This case is a follow up to HBS Case No. 721-373, Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited (A). Following the events of the previous case, Takeda reached an agreement to acquire Ireland-based Shire Plc. The case follows some of the achievements and challenges Takeda and its employees face following the acquisition. It outlines the company's situation in 2019 and raises discussion about its future prospects.
This case follows Christophe Weber, President and CEO of Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited, a leading pharmaceutical company headquartered in Tokyo, Japan, as Takeda considers acquiring Shire Plc, a biotech company based in Ireland. The acquisition would turn Takeda into a top ten global pharmaceutical company; however, other pharma companies were showing initial interest in acquiring Shire, and the acquisition would require a large amount of funding. Other concerns about the bid were nonfinancial. Over the last two decades, Takeda had aggressively pursued globalization and was now a global company with two thirds of revenue raised outside Japan and a diverse management team. What was the implication of acquiring Shire? Was now the right time to take such a big step? Was the acquisition in line with the company's goals? How would the combined company be managed? Would the acquisition put an end to Takeda as a Japanese company?
Updates the Tokio Marine (A) case by providing information on the organisation structure adopted by the Japanese insurance firm as it moved to integrate its global operations, along with changes in HR policies that sought to balance traditional Japanese practices with those of its foreign subsidiaries.
Tokio Marine, Japan's leading insurance company, has spent nearly two decades building a global footprint in different insurance businesses around the world. As the company becomes majority non-domestic it has to make a choice of what organisation structure to adopt to best manage the global footprint. Should it separate the domestic and international businesses, or should it attempt to integrate the two organisations in meaningful ways?
This supplement describes the strategy and organisation changes made by British executive, Alistair Dormer, after he is made head of Hitachi Rail's global business. The company acquires an Italian company, continues to win contracts in the UK, but struggles to bring its greenfield manufacturing facility up to speed as knowledge transfer from Japan proves difficult. Dormer creates a new global organisation structure with executives based in different geographies and tries to maintain the traditional Hitachi values in the new organisation.
Hitachi must decide whether to make a British executive, who has successfully built its European rail business from scratch, head of its global rail division even though the bulk of revenues for the unit still come from Japan. The case describes the history of Hitachi Rail as the provider of trains for the Japanese Shinkansen and its struggles to build a European business with expatriates before the success of an outside hire, Alistair Dormer, in winning major contracts in the UK. By 2014, Hitachi is wondering whether to make Dormer CEO of the global rail business in order to further globalise the unit. Will an outsider and a foreigner be the correct choice for a Japanese company? How can the values of the Japanese company be preserved as it globalises? What changes are necessary to further globalise the business?
Raksul, 2018 Forbes Japan "Startup of the Year," ran an e-commerce platform drawing upon thousands of individual suppliers. Launched as a business-to-business printing services marketplace, Raksul had recently expanded to operate both a logistics/delivery marketplace and a television advertising marketplace. Each marketplace faces its own growth challenges; at the same time, the CEO must consider whether and how each marketplace can enhance the others.
Shiseido was in the midst of a six year corporate turnaround, trying to reverse the effects of decades of under-investment in R&D and marketing which had led to a cycle of declining customer support and brand value. Would the CEO's VISION 2020 plan, centered on four strategies: 1.) increasing R&D spending from 1.8% to 3% of sales, 2.) investing an incremental ¥120 billion in brand-building marketing, 3.) moving to a "think global-act local" matrixed brand management structure, and 4.) rethinking brand portfolio strategy, be enough to achieve aggressive 8% per year sales goals while simultaneously increasing the company's operating margin from 8% to 10% in the highly competitive and slow growing beauty industry?
In spring 2016, Kameda's CEO, Michiyasu Tanaka, is facing difficult questions from board members over the lackluster performance of the company's US subsidiary. Kameda was the leading player in the Japanese rice cracker market and was looking to expand overseas to achieve growth, with the vision of becoming a global food company. Starting in 2008, it had tried to market its best-selling product in Japan, Kakinotane, as well as other types of rice-based snacks to US consumers. Despite years of offering samples to consumers, modifications to the naming and packaging design, the addition of new flavors, changes in the supermarkets it placed its product, and offering retailers slotting fees - sales were well below expectations and losses were mounting. The situation was especially baffling as the company believed that the gluten-free trend as well as a growing desire for healthier food should have bode well for its rice-based snacks; moreover several Japanese food makers had recently achieved success in the US (such as Calbee with snapeas and Ito En with teas). On the bright side, Kameda's recent acquisition of a US company, Mary's Gone Crackers, was showing steady sales growth; though profits were very low due to high manufacturing and raw ingredient costs, and distribution coverage was limited. Tanaka and his management team had only a few years to turn things around or consider closing the Kameda USA subsidiary. Every marketing element was on the table: from changing the packaging to rethinking the retail approach to accepting private label deals to investing in more efficient plants to partnering with a well-known US brand in the snack food space. Could Tanaka save Kameda USA and dramatically improve the profits of Mary's Gone Crackers?
