California gay marriage fame), claims that in September 2008 the U.S. arbitrarily set aside the rights of AIG's shareholders - violating the Fifth Amendment by taking private property without just compensation - while preserving shareholder rights in other troubled financial institutions, including Goldman Sachs whose ex-CEO was then Treasury Secretary. The U.S. government moves to dismiss the case arguing that it has wide discretion in times of crisis, but a federal judge allows the suit to proceed. The case raises two issues central to understanding capitalism: (1) the importance of and limits to property rights; and (2) the role of the state in choosing between varieties of capitalism, here between oligarchic and entrepreneurial capitalism.
Two lost decades later, capitalism in Japan embodies peculiar contradictions-preserving wealth and social stability in the face of declining economic power. Scant transparency in Japanese corporate practices plays an important role in this phenomenon. Sometimes justified as an embodiment of Japanese culture, the opacity of Japanese corporations is credited with empowering managers to make long-term business decisions that preserve employment and business relationships and maintain social harmony. But opacity also facilitates fraud and corruption, which erode investor confidence and stifle risk-taking. A flamboyant politician, Kotaro Tamura, attempts to raise public awareness around these tensions, but his provocative style earns him few friends in Japan's conservative political establishment.
What should business leaders do about corruption? In December 2011, four HBS alumni met to debate how to engage the unprecedented protests against Vladimir Putin's corrupt government, which had erupted in Russia in response to alleged fraud in the recent parliamentary elections. A notable figure in the protests was anti-corruption blogger Alexey Navalny. Navalny used publicly available requests for tender, "crowd-sourcing", and volunteer experts to discover, expose, and encourage prosecution of corrupt dealings by the Russian government. These efforts made Navalny a cause celebre in Western media, and a popular figure with Russia's tech-savvy population. But was Navalny the right figure for business leaders in Russia to organize around? What were the risks of getting involved with a politically volatile activist?
With China shifting toward a consumer-led growth model, non-bank lending has a critical role to play, but how easy is it to do business in this sector? What are the promises and pitfalls of the industry, and how well is Zane Wang, the case protagonist, navigating them?
Why is a U.S. solar technology firm manufacturing in China instead of the U.S.? Chuck Provini faces this question not just from the market, but also from the U.S. government. This case examines the making of a new joint venture in China at a time when both the U.S. and Chinese governments are eager to expand and develop their clean tech sectors.
After its founding in the late 1980s, Cree Inc. quickly grew into a major player in the emerging LED market. By 2007, technological improvements in LEDs had made them suitable for TV, computer, and mobile "backlighting"; and concerns over global warning led to calls to shift to more energy-efficient sources of general lighting (which favored LEDs, as they were far more efficient than the traditionally-dominant incandescents). In this context, Cree faced a strategic conundrum: Should it focus on its historical expertise in manufacturing LED "chips" and components for use in other manufacturers' applications and screens, where LEDs now had established usage? Or should it instead attempt the risky venture of manufacturing its own LED light-bulbs for direct sale to consumers for general lighting? This case presents the history of Cree and information on the LED and general-lighting markets, as background for a debate on Cree's strategic choice.