Describes the transformation of a company's corporate-level strategy. Begins by laying out the strategy that brought the Newell Co. stunning success for nearly three decades. The highly integrated, internally consistent strategy was tailored for manufacturing and selling a particular genre of products to a particular kind of customer. In the mid-1990s, Newell encountered some shifts in its competitive environment and a subtle erosion in profits. In 1999, the $3.5 billion company paid a 49% premium to acquire the $2.5 billion Rubbermaid Co., in part for its product development process and strong consumer brands. After the acquisition, the profits of the combined enterprise deteriorated at an accelerated rate and the CEO was replaced. In less than a year, a fundamentally new strategy was announced, profits improved, and both Wall Street and major retailers were encouraged. Some setbacks followed, leading to reduced earnings and revised expectations. Exposes students to the pains and struggles of changing a deeply ingrained and long-lived strategy. Also forces them to confront the question of whether the new strategy is the right one and the markers one should seek to prove the case.
The causes of many corporate governance problems lie well below the surface--specifically, in critical relationships that are not structured to support the players involved. In other words, the very foundation of the system is flawed. And unless we correct the structural problems, surface changes are unlikely to have a lasting impact. When shareholders, management, and the board of directors work together as a system, they provide a powerful set of checks and balances. But the relationship between shareholders and directors is fraught with weaknesses, undermining the entire system's equilibrium. As the authors explain, the exchange of information between these two players is poor. The authors suggest several ways to improve the relationship between shareholders and directors: Increase board accountability by recording individual directors' votes on key corporate resolutions, separate the positions of chairman and CEO, reinvigorate shareholders, and give boards funding to pay for outside experts who can provide perspective on crucial issues.
Hardly anyone has a good word to say about hierarchies. They routinely transform motivated and loyal employees into disaffected Dilberts. Yet, the intensity with which we struggle against hierarchies only serves to highlight their durability. In this article, organizational behavior expert Harold J. Leavitt presents neither a defense of human hierarchies nor another attack on them. Instead, he offers a reality check, a reminder that hierarchy remains the basic structure of most, if not all, large, ongoing human organizations. That's because although they are often depicted as being out of date, hierarchies have proved to be extraordinarily adaptive. Over the past 50 years, for example, they have co-opted the three major managerial movements--human relations, analytic management, and communities of practice. Hierarchies also persist because they deliver real practical and psychological value, and they fulfill our deep need for order and security. Despite the good they may do, however, hierarchies are inevitably authoritarian.