For more than 70 years, beginning in 1929, one party-the Party of Institutional Revolution, known by its Spanish initials PRI-dominated political life in Mexico, at all levels of government. But when Vicente Fox, a candidate of the rival National Action Party (PAN) won the presidency in 2000, change rippled through the country's overall political structure. This case tells the story of the emergence of competitive elections at the municipal level-in particular, one municipality emblematic of larger change. In describing the change in political life in Chignahuapan, a jurisdiction of some 50,000 in the Sierra Norte mountains northeast of Mexico City, the case frames the question of whether electoral change can lead to sustainable reform of local government. It is a question which arises when, surprisingly, a reform-minded PAN administration gains power in the locality in February 2002-and proceeds to change both administrative processes (opening meetings of the local Council for the first time) and moving generally toward transparency and improved local services. The reform administration, was, however, limited by law to just one term-thus, posing the central question of the case: in what ways can a reform administration seek to ensure that the changes it initiates will not be transitory? HKS Case Number 1841.0

For more than 70 years, beginning in 1929, one party-the Party of Institutional Revolution, known by its Spanish initials PRI-dominated political life in Mexico, at all levels of government. But when Vicente Fox, a candidate of the rival National Action Party (PAN) won the presidency in 2000, change rippled through the country's overall political structure. This case tells the story of the emergence of competitive elections at the municipal level-in particular, one municipality emblematic of larger change. In describing the change in political life in Chignahuapan, a jurisdiction of some 50,000 in the Sierra Norte mountains northeast of Mexico City, the case frames the question of whether electoral change can lead to sustainable reform of local government. It is a question which arises when, surprisingly, a reform-minded PAN administration gains power in the locality in February 2002-and proceeds to change both administrative processes (opening meetings of the local Council for the first time) and moving generally toward transparency and improved local services. The reform administration, was, however, limited by law to just one term-thus, posing the central question of the case: in what ways can a reform administration seek to ensure that the changes it initiates will not be transitory? HKS Case Number 1841.1

In November 1998, Jan Kasl, a successful architect and erstwhile city councilor, was his party's surprise choice for mayor of Prague, the capital city of the Czech Republic. A virtual political unknown, Kasl was chosen for the post only after the presiding mayor was rejected by the other political parties in negotiations to form a coalition government. Given Kasl's inexperience and low profile, most observers assumed he would be a quiet figurehead, following in his predecessor's footsteps and toeing the party line. Kasl, however, had different ideas. While a relative newcomer to government, Kasl had long been frustrated by what he viewed as the opaqueness of city operations, and angered by suspected abuses by those in power. Soon after his appointment, Kasl vowed to do his best to open up municipal government and stop the conflicts of interest, lack of accountability, and questionable deals he believed had damaged the image and effectiveness of City Hall. To do so, though, he would have to figure out how to overcome significant institutional and political obstacles without causing a political backlash that could stymie all progress, or even force him from office. Is it better for a leader with a reform agenda to confront antagonists-and rely on public support to force change? Or would a behind-the-scenes, coalition-building strategy be the more pragmatic and effective? Or does successful reform borrow from both approaches? In addition to these leadership issues, this case provides a window into the political life of post-socialist Eastern Europe-the so-called "New Europe"-and provides a vehicle for analysis of the question of what is the best structure for local government in a newly-democratizing (and decentralizing) state. HKS Case Number 1798.0

In November 1998, Jan Kasl, a successful architect and erstwhile city councilor, was his party's surprise choice for mayor of Prague, the capital city of the Czech Republic. A virtual political unknown, Kasl was chosen for the post only after the presiding mayor was rejected by the other political parties in negotiations to form a coalition government. Given Kasl's inexperience and low profile, most observers assumed he would be a quiet figurehead, following in his predecessor's footsteps and toeing the party line. Kasl, however, had different ideas. While a relative newcomer to government, Kasl had long been frustrated by what he viewed as the opaqueness of city operations, and angered by suspected abuses by those in power. Soon after his appointment, Kasl vowed to do his best to open up municipal government and stop the conflicts of interest, lack of accountability, and questionable deals he believed had damaged the image and effectiveness of City Hall. To do so, though, he would have to figure out how to overcome significant institutional and political obstacles without causing a political backlash that could stymie all progress, or even force him from office. Is it better for a leader with a reform agenda to confront antagonists-and rely on public support to force change? Or would a behind-the-scenes, coalition-building strategy be the more pragmatic and effective? Or does successful reform borrow from both approaches? In addition to these leadership issues, this case provides a window into the political life of post-socialist Eastern Europe-the so-called "New Europe"-and provides a vehicle for analysis of the question of what is the best structure for local government in a newly-democratizing (and decentralizing) state. HKS Case Number 1797.0

