This case presents a comprehensive overview of the BOJ's ultra-easy monetary policy which started in 2012. After years of sustained government and central bank intervention, Japan's monetary policy has reached a critical stage. Then world questioned how the BOJ's new Governor, Kazuo Ueda can find a way to extricate the nation from years of economic inertia, stimulate domestic consumption, boost GDP growth, and stabilize inflation at a 2% threshold. And world questioned this could be achieved without damaging the global economy. On March 19, 2024, with prices seemingly on track toward the bank's goal of sustained 2% inflation, Japan's persistently weak yen and robust wage hikes offered by Japanese companies, the BOJ ended the negative rate policy (NIR) and raised interest rates for the first time in the past 17 years. The BOJ also ended its yield curve control policy (YCC) of keeping 10-year Japanese government bond yields at around 0%. It has fulfilled their roles but will continue the large-scale monetary easing (QE). The BOJ's policies have stood in contrast to other central banks, which have raised rates sharply over the past two years to combat inflation sparked by the COVID pandemic, the Ukraine war and supply chain issues

In countering the threat of broader monetary policy divergence between the two nations, the JPY sank sharply against the USD. Although the BOJ continued with vigorous monetary easing, the US Federal Reserve started to restrict its monetary policy as inflation rose. Japanese exporters viewed a weak JPY as a bonus when funds were repatriated because it improved their overseas profits. But when coupled with an increased cost of crude oil and other commodities, it raised import costs and hindered consumer spending in Japan, a resource-scarce economy. Kuroda, the governor of the BOJ emphasized that it would retain its current policy if an increase in the consumer price index seemed temporary and not sustained. He cautioned that if the index rose above 2%, the BOJ would change its policies. His term of office as Governor of the Bank of Japan was scheduled to end in April 2023, but with an Upper House election in 2022, he was under domestic pressure to ensure that inflation remained under control

Popular Japanese fast-food chain Saizeriya operates affordable family-style Italian restaurants in Japan with subsidiaries in a number of Asian locations. Since the company's Australian suppliers require payments to be made in Australian dollars (AUD) instead of Japanese yen (JPY), volatile currency exchange rates continue to be a serious risk to Saizeriya's operations. The company's president, Issei Horino, believes foreign currency hedging could reduce the costs associated with exchange rates. But an earlier attempt to use foreign currency coupon swap contracts from BNP Paribas went horribly wrong- it cost the company JPY15bn to break those contracts. As the JPY continued to depreciate, together with declining restaurant sales and a falling share price, Horino decided to revisit the company's previous use of foreign currency hedging to investigate whether Saizeriya could adopt an appropriate foreign currency hedge.

Despite Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's new economic strategy, known as "Abenomics," being enacted in 2012, Japan's deflationary spiral continued. In an effort to stimulate economic growth, early in 2013 the Bank of Japan (BOJ) stepped in, using quantitative and qualitative monetary easing (QQE) with the aim of achieving an inflation target of 2% in two years. At that time, the short-term prime interest rate was 1.475% per year. Could an unconventional monetary policy work? Despite all efforts, Japan's economy remained weak. On 20 January 2016, the BOJ's governor, Haruhiko Kuroda, held a policy meeting in Tokyo, where the decision was made to introduce QQE with a negative interest rate.

Many companies study the management strategies of others, adapting and learning from the experiences of large multinationals. But global corporations also need strategies that are capable of adapting to changing markets and profitability. Is it possible for these corporations to develop new and powerful insights from smaller firms? The Toyota Motor Corporation's philosophy and business strategy, known as the "The Toyota Way" is globally recognized as an industry leader, and its managerial values and business methods are regarded as benchmark practices, guiding the processes and strategies of organizations worldwide, e.g., Toyota's Kanban method, of inventory control which facilitates just-in-time manufacturing, is seen as the optimal approach to inventory control. Founded in Japan in 1937, the company grew rapidly. But a series of issues, resulting in a drop in vehicle sales and profitability left Toyota's president, Akio Toyoda, considering how the company could find a more sustainable way of growing and how to incorporate this new philosophy into its existing business model. Toyoda is now a strong advocate for an alternative philosophy known as the "Nenrin or tree ring" strategy. He credits a small company, Ina Food, which makes agar, a traditional ingredient in Japanese food, as the source of Toyota's ongoing success. Finding inspiration in Ina Food's 55 years of sustainable growth and profit, Toyoda now follows many of its key initiatives. The corporate giant has become one of the largest corporations globally, while still promoting the virtues of slow and steady growth on an ongoing basis.

