The case, "AirAsia Malaysia: The IPO Decision", presents the situation faced by Tony Fernandes, founder and CEO of AirAsia Berhad (AAB), when he and his team of senior managers had to decide whether they should raise funds through an initial public offer (IPO) or through private equity. The airline started operations in January 2002 and became debt-free within eight months. It earned a net profit of RM 49 million on a revenue of RM 392.7 million in 2004. The AAB planned to buy planes and augment its fleet of 17 aircraft. Fernandes wanted to replicate his low-cost model in other countries as well. In November 2003, he entered into a collaboration with Shin Corporation of Thailand to start a budget carrier there. The team needed RM 800 million to buy more aircraft to expand its business. Going public would mean greater administrative burden on the small team of managers. Fernandes had the choice of going through private placement and raise funds, which would mean control in the hands of a few as opposed to diffused control in a public offer. In this context, he wondered what could be done.

The case provides an opportunity to formulate a late entrant's response to the competitive dynamics set in motion by its repositioning as a low-cost airline. It presents the dilemma before Tony Fernandes-the chief executive officer of AirAsia Sdn Bhd (AAB)-about how he should respond to the competitive retaliation from Malaysia Airlines (MA), the incumbent national carrier of Malaysia. Fernandes entered the Malaysian aviation industry in December 2001 by acquiring an ailing AAB. After acquiring the airline, he repositioned it as a "low-fare, no-frills" airline with the tagline "Now everyone can fly". He focused on all possible avenues to reduce the operations and maintenance costs and maximise the capacity utilisation of the planes. The initiatives yielded results, and AAB became debt-free within eight months of its renewed operations and reported a monthly cash flow of RM 18 million. With the utilisation of 4,000 seats daily and a passenger load factor of 70%, the airline repaid the loan of RM 100 million and earned a monthly profit of RM 2 million. In August 2002, MA retaliated by announcing its super saver offer that provided a full-service flight experience at 50% of the original fare. The tariff reduction resulted in a drop of 40% in AAB's bookings and threatened its survival. Fernandes had to respond to the new development.

This case presents a situation faced by Tony Douglas, CEO of Etihad Airways, a government-owned, full-service airline. It is February 6, 2020, and Douglas is reviewing the progress he has made in turning Etihad around and charting a direction for its future. The key strategic options are: 1) Contracting and turning Etihad into a regional airline, 2) reshaping Etihad as a low-cost carrier (LCC), or 3) continuing to operate Etihad as a full-service, internationally-focused airline. Additionally, the company could form an alliance with its closest competitor, Emirates Airline. Created in 2003 with a mandate to operate "safely, commercially, and profitably," Etihad positioned itself as a luxurious airline and pursued aggressive internationalization and growth. It was the second national airline in United Arab Emirates (UAE) after Dubai's Emirates Airline. Etihad's initial strategy was directed by CEO James Hogan, and while the company was profitable for many years, it began incurring losses in 2016. The case provides quantitative and qualitative information to enable students to evaluate Etihad's strategy and performance and make recommendations for its future. This case was the third place winner in WDI Publishing's MENA Case Writing Competition "Doing Business in the Middle East North Africa Region," sponsored by Michigan Ross Executive Education.