In early 2002, world attention turned to the upcoming election in the southern Africa nation of Zimbabwe. Once viewed as a model of relative prosperity and potential, as well as democracy in sub-Saharan black Africa, the nation faced political violence, an AIDS epidemic, and food and fuel shortages, under the rule of long-time president Robert Mugabe, the one-time revolutionary leader in what was once white-ruled Rhodesia. This case focuses on the political strategy and campaign of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), an opposition party led by former labor leader Morgan Tsvangirai. The MDC faced the daunting challenge of waging a peaceful and successful campaign notwithstanding what were widely viewed around the world as increasingly anti-democratic steps taken by Mugabe-including land seizures of white-owned farms and potential vote-rigging. Tsvangirai must balance a desire for victory with concern for his personal safety, concern for stability in Zimbabwe, and the long-term prospects for the MDC and democracy in Zimbabwe. HKS Case Number 1655.0

When Paulo Renato de Souza accepts an appointment to become Brazil's minister of education, he faces extreme challenges. Public education in Latin America's most populous nation is widely viewed as a failure. Brazil's vast population of poor children often attends schools that are both physically inadequate and have inadequate textbooks. His own department has seen a parade of ineffective leaders and has only indirect authority of state governments responsible for primary education. HKS Case Number 1571.0

This sequel accompanies the case Tackling Poor Performance (1571.0). When Paulo Renato de Souza accepts an appointment to become Brazil's minister of education, he faces extreme challenges. Public education in Latin America's most populous nation is widely viewed as a failure. Brazil's vast population of poor children often attends schools that are both physically inadequate and have inadequate textbooks. His own department has seen a parade of ineffective leaders and has only indirect authority of state governments responsible for primary education. HKS Case Number 1571.1

When a young, former mining executive with no previous elective office experience is elected Mayor of La Paz, Bolivia in 1985, he expects to attack notorious inefficiency and overstaffing aggressively. But, within weeks, Mayor Ronald MacLean finds that, although he faces some predictable antagonists, such as public sector unions resistant to personnel cutbacks, he also faces difficulty in even understanding the workings of the city government. MacLean ultimately realizes that the problems he faces are less those of inefficiency than a more potent antagonist: corruption. This case describes the efforts of Mayor MacLean to understand how and why corruption has taken root in the La Paz government and to devise a strategy to uproot it. The second part of the case specifically spells out approaches which stem from MacLean's belief that corruption is less a reflection of cultural or ethical problems than one of poorly-designed systems which provide the medium for corruption to take hold. MacLean's progress in combating corruption is described, as is its recurrence following MacLean's departure from office. The case is well suited to discussions of organizational change but is best suited to specific discussion of corruption in the developing world and the ways in which progress against it can be institutionalized and sustained. HKS Case Number 1523.0

When a young, former mining executive with no previous elective office experience is elected Mayor of La Paz, Bolivia in 1985, he expects to attack notorious inefficiency and overstaffing aggressively. But, within weeks, Mayor Ronald MacLean finds that, although he faces some predictable antagonists, such as public sector unions resistant to personnel cutbacks, he also faces difficulty in even understanding the workings of the city government. MacLean ultimately realizes that the problems he faces are less those of inefficiency than a more potent antagonist: corruption. This case describes the efforts of Mayor MacLean to understand how and why corruption has taken root in the La Paz government and to devise a strategy to uproot it. The second part of the case specifically spells out approaches which stem from MacLean's belief that corruption is less a reflection of cultural or ethical problems than one of poorly-designed systems which provide the medium for corruption to take hold. MacLean's progress in combating corruption is described, as is its recurrence following MacLean's departure from office. The case is well suited to discussions of organizational change but is best suited to specific discussion of corruption in the developing world and the ways in which progress against it can be institutionalized and sustained. HKS Case Number 1523.1

When a reform-minded economist joins Romania's Ministry of Agriculture, she expects to help move her nation toward market-based changes that will increase the production of food by reducing subsidies and tariffs. Instead, General Secretary Cristina Esanu, formerly with the World Bank, quickly confronts a dilemma. The terms of the release of a new round of World Bank assistance to Romania make new aid contingent on Romania's "progress" toward lower tariffs, generally considered to be protecting inefficient producers from outside competition. Esanu quickly learns that powerful political interests make further tariff reductions, in particular, very difficult to achieve. When the World Bank makes clear that it will ask that at least a symbolic five percent tariff reduction be implemented in order for Romania to receive new assistance, Esanu is asked by her superior--the Agriculture Minister--to take on a task about which she is deeply ambivalent: writing a memo to convince the World Bank that tariffs should not be reduced. The case raises questions about how a public official can, and whether she should, compromise principles and pragmatic political considerations. HKS Case Number 1507.0

