Launched in 2021, the #Donate2Help campaign of Dish TV India Ltd. (DTIL) encourages its subscribers to donate their unused set-top boxes (STBs) to underprivileged people for a noble cause. Using electronic devices, users can access free satellite infotainment content made available by the state-owned Doordarshan. The campaign was promoted through an advertisement showing the benefits of a STB for a rural girl who had limited internet access who used the device to gain access to content that furthered her education. DTIL intended to have a positive social impact and monetize the unused STBs. This campaign, the first in the direct-to-home industry, helped the company create positive brand perception. The reuse of unused STBs helps reduce e-waste by extending the life of the devices and not dumping them in landfills prematurely. However, the campaign needed more visibility, and its impact could have been better. DTIL intends to expand and scale up the campaign as a part of its adoption of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) guidelines.<br><br>India, the first country to make corporate social responsibility (CSR) mandatory by law, added an ESG framework to the Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report (BRSR) required by Indian companies in 2022–23. Initiatives like #Donate2Help are significant as regulatory obligations and stakeholder expectations pressure companies to contribute to ESG through their business processes and operations. Is there an overlap between CSR and ESG? How should the company operationalize its ESG commitment beyond regulatory compliance? What are the critical factors for successful ESG adoption in a competitive market being disrupted by ongoing technological advancements?
In 2016, Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited (RJio), a subsidiary of Reliance Industries Limited, disrupted the Indian telecom sector by offering consumers access to the latest cutting-edge fourth-generation (4G) data and voice services at affordable prices. Competitors alleged that RJio had indulged in predatory pricing to acquire customers, but they lost the litigation as the anti-trust regulator held that the company should enjoy the benefits of a start-up and no predatory pricing rules were applicable. Within five years of its launch, RJio had become the top Indian telecom company. In 2023, competitors had caught up by offering better services at equitable rates. Had RJio indulged in predatory behavior to establish itself in a price sensitive market? Could the company continue at the same pace in the future? Had RJio transitioned into a new role as a technology company? What role should retailers play in ensuring customer acquisition to support RJio’s future growth strategy?
Cashify, a start-up incorporated in 2013, is a reverse commerce (re-commerce) company in India with first-mover advantage in the re-commerce of electronic goods. In its contribution to the circular economy (CE), it claims to handle 100,000 used smart phones a month and plans to grow the figure to 200,000 by 2023. The company contributes to the CE by adding value to used electronic devices, particularly smart phones, and extending their lifespans. This ensures that products enter into repeat economic transactions before finding their way to landfills. However, the re-commerce model that gave Cashify a competitive edge became obsolete in 2022 because of emerging competition that leveraged technological advancements to create value in the sector. The company’s founders now find themselves facing difficult questions: Should they include new electronic products in their portfolio? In 2022, after two years of COVID-19-related impacts on the economy, overall circular growth was slipping, as consumers preferred to buy new products instead of recycled, refurbished, and reused goods. Can consumers be incentivized to return to the CE and appreciate the value of remodelled goods? Should the company diversify into new products entirely, including automobiles, home appliances, textiles, apparel, and plastic packaging?
On October 10, 2017, the co-founders of Snapper Future Tech Private Limited (Snapper) were discussing the solutions they had proposed at a recent blockchain business conference. Snapper’s initiative envisaged digital solutions for smooth land registration, adding transparency, accountability, and good governance at every stage of the process. Snapper had developed a proof of concept for land records on a private blockchain in a cloud-based environment. Its live demonstration of the proposal was well received by the conference attendees; the challenge was whether the government would consider the solution and engage on a long-term basis with the company for blockchain solutions in land registrations. Would Snapper’s journey be acknowledged in the annals of the country’s digital revolution?
Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited (Jio) launched JioMoney, a mobile wallet (m-wallet) service, in May 2016. Jio was a new entrant in a market populated by established services. Six months later, when the government of India announced demonetization of two high-value currency notes, India’s cash-driven economy was pushed toward digital payments, providing Jio and its competitors with an opportunity. Jio had advanced technology supporting its service. But to leverage the opportunity and its technology, Jio would have to access the 72.2 per cent of India’s population that lived in rural areas. Many of these people did not have bank accounts, and most of them had no experience with digital transactions. Further, despite the availability of the latest 4G cellular technology—which was necessary for successful digital money transfers—a great number of people in India still used phones that were two generations older and unable to take advantage of the m-wallet industry. How could JioMoney overcome the challenges to take advantage of the opportunities?
In 2015, Snapdeal, an e-commerce company in India, faced a supply chain situation in reverse logistics. In conforming to the industry trends, the company had a policy on assured product returns, which led to most customers returning to an online merchant for future purchases. However, by the end of 2015, the estimated worth of products returned under the Indian e-commerce platform was $800 million to $1 billion. The rate of returns of online products could add substantial logistics costs to each product return, hampering the industry’s growth. Snapdeal had some serious questions to address. Should it reverse its policy and not give customers a chance to return products? Should the company connect organizations and retailers with customers and derive valuable feedback from them? Should Snapdeal alter its product return policy in favour of a free returns or no questions asked return policy? Would corrective action be required for the e-commerce industry so companies like Snapdeal could create a return policy for customers who had legitimate reasons to return products?
On May 21, 2015, food inspectors in the North Indian state of Uttar Pradesh tested Maggi instant noodles that had been manufactured by Nestlé India Limited. Their results led them to declare that the samples contained higher-than-permissible levels of monosodium glutamate and lead — substances that could, at those levels, potentially cause harm to consumers. The well-known brand accounted for 26 per cent of Nestlé India Limited’s annual revenue, and the subsequent recall was a source of controversy. The recall was one of the biggest business stories of the year in India and was estimated to have cost Nestlé India Limited US$50 million. The company’s response to the problem ranged from inaction and denial to attempts at rectification and redemption. The overall actions of the company were characterized by confusion regarding product safety and contradictory statements about the accusations that had been made against it. Given the material losses and the damage to both the Maggi and Nestlé India brands, the company wanted to know how the situation could be corrected — and avoided — in the future. Was the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India correct to recall Maggi noodles? Once the crisis was in motion, how could Nestlé India Limited have handled the situation to appease customers, regulators, and stakeholders?
After a series of strikes in its Manesar manufacturing plant in 2011, Maruti Suzuki India Limited is beginning to recover from the after-effects of the strike. Amid this tense atmosphere, a minor brawl breaks out between supervisors and workers, then escalates into full-scale violence and arson, which results in the death of the plant’s general manager of human resources. The company locks down the plant, and law enforcement agencies initiate criminal proceedings against the workers. The incident raises serious questions about industrial relations at the plant and, in particular, the suitability of the Japanese management style in the Indian context.<br><br>See A case 9B13C009.
In 2011, Maruti Suzuki India Limited (MSIL), India’s largest car manufacturer, had three strikes in its new plant in Manesar, India. Although workers wanted recognition of a new union along with improved working conditions, MSIL insisted that workers be represented through the existing union that operated at a nearby plant. Tensions escalated to the point of violence and the matter caught the attention of national media, political parties, national trade unions, and central and state governments. Due to these strikes, MSIL struggled in terms of reputation and market share, and its component suppliers stockpiled inventory. After a series of hectic parleys and stressful episodes, the two parties reached an agreement. However, there were serious doubts as to its longevity and whether Suzuki’s Japanese management style was suitable in an Indian context.<br><br>See B case 9B14C048.