Sumitomo-Mitsui Bank (the Bank) was found not to have breached its duty of explanation when an interest-rate swap agreement had been executed between the Bank and a customer (the Company), under which fixed and floating interest rates would be swapped and the resulting difference settled. The Company had borrowed substantially at floating-rate interest and wanted to hedge against the risk associated with rising interest rates. During the period from June 8, 2005 to June 7, 2006, the Company paid ¥8.8 million in total to the Bank as the difference between the fixed interest rate and the floating interest rate, and penalty interest payments due to delay. The Company then sued the Bank and asserted that it had breached its duty of explanation, abused its superior bargaining position, and inappropriately and unfairly solicited this agreement with the Bank. The Company had a basic question as to whether this swap was for hedging or speculation, and claimed that the Bank had not fully explained the product and the risk involved. A full economic analysis of this derivative for this case study was included so that it can be employed to assess the court decision.

In 2015, Toshiba, a conglomerate best known throughout the world for its electronics products, announced to the world that it has overstated profits by 151.8 billion yen (US$1.2 billion) over a seven-year period. The conduct of Toshiba's management and employees left a deep stain on Japan that threw corporate culture and corporate governance practices into turmoil. This case presents a comprehensive overview of the Toshiba accounting scandal. It examines how the accounting irregularities in evidence at Toshiba spread from a relatively minor case of accounting misrepresentation to corporate-wide deception ingrained in the cultural fabric of the organization. The research highlights how issues of corporate culture can undermine even the most robust corporate governance strategies, and examines some of the challenges Toshiba faces in its attempts to recover from the biggest accounting scandal in contemporary Japanese history.

On October 1, 2013 at a meeting of ruling party officials, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said that he had decided to go ahead with a plan to increase the sales tax from 5% to 8%, beginning April 1, 2014. This tax hike had become law in August 2012, under then-Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda. Abe, faced with a choice he did not ask for, sought to make a decision he could live with. Deciding whether to raise the tax had proven very hard for him. He had to take extraordinary care weighing conditions. The Bank of Japan had already fired the first "arrow" of Abenomics, an unconventional easing of the money supply. The second, fiscal stimulus, was constrained by Japan's fiscal rebalancing goals. With regards to the third arrow, a strategy for economic growth, the government was still working out how to break entrenched regulations in farming and employment. Until the very last moment, Abe had to consider whether a tax increase would lead Japan back into the deep valley of deflation and economic stagnation.

Ever since Yasuhiko Shogaki took over Saizeriya Co., Ltd. (Saizeriya) in 1968, the restaurant had aimed to provide healthy and tasty Italian meals at affordable prices for everyone. On 9 December 2008, Shogaki made a stunning public announcement - that the company had incurred a loss of ¥15 billion caused by the use of foreign currency coupon swaps. He further announced that because of such transactions (such as trading in derivatives to hedge against foreign exchange risks), the Italian-restaurant chain operator might fall into the red in terms of group net earnings for that fiscal year through August 2009. Shogaki revealed that Saizeriya had signed derivatives deals with BNP Paribas Securities (Japan) Ltd. in October 2007 to procure Australian dollars (A$) that the restaurant needed to import food from that country. Following the disclosure, Saizeriya's stock price went limit-down on 10 December 2008 as investors rushed to dump the stock. Some directors and shareholders questioned this disclosure. Shogaki then had to decide whether the company should continue hedging (such as with swaps), despite the fact that Saizeriya had just suffered huge losses from similar transactions. If Saizeriya did not arrange any hedging, the company could enjoy yen appreciation merits for the payments in A$.

The economic policies advocated by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan, dubbed Abenomics, have weakened the yen and given new life to Japan's stock market. There are three components of Abenomics: monetary easing, fiscal spending, and growth strategies. The economy-boosting effects of Abenomics and the Bank of Japan's (BOJ's) bold monetary easing policy are stirring up considerable global interest in Japan. Of the three components of Abenomics, monetary easing and fiscal spending are unlikely to inflict much pain on the public, apart from the fact that younger generations will be forced to pay back the debt the government is rapidly incurring. But the third component, growth strategies, can only be effective when addressing regulatory issues that have long been left untouched. What Japan needs most is regulatory and structural reform. These painful, drastic reforms will shuffle the deck for protected businesses. While structural reforms almost always inflict pain on vested interests protected by regulatory walls, creative initiatives by newcomers benefit consumers and help to revitalize the economy.

