• Why Every Executive Should Be Focusing on Culture Change Now

    Having the wrong culture undermines the best-laid strategy and organizational development plans, but many leaders haven't necessarily accepted the need to be proactive in building the types of culture required for their transformation strategies to succeed. The authors describe seven elements of adaptive culture that they consistently see in businesses that have transformed successfully and share a set of eight culture transformation principles that maximize the likelihood of success.
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  • International Trade Meets Intellectual Property: The Making of the TRIPS Agreement (Abridged)

    This is an abridged version of note NR15-02-1661.0. The focus of international trade negotiations was once quotas and tariffs - how much of a particular product could be imported and the duty levied at the border. As the world economy has experienced deeper integration, attention has shifted away from tariffs and quotas to the complex policies and rules that affect the international movement of goods, services and investment. Such policies include protections for intellectual property rights. Negotiated during the Uruguay Round, the 1994 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) significantly broadened the reach of the trading regime by establishing .a comprehensive set of global trade rules for intellectual property. World Trade Organization (WTO) members are now obliged to adopt policies that protect patents, trademarks, and copyrights. While countries remain free to provide even more protection than the TRIPs requires, the agreement sets minimum standards. 1661.3
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  • Fast Track Derailed: The 1997 Attempt to Renew Fast Track Legislation, Abridged

    In the United States, the president has the Constitutional authority to negotiate international trade agreements. But the Congress has the ultimate authority over trade. This arrangement blunts the negotiating power of the United States in trade talks because other countries know that any commitments made at the table could be altered or rejected by Congress. Therefore, from 1974 to 1993, Congress granted the president fast track authority by committing to an expeditious yes-or-no vote on trade implementing egislation with no amendments or changes in return for regular consultations and timely notification on the part of the administration. However, beginning in the early 1990s, fast track became the subject of fierce political debate and a focal point for concerns about global trade liberalization. HKS Case Number 1660.3
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  • Food Fight: The US, Europe, and Trade in Hormone-Treated Beef (Abridged)

    Those familiar with transatlantic trade relations are well aware of the longstanding US-EU dispute over trade in beef. This note traces the history of the quarrel, beginning with the introduction of the use of growth-promoting hormones for raising beef cattle. In 1989, Europe banned the use of these hormones. The ban covered all beef, including meat imported from the United States where growth-enhancing hormones were widely used. In retaliation, the United States imposed punitive tariffs on approximately $100 million worth of European food imports. In the years that followed, the rules changed. New multilateral institutions and agreements were put in place to govern disputes like the beef quarrel such as the SPS Agreement negotiated during the Uruguay Round of trade talks. Despite these changes, the story was very much the same a decade later. Though the new World Trade Organization (WTO) ruled against the European ban, the EU continued to refuse beef raised with growth-promoting hormones. In 1999, once again, the United States imposed punitive tariffs on approximately $117 million on foods imported from Europe. The rules had changed, but the endgame remained much the same. At the core of the dispute lay fundamental disagreements about trade in food. The United States argued that the European regulatory process had been captured by politics. US officials were frustrated by what they saw as a political move to protect the EU beef market by invoking scientifically unsupported claims about the detrimental health effects of hormones. The real issue, Europe retorted, was that the US trade system had been captured by industry-the United States had soured the entire transatlantic trade relationship by capitulating to the demands of the corporate beef lobby. Furthermore, some consumer groups argued that it was not the role of a group of trade lawyers and diplomats at the WTO to make decisions related to health and safety. HKS Case Number 1677.3
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  • Getting to Dayton: Negotiating an End to the War in Bosnia

    The road to the breakthrough Dayton Peace Accords, which ushered in the prospect of a stable peace in the war-torn former Yugoslavia, is built through an intricate, high-pressure negotiation brokered by the United States and involving Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and the western European powers. This case focuses on the dynamics of those negotiations as led by US State Department chief negotiator Richard Holbrooke and members of his negotiating team. It raises strategy issues (When would it be wise to push for a ceasefire?); ethics issues (Is it moral to negotiate with those accused of war crimes?); and personality issues (Is it strategy or the force of Holbrooke's personality which ultimately brings the parties to the table?). Based on extensive interviews with Mr. Holbrooke, this case brings to light new details about one of the highest-stakes negotiations of the post-Cold War era. HKS Case Number 1356.0
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