The case describes the evolution between 1999 and 2008 of a family-owned contract manufacturing company into a publicly traded, US$400 million global firm. The son of the founder, Bernie Auyung, assumed the CEO position with the company during this period and has worked with his father to build a broader, professional management team. In the process the company has applied a range of leading-edge innovation management and strategy tools that put it far ahead of most Chinese peer companies. Computime provides an exceptional model for other companies in developing countries looking to evolve from a low-cost competitor into a global leading company with its own technologies and brands. Students are asked to assume Bernie's role and suggest the path forward. The teaching note describes what the team actually did, and addresses the questions raised at the end of the case.
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. How can established organizations build successful new businesses on an ongoing basis? In their study of nearly 30 corporations as diverse as Google, DuPont, and Cargill, the authors identified two dimensions under the direct control of management that consistently differentiated how companies approach corporate entrepreneurship. The first is organizational ownership: Will the primary ownership for the creation of new businesses be focused in a designated group, or will it be diffused across the organization? The second is resource authority: Will projects be funded from a dedicated corporate pool of money or in an ad hoc manner, perhaps through business-unit budgets? Together the two dimensions generate a matrix with four basic models of corporate entrepreneurship: the opportunist, the enabler, the advocate, and the producer. In the opportunist model (example: Zimmer Holdings), the company has no deliberate approach to corporate entrepreneurship, and new businesses are built mainly from the grassroots efforts of a few "project champions." Enabler companies (example: Google), provide funding and senior executive attention to prospective projects. In the advocate model (example: DuPont), the company strongly evangelizes for corporate entrepreneurship, but business units provide the primary funding. Lastly, producer companies (example: Cargill), establish and support a full-service group with a mandate for corporate entrepreneurship. Each of the four models has a different objective, function, and set of challenges. Whichever model is chosen, the crucial thing to remember is that corporate entrepreneurship needs to be nurtured and managed as a strategic, deliberate act.
The case compares two U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) programs from the 1970s and 1980s: (1) "stealth" combat aircraft, capable of evading detection or engagement by anti-aircraft systems, and (2) precision attack of hardened ground vehicles from "standoff" distances, i.e., far behind the battle lines. Conceived at roughly the same time, motivated by the same strategic challenge, and initially driven by the same DoD organization, stealth combat aircraft progressed from idea to deployment in less than eight years-an astounding pace for a complex military system-while a demonstrated system for standoff precision strike against mobile ground targets was not fully implemented. The case highlights the critical role of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), part of the DoD, regarded as one of the most innovative entities in the U.S. federal government.
The case describes the evolution between 1999 and 2005 of an unusual innovation team within the office of the Chief Information Officer of BP. The team leader, Vice President and Chief Technology Officer (CTO) Phiroz Darukhanavala ("Daru"), eschewed a large group and a venture budget in favor of a small, lean team intimately engaged with BP's business units. The case described several mechanisms created by the CTO office during its early evolution, aimed at expanding executives' appreciation of emerging technology capabilities, building a network of relationships through which emerging technologies are scouted and vetted, and providing structured mechanisms for technology transfer. In late 2005 the CIO's Advisory Group challenged the CTO office to "keep reinventing yourselves." Students are asked to assume Daru's role and suggest new processes and structures to continue the evolution of the CTO office. The teaching note describes what the team actually did, and addresses questions raised at the end of the case.