Ina Food Industry Co. Ltd. ("Ina Food") is situated in the city of Ina, Nagano Prefecture, and surrounded by the soaring mountains of the Japanese Alps. Hiroshi Tsukakoshi, Ina Food's 75-year-old chairman, has led the company through an incredible 55 years of continuous revenue and profit growth. The company is a leading manufacturer of powdered agar, a traditional gelatin product derived from seaweed. In the summer of 2012, Tsukakoshi is looking through the windows of his office in Ina City. He is thinking about how he aims for his company to be a corporation that is conscious of the global environment. He feels he has done a good job so far. The business has prospered and does not present any urgent problems. However, he also feels that he should not simply sit back and savor his success. He is facing his retirement and has concerns about the long-term growth of the company. He is thinking it might be the right time to introduce some new marketing strategies for the company. There is also another reason for concern: Japan's deflationary environment, persistent for 20 years now. He is interested in increasing sales volume and profit by raising prices when most other companies are lowering theirs under deflation. In this environment, even keeping prices constant means a relative increase of price. Tsukakoshi believes that, in essence, as long as a company is confident in the competitiveness of its products, there are always methods to raise prices and increase profits. The key is raising the prices of merchandise and services in a way that the customers can accept. Raising prices in a difficult economic climate is a risky decision. Nevertheless, the company is successful in raising the price under deflation. While the Japanese economy faces serious difficulties, the company has obtained successful results thanks to marketing, producing, financing, and allocating resources.

In the late 1970s, Walt Disney Corporation sought to expand its enterprise to Japan. Oriental Land Corp, which represented the Japanese side of the negotiations, and Walt Disney had to decide on a licensing arrangement or a joint venture. The objective of this study is to examine the actual determinants, models and data of that investment choice. This case study is of value to governments and multinational enterprises that want to explore an optimal alliance with a foreign partner. Based on the law, the Japanese government intervened in the negotiations between the Oriental Land Corp and Walt Disney as to the form of the arrangement for Tokyo Disneyland. Thirty eight years later, it is worthwhile to examine the validity of their decisions and which arrangement benefited the project and the partners most. This case study presents ex post empirical evidence for this discussion. The efficacy and effectiveness of the law that allows the Japanese government to intervene are also questioned.

On 9 May 2005, Oriental Land Co, Ltd ("OL") announced changes in the company's top management. They were feeling the heat not only from the humid weather in Tokyo in the rainy season but also as a result of the visitors' numbers that had just come in. The total combined attendance at Tokyo Disneyland Park and Tokyo DisneySea Park for the fiscal year (1 April 2004 to 31 March 2005) amounted to 25.021 million guests, 98.2% of the previous year's attendance. The top management was concerned that this decrease in attendance might be a bad sign of tough times ahead and it was a prime example of a successful foreign investment in Japan now caught in a completely new structural change. The factors that had been critical to its past success were now diminishing. The top management thought that the amusement park and leisure land industry provided little cause for optimism, due to factors such as slackening consumer spending and demographic changes. Under these conditions, the top management felt that a study was needed to determine whether OL could diversify the operating base. They specifically wanted to know whether the current pricing policy was effective under deflation, which the Japanese economy had been suffering for a long time, and how changes in pricing to visitors, if necessary, would affect the company's cash flow in the future. The new pricing strategy would be based on the price elasticity of demand by the visitors to the company's services.The top management asked the planning department to study the possible price changes and use net present value ("NPV") methods to evaluate these alternatives on the effect of the future cash flow. The strategy would also need to incorporate the company's long-term strategies.

On 17 March 2006, Japanese Internet company Softbank Corp announced that it had reached a final agreement with British cellular phone giant Vodafone Group Plc to buy its Japanese unit, Vodafone K.K. for ¥1.75 trillion. To finance the largest business acquisition ever by a Japanese firm, Softbank intended to raise between ¥1.1 trillion and ¥1.2 trillion through leveraged-buyout ("LBO") financing, using Vodafone K.K.'s assets as collateral . With the acquisition of Vodafone K.K., Softbank aimed to build a multilateral communications business, integrating news, video and other online content with Vodafone's cellular and fixed-line services. But first Softbank had to borrow between ¥1.1 trillion and ¥1.2 trillion to finance its purchase. The sum was the largest ever to be raised for a buyout by a single Japanese company.

Early 2005 saw the first hostile takeover in Japan. Financed by foreign capital, the takeover startled Japan's traditional business establishments who now feared that the threat of hostile takeovers had finally become a reality in Japan. Meanwhile, Japan also went through numerous accounting scandals involving public companies and was seeing dramatic changes in disclosure and corporate-governance rules and regulations in regards to issuers of publicly traded securities and their officers and directors. Concurrently, Mr Hidezo Terai, president of World Co. Ltd, Japan ("World"), a publicly traded apparel company on the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges, considered returning the company to its private limited status and de-listing it from both the stock exchanges. The company believed doing so would allow them to introduce a management system for quick and flexible responses in the ever-changing fashion business. The market on the other hand suspected that such a move was driven by a need to seek relief from the new disclosure and corporate-governance rules and regulations, and to protect World from possible hostile takeovers

