How can companies develop and maintain global supply chain networks that are robust - that is, capable of maintaining an uninterrupted flow of goods and materials - when confronted with a geographically spreading disruption that could cause the shutdown of multiple suppliers at once? To answer this question, this article combines an empirical analysis of supply chain networks of three global automotive manufacturers with computational experiments. The results reveal that even when a small fraction of buyers adopt regionalizing supplier-selection practices - those in which a buyer chooses geographically proximate suppliers, whether to the buyer or its current suppliers - the supply chain network becomes more robust.
Indus Towers, the world's largest telecom tower company, is a joint venture between three telecom rivals in India. These rivals-Bharti Airtel, Vodafone India, and Idea Cellular-combined their telecom towers to provide "shared telecom infrastructure" to wireless telecom operators on a nondiscriminatory basis. The CEO has transformed Indus from a struggling startup with a monopolistic mindset into a customer-centric organization. He now wants to grow Indus. To achieve this, however, he needs to reconcile conflicting objectives among Indus's shareholders. All three shareholders are also his customers; often these dual roles engender different perspectives and lead to different requirements. The CEO needs to determine how to convince the board to take a decision that keeps Indus's best interests in mind while balancing the operators' interests.
This article highlights several important dimensions of planning for exit from strategic alliances and also offers several examples of the disastrous consequences of inadequate exit-planning. While many companies fall into the trap of having no exit plan, other companies take too simple a planning approach, wondering if the exit will be unconditionally easy or hard. A more effective approach involves questions such as "When should the exit be easy and when should it be hard? And for which partner?" The article develops a framework that stipulates contingency-specific exit provisions for each partner in the alliance-specifically, situations in which exit should be symmetric and easy for both partners, symmetric and hard for both partners, or asymmetric, hard for one partner and easy for the other. Furthermore, many alliances today reflect complex deals that cover several distinct developmental stages, each of which contains a distinct set of contingencies. Such alliances require a dynamic application of the exit framework, wherein each stage of the alliance development entails a different set of exit provisions, and exit from one stage would signify the beginning of the next.