In December 2017, the Electrical and Mechanical Services department (EMSD) held its first Innovative Technology Day in collaboration with Hong Kong Science and Technology Parks Corporation at EMSD’s Hong Kong headquarters. The event, which brought together government departments and related organizations as well as developers of innovative technologies, was a first step in responding to the new policy direction outlined by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in her first policy address and to the challenge issued to EMSD staff by the director of Electrical and Mechanical Services. Supervising engineers at EMSD were directed to develop a strategic roadmap and implementation plan to move EMSD forward to implement the organization’s new mandate: to be a promoter and facilitator of innovation and technology (I&T).
On December 20, 2008, Ontario’s premier, Dalton McGuinty, and Canada’s prime minister, Stephen Harper, announced their decision to provide $3 billion in interim loans to General Motors of Canada Limited. Due to the 2008 economic downturn and declining auto sales, the company had drawn from its cash reserves in an effort to maintain operations and, as a result, was facing insolvency. The automaker accounted for approximately 19,000 direct jobs in Ontario, and its collapse would mean a great economic loss for Canada. The provincial and federal governments needed to work together to support the company and, in doing so, also support Canada’s economy during this financial downturn. Ontario’s assistant deputy minister of Finance needed to determine the best way to proceed with the proposed financial plan, while also working with multiple governments and appeasing public opinion.
In late 2010,the director general of the Industrial Sectors Directorate at Environment Canada, was reviewing a draft work plan for the Air Quality Management System (AQMS), a regulatory project to deal with Canada’s transboundary air pollution problems. Though some of the key elements of AQMS were in place and director general had the support of co-chairs from Alberta and Ontario, she had to develop a series of briefings on her strategy before the end of 2010 so that she could gain approval from her deputy minister and minister.
By late 2015, the chief executive officer of Devonian Coast Wineries in the Canadian province of Nova Scotia had invested in the business and had broadened the distribution of the wines he produced. His chief concern was growing sales beyond Nova Scotia’s provincial borders. Selling wines in other provinces was difficult because it required approaching the various provincial liquor control boards. He had three options: continue to engage with each provincial liquor board’s buyers, lobby for greater retail access, or pursue the removal of provincial barriers to wine trade within the Atlantic provinces. If all interprovincial barriers were removed, he would need to compete with other provinces’ larger wine producers, and they would likely gain market share at the expense of local wineries. What was the best strategy to expand Devonian Coast Wineries’ distribution beyond Nova Scotia?
In June 2007, the chief executive officer of Telesat Canada, headquartered in Ottawa, Ontario, was considering his strategy following a decision by Industry Canada to reject four out of six of its applications for satellite slots. His largest concern was the decision to award the two most important licences for the Extended Ku-band network — which the company’s largest clients, Bell Canada Inc. and Shaw Communications, were both seeking — to a subsidiary of a non-Canadian company, Ciel Satellite Limited Partnership, which was owned by SES S.A., a global corporation based in Luxembourg. The regulator’s decision had the potential to severely limit Telesat’s future revenues as well as destabilize its valuation in the midst of a sale process. The company needed a plan of action to propose a reconsideration of the allocation of licences while also maintaining its working relationship with Industry Canada.
In late January 2009, the assistant deputy minister of Industry Canada was considering how to design the Knowledge Infrastructure Program, which had unexpectedly been assigned to the department in the recent federal budget. A $2 billion spending program focused on knowledge infrastructure, its projects were required to be completed within two years. The immediate goals were to provide a significant short-term economic stimulus and help create jobs during the economic recession. The long-term objective was to fund the modernization plans of universities and colleges. However, there were severe challenges that had to be met: the program must begin within 120 days; there were significant staff constraints in the department; the regulatory process and Auditor General’s standards must be followed and met; accountability standards had to be addressed; and the political element (both federal and provincial) of project selection must be taken into account. How could the program be designed and administered quickly despite the department`s limited capacity?
In February 2011, the senior associate deputy minister of Industry Canada was appointed as the Canadian prime minister’s personal representative to the bi-national team charged with developing the “Beyond the Border Action Plan” to both improve security and streamline cross-border commerce and travel between Canada and the United States. He was immediately faced with a range of decisions on how to proceed — whom to consult, which Canadian team members to hire, which of many possible priorities to pursue in discussions with his U.S. counterparts and which steps to take to manage a complex process involving a multiplicity of large and powerful Canadian government departments and agencies as well as private sector interests. While he didn’t yet have strategies to address these issues, he knew that he would have to formulate them rapidly. Both the prime minister and the U.S. president had made clear their desire to move quickly — ideally, an action plan was to be in place within six months.
In late December 2003, the new acting CEO of Ontario Power Generation, the provincial Crown corporation responsible for the bulk of the province’s electrical power generation, was deeply worried. Three major events had led to a decline in the company’s revenues in 2003: a massive power failure that affected large portions of Ontario and the U.S. eastern seaboard in August, the maintenance-related planned outage at the Darlington Nuclear Station and the new provincial Liberal government’s mandated future phasing out of air polluting coal-fired electricity stations. In addition, in reaction to a damning report on cost overruns at the Pickering Nuclear Station, the Liberal government had dismissed the board and CEO and ordered a comprehensive audit. The acting CEO knew that he needed to respond quickly to the crisis of confidence facing the firm.
On January 28, 2009, the president and CEO of the Business Development Bank of Canada is considering the impact of the minister of finance’s announcement in his recent 2009 budget that the bank would offer a new financial product to help auto and heavy equipment dealers suffering through the global financial and economic crisis. A wholly owned Government of Canada Crown corporation, the bank’s mandate is to help create and develop Canadian businesses through financing, subordinate financing, venture capital and consulting services, with a focus on small and medium-sized enterprises. It is expected both to complement private-sector financial institutions and to earn a rate of return on common equity greater than or equal to the government’s average long-term cost of capital. Taken by surprise due to budget secrecy, the president has spent the last two days in conversations with his staff, senior government officials and his board chair. He needs a plan to quickly launch this new and completely unfamiliar line of business while navigating the complex governance and stakeholder environment that BDC faces.
In August 2009, the newly appointed president of the Federal Development Agency for Southern Ontario, FedDev Ontario, is contemplating the task in front of him. The region’s manufacturing sector, especially the auto industry, had been hit hard by the global recession of 2008; for the first time in its history, Ontario was now a “have not” province, and the federal government was hoping that enthusiasm for this new regional development agency would not only result in the creation of more jobs but would lead to support for the Conservatives in the upcoming election. The new president knew he would need to gain the confidence of his minister and political staff while developing a three-month short-term plan to get up and running as well as a one-year longer term plan to grow the agency and develop its programs. Expectations of both program and political success were high; the new voyage on which he was embarking would be the riskiest of his career.
In late January 2011, the assistant deputy minister of Environment Canada is contemplating the final report of the joint review panel conducting the environmental assessment of Total E&P Canada’s $10 billion oil sands project, the Joslyn Mine near Fort McMurray, Alberta. Although the report advised that the project would be in the public interest only if — and it was a big if — adverse effects on species at risk were fully mitigated, she was aware that both the company and provincial officials did not agree with the need for further wildlife protection measures. Further, behind the scenes, the industry lobby group, the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, opposed any offsite protection of habitat that might be seen as a precedent for future projects. The federal government’s priority was jobs, and the assistant deputy minister would soon be under pressure to advise the minister on whether to authorize the project to proceed. Without a mechanism to ensure that threatened wildlife would be protected, she could not recommend approval. She needed to find a solution that would work both for the environment and the project.