In Tokyo on Monday, April 24th, 2006, the U.S. dollar fell to a three-month low against the yen, carrying over its weakness from Friday's trading in New York, where it had fallen more than two yen (1.75%). Mr. Teruhide Osawa, president of OSG Corporation in Japan (OSG), a multinational cutting-tool producer, was following the foreign exchange market on his computer screen that Monday and was very surprised to see that the yen had appreciated 1.75% in one day. He wondered if such a big change would cause problems for the company's business. Faced with big fluctuations in the yen-dollar exchange rate, he summoned the manager of the Support Center Finance Group, asking him to analyze and report on how OSG's foreign currency transaction exposure was measured, and how it could be managed. He asked the manager specifically how the company was currently hedging its foreign currency exposures. The Finance Group gave a presentation at a meeting of the board of directors on May 29th, 2006. They explained that in order to eliminate short-term transaction exposure, a variety of hedging methods were available at varying costs to the company. After the presentation by the Finance Group, members of the board got into a heated discussion.

Ina Food Industry Co. Ltd was situated in Ina, Nagano Prefecture, and surrounded by the soaring mountains of Japan's Alps. Amidst this idyllic setting, Mr. Hiroshi Tsukakoshi, Ina Food's 68-year-old chairman, had led the company through an incredible 48 years of continuous revenue and profit growth. The company was a leading manufacturer of powdered agar, a traditional gelatin product derived from seaweed. In 2005, news about the medicinal benefits of agar led to a boom in demand, but Tsukakoshi felt that this was an unfortunate event and believed that if management was not preoccupied purely with revenue, and instead focused on establishing steady growth, the company would continue to exist for a long time. This in turn would please everybody who was directly or indirectly associated with the company. He was confident that Ina Foods was a new model for Japanese small- and medium-sized businesses under a new management philosophy that brought happiness to employees and community. He felt he had done a good job so far. The business had prospered and did not pose any urgent problems. But he also felt that he should not simply sit back and savor his success. There were tremendous growth opportunities and he knew operations should be improved before those opportunities could be targeted.

Japanese corporations faced the looming threat of hostile takeovers because of the rapid dissolution of cross-shareholdings that began in the 1990s; in particular, between creditor banks and corporate borrowers. As a result of this uncoupling the share of stable shareholders, those in long-term business relationships with the corporation, fell by half over the past 10 years. On the other hand, foreign ownership of Japanese companies, which used to account for only a small percentage of all outstanding shares, rose rapidly. Thus, the proportion of free-floating shares has risen significantly, implying that buying out a company by means of a takeover bid in Japan has become far easier. Although Japanese corporations have traditionally believed that hostile takeover bids have little chance of success, Hidemaru Yamada, president of Nireco Corp.--a high-tech measuring device manufacturer--felt the need to introduce "poison pill" defenses to counter possible hostile takeover bids from foreign investors. Nireco assessed the situation regarding the introduction of poison pills, taking into account Japan's institutional infrastructure, its laws, and its economic conditions; in March 2005, it announced a "security plan," which included an issue of subscription warrants to existing shareholders in the event of an unfriendly takeover bid.

Internet service firm Livedoor allegedly took advantage of loopholes in securities trading laws to swell the amount of assets held by the firm and its president, Horie, who led the Livedoor group. Livedoor was established in April 1996 with 6 million yen (US$55,798.38) in capital. It made its stock market debut in April 2000, with a stock market value of 57.2 billion yen. Its market capitalization surged to 830 billion yen (US$6.88 billion) as of December 2005, a 15-fold spike. Behind the steep jump in the corporate value were a series of highly tactical moves intended to boost the stock prices of the parent and group firms. Livedoor's strategy essentially focused on how to attract speculative investment money from individual investors, largely ignoring institutional players. Livedoor's operations turned out to be a kind of "money game" under the guise of efforts to challenge the establishment. Where did Livedoor deviate from the path of fair business, and what kind of illegality was involved in its activities? Shedding light on these questions should help both companies and investors make more constructive use of the securities and capital markets.

In February 2005, the top management of Fuji Television Network, Inc., one of Japan's leading media conglomerates, was informed that a small IT-related company, Livedoor Co., had bought 35% of shares in Nippon Broadcasting System, Inc. (NBS) with the help of Lehman Brothers, a U.S.-based financial services firm. Fuji TV owned 12.39% of NBS shares and was in the process of acquiring it. What complicated the issue was that NBS' main asset was its 22.5% stake in Fuji TV. The news came as a shock because Livedoor had acquired NBS shares through off-floor trading at the Tokyo Stock Exchange--prohibited by the Securities Exchange Law, unless done for the purposes of a takeover bid. Fuji TV's top management had to take effective measures to counter Livedoor's move. Such measures involved the assistance of legal counselors and the planning department, who studied which legal and effective actions Fuji TV could take against Livedoor and calculated the corporate value of NBS using both American and Japanese methods.