As part of its efforts to recover from hyperinflation and an oversized public sector, the government of Argentinaspecifically the province of Buenos Airesseeks to control costs and improve service in local government. To do so, the provincial government tries a bold strategy: it splits up three large suburban Buenos Aires municipalities into eight new, smaller, jurisdictions. This budgeting, financial management, and political strategy case focuses on the implementation of the move toward smaller, more local government, through the prism of the creation of one of the new municipalities: the town of Hurlingham. The case describes the nuts-and-bolts budget decisions which a transition team of officials must make how to structure the new government, how to increase tax receipts and the political decisions which its new mayor confronts. He must decide which parts of the new town will get service priority: high-voting wealthy districts where tax collection has been low, or poorer neighborhoods from which the new mayor drew key electoral support? This case allows both for rigorous budget analysis and assessment of budget-related political strategy. HKS Case Number 1493.0

As part of its efforts to recover from hyperinflation and an oversized public sector, the government of Argentinaspecifically the province of Buenos Airesseeks to control costs and improve service in local government. To do so, the provincial government tries a bold strategy: it splits up three large suburban Buenos Aires municipalities into eight new, smaller, jurisdictions. This budgeting, financial management, and political strategy case focuses on the implementation of the move toward smaller, more local government, through the prism of the creation of one of the new municipalities: the town of Hurlingham. The case describes the nuts-and-bolts budget decisions which a transition team of officials must make: how to structure the new government, how to increase tax receipts and the political decisions which its new mayor confronts. He must decide which parts of the new town will get service priority: high-voting wealthy districts where tax collection has been low, or poorer neighborhoods from which the new mayor drew key electoral support? This case allows both for rigorous budget analysis and assessment of budget-related political strategy. HKS Case Number 1493.1

In this case, the president of Bolivia and a team of officials grapple with questions of how to set up a model for privatizing a number of state-owned enterprises. In the 1980s, Bolivia, like most other Latin American countries, embraced a more market-oriented development strategy that required the state to intervene less in the economy and to focus more on the essential tasks of government. In the case, privatization is high on the leadership's policy agenda in large part because it is the "unfinished business" of the neo-liberal economic reform program that was first adopted in 1985. In addition, the president has a number of specific goals he wishes to achieve through the process of privatization, such as eliminating a large source of public sector corruption and responding to problems of poverty and inequity in the country. HKS Case Number 1447.0

When the administration of Peru president Alberto Fujimori embarks on an ambitious privatization program, it turns inevitably to the nation's creaking telephone system. With but 2.5 phone lines per 100 persons, Peru, in the mid-1990s, had the lowest phone "density" in Latin America; installation of a new line took years, except via a thriving black market in existing lines. But the privatization committee which begins to plot the role of both the existing local and long distance phone monopolies, knows that it faces formidable obstacles to change: a suspicious and powerful military which nationalized the phone system in the 1970s; an influential cellular phone operator with his own agenda; existing unions, doubtful legislators who must approve a constitutional amendment to allow privatization to go forward. This case is about the political management of privatization. It describes the "interest group map" developed by the privatization committee and poses the question of what tactical approach should be taken with each. Case users must envision the potential conflicts, the objective desired, and the most useful tactics. The sequel describes the early success of the privatization process, after the phone system's sale to the Spanish phone giant, Telefonica. HKS Case Number 1404.0

When the administration of Peru president Alberto Fujimori embarks on an ambitious privatization program, it turns inevitably to the nation's creaking telephone system. With but 2.5 phone lines per 100 persons, Peru, in the mid-1990s, had the lowest phone "density" in Latin America; installation of a new line took years, except via a thriving black market in existing lines. But the privatization committee which begins to plot the role of both the existing local and long distance phone monopolies, knows that it faces formidable obstacles to change: a suspicious and powerful military which nationalized the phone system in the 1970s; an influential cellular phone operator with his own agenda; existing unions, doubtful legislators who must approve a constitutional amendment to allow privatization to go forward. This case is about the political management of privatization. It describes the "interest group map" developed by the privatization committee and poses the question of what tactical approach should be taken with each. Case users must envision the potential conflicts, the objective desired, and the most useful tactics. The sequel describes the early success of the privatization process, after the phone system's sale to the Spanish phone giant, Telefonica. HKS Case Number 1404.1