"Womenomics in Japan" profiles Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's vigorous attempts to revive Japan's economy, specifically by advocating for a larger role for women in the economy--not as a matter of social policy or gender equity per se, but as an essential element of any solution to Japan's persistent low economic growth. Several decades of economic stagnation led Abe to spearhead a multi-faceted reform effort to shake off deflation and come to grips with Japan's large national debt and rapidly aging society. "Womenomics"--the promotion of economic empowerment for women--has been a key element of this effort. Since taking office in late 2012, Abe has advocated for women in myriad ways: through sustained rhetoric at home and abroad, by naming women to key cabinet and party positions, and by setting ambitious numerical targets for expanding their professional ranks. To support these efforts at effecting institutional change, Abe also has overseen rapid growth in daycare facilities for the children of working mothers, and has worked intensively to encourage Japan's business associations to increase hiring, promotion, and empowerment of women among member firms. At issue is how effective such measures have been, and whether they can successfully be sustained.
In early 2016, Motoi Oyama, president and CEO of ASICS, a major sports apparel and footwear manufacturer based in Japan, lays out his company's growth plan for the upcoming 5 years. The new plan set ambitious goals in terms of revenue and profit increases. At the heart of the strategy to achieve these goals are a desire to embrace a more direct to consumer mindset, expand into new customer segments, and communicate a more consistent and emotional brand worldwide. With its primary core customer currently the "serious" runner and its innovation strategy geared towards high-end performance, pursuing these objectives in light of the fierce competitive landscape posed a multitude of challenges. Moreover, the company had recently launched several lifestyle brands (using brand names it had revived), which posed brand architecture issues. Lastly, the company had just acquired a digital fitness app, RunKeeper, and was wondering how best to leverage this asset and how it fit with the main pillars of the growth plan strategy. The Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games would coincide with the conclusion of the 5 year plan, and ASICS had paid over $100 million to be a Gold Sponsor of the games- Oyama wondered whether his company was on the right track to achieving the goals he intimated to shareholders.
Japan's corporate culture has traditionally prioritized the interests of stakeholders such as customers, employees, and suppliers over those of shareholders. After a decades-long economic slump, Japan's government has revitalized efforts to improve corporate governance in the country's public firms and to elevate public firms' incentives to engage with shareholders. Misaki Capital was founded in 2013 with a strategy of constructively engaging with portfolio firms, providing operational and financial advice to management to improve enterprise and shareholder value. This case asks students to consider the attractiveness of Japanese equities given recent reforms and to evaluate Misaki Capital's constructive investment approach. Students will evaluate how corporate governance in Japan is connected to public firms' market valuations and how elevating shareholders' de facto rights could improve firm performance and valuations. Which of Misaki's recommendations should Sangetsu Corporation pursue? How do they create value?
In February 2015, Daniel Loeb (a US-based activist investor) announced his firm had a large investment in FANUC Corporation, a leading producer of industrial robots and software for machine tools. Loeb was demanding that the Japanese firm change its financial and governance policies (e.g., distribute more cash, fix its "illogical" capital structure, and provide more information to shareholders). FANUC's CEO, Yoshiharu Inaba, and his board must decide if and how to respond. One the one hand, the firm had been very successful having built leading global market shares in each of its core divisions and profitability that exceeded what Goldman Sachs earned on a per person basis. On the other hand, the Japanese government was calling for financial and governance reform as part of the prime minister's recently-announced economic growth strategy known as "Abenomics". Although Inaba and his team had previously considered many of the proposed changes, the question was whether it was now time to actually make some of the changes.
In 2015, Nissan was third place in the Japanese auto market, behind Toyota and Honda. The challenge of increasing market share was that 80% of car shoppers who were non-Nissan owners did not consider Nissan during their purchase process. This process involved three main consumer touchpoints: mass media advertising, internet auto websites and the physical dealerships. In the last 5 years, the importance of the dealers in influencing car sales had greatly diminished as consumers researched and chose which make and brand of car to buy online, going to the dealer only to negotiate price, purchase and receive the car. Given this trend, how should Nissan's top marketer make changes in how Nissan manages these three key consumer touchpoints? And how to better integrate them to maximize sales.
Komatsu built a very successful business in China over the last two decades. But it is now facing rising competition from lower cost domestic Chinese companies, which are themselves trying to become global players. Facing the same situation, Caterpillar is implementing a two-brand strategy. What should Komatsu do to retain its leadership position in China?
Hideo Seto, the recently appointed chairman of the investment committee of the Enterprise Turnaround Initiative Corporation, must decide whether to push JAL group, Japan's largest airline, into bankruptcy or to act as a sponsor in an out-of-court restructuring. The bankruptcy of JAL would be the largest ever for an industrial firm in Japan's history. The case introduces the mechanics of bankruptcy, the tradeoff between out-of-court restructuring and bankruptcy, and the costs of financial distress. At the level of public policy, the case also serves as a useful backdrop to discuss the role of bankruptcy in the efficient functioning of the economy, and the related comparison between Japan and the U.S. in terms of both the bankruptcy code and the cultural attitudes toward corporate restructuring. This case can fit into an introductory course in a module on capital structure and the tradeoff between the costs and benefits of debt or in an advanced corporate restructuring course in a module on the effect of different legal and cultural environments on bankruptcy proceedings.