Clayton Christensen's Theory of Disruptive Innovation presciently explained that fast-moving disrupters entering the market with cheap, low-quality goods could undermine companies wed to prevailing beliefs about competitive advantage. In the last decade, however, disrupters have changed dramatically. They now enter the market with products and services that are every bit as good as those offered by legacy companies and make it harder than ever for traditional businesses to compete.

For decades, the business world has been fixated on achieving sustainable competitive advantage, a position within an industry that allows a company to best its rivals over the long term. Though we can all point to organizations that have succeeded with this approach--think GE and Unilever--in today's world, the edge of most companies doesn't last long. The forces at work here are familiar: the digital revolution, disappearing barriers to entry, globalization. In a turbulent environment, businesses can't afford to spend months crafting a single long-term strategy. They need a portfolio of multiple transient advantages that can be built quickly and abandoned just as rapidly. Transient advantages call for a whole new playbook, says Columbia Business School's McGrath. It involves a view of strategy that is less industry-bound and more customer-centric. Executives who grasp this shift don't rely solely on analysis to develop strategy; they use tools like advanced pattern recognition and observation to set broad strategic themes and then let people experiment within them. They also adopt decision metrics that support entrepreneurship, replacing the net present value rule, for instance, with the logic of real options. And, knowing that product features can be copied instantly, they focus on providing experiences and solutions to problems to customers, and turn relationships into competitive barriers.

The innovation function — the starting point for creating new advantages — is ineffective in most companies. Warning signs that an innovation process is broken can be grouped into six categories. 1. Innovation is episodic. Innovation should be continuous and systematic, yet it is often downsized during a company’s financial struggles and is sometimes suppressed if a new idea threatens existing business models. 2. The innovation process is invented from scratch. Companies often neglect the wealth of educational opportunities and coaching, as well as the vast literature on venturing and entrepreneurship. 3. Resources are held hostage by incumbent businesses. Allowing existing businesses to determine where employees and funds are allocated does not enable or support innovation. 4. Innovations are force-fitted into existing structures. New businesses should be given combinations of people, assets, and resources that suit their particular needs. 5. Applying the same criteria to evaluate both an innovation and the core business. It is wrong to use the same planning, budgeting, and control processes for things that are predictable and those that are not. 6. Insisting on the venture meeting the plan. Many innovation leaders try to defend past assumptions even after they have been proven wrong.

Steady, predictable growth is what every big company strives for, and what investors prize above all else. McGrath set out to discover how many companies actually deliver. To meet her initial criteria, a company had to have a market capitalization of at least US$1 billion and to have grown by 5% each year over a five-year period. Only 8% of the companies in her sample of 4,793 qualified. When the five-year period was doubled, only 10 companies qualified--and of those, only five had grown both revenues and net income every year. The success of these "growth outliers" can't be explained by industry, company age or ownership structure, global location or economy (emerging versus developed). They do, however, share a lot of practices. For example, they diversify their portfolios with early, small bets, manage major resource allocations centrally, focus attention on culture and shared values, and hold on to their talent. Their practices add up to an intriguing, counterintuitive profile: Although they are nimble and adaptive, their leadership, strategy, and values are extraordinarily stable. The author concludes that this seeming paradox is a feature, not a bug: Stability is what enables these companies to innovate and to maintain steady growth.

Business life has always featured the unpredictable, the surprising, and the unexpected. But in today's hyperconnected world, complexity is the norm. Systems that used to be separate are now intertwined and interdependent, and knowing the starting conditions is no guide to predicting outcomes; too many continuously changing interactive elements are in play. Managers looking to navigate these difficulties need to adopt new approaches. They should drop outmoded forecasting tools-for example, ones that rely on averages, which are often less important than outliers. Instead, they should use models that simulate the behavior of the system. They should also make sure that their data include a good amount of future-oriented information. Risk mitigation is crucial as well. Managers should minimize the need to rely on predictions-for instance, they can give users a say in product design. They can decouple elements in a system and build in redundancy to minimize the consequences of a partial system failure, and turn to outside partners to extend their own company's capabilities. They can complement hard analysis with "soft" methods such as storytelling to make potentially important future possibilities more real. And they can make trade-offs that keep early failures small and provide the diversity of thought needed in a nimble organization faced with complexity on virtually every front.

It's hardly news that business leaders work in increasingly uncertain environments, where failures are bound to be more common than successes. Yet if you ask executives how well, on a scale of one to 10, their organizations learn from failure, you'll often get a sheepish "Two-or maybe three" in response. Such organizations are missing a big opportunity: Failure may be inevitable but, if managed well, can be very useful. A certain amount of failure can help you keep your options open, find out what doesn't work, create the conditions to attract resources and attention, make room for new leaders, and develop intuition and skill. The key to reaping these benefits is to foster "intelligent failure" throughout your organization. McGrath describes several principles that can help you put intelligent failure to work. You should decide what success and failure would look like before you start a project. Document your initial assumptions, test and revise them as you go, and convert them into knowledge. Fail fast-the longer something takes, the less you'll learn-and fail cheaply, to contain your downside risk. Limit the number of uncertainties in new projects, and build a culture that tolerates, and sometimes even celebrates, failure. Finally, codify and share what you learn. These principles won't give you a means of avoiding all failures down the road-that's simply not realistic. They will help you use small losses to attain bigger wins over time.

With product life cycles growing ever shorter and competition cropping up in unexpected places, nearly every industry is facing disruption. How can you tell if your model is running out of gas? For starters, if your next-generation innovations provide smaller and smaller improvements and your people have trouble thinking of new ways to enhance your offering. Pay heed to the signs and start experimenting with several new options until you find one that will turn your threat into an opportunity.

Two professors who have studied how leaders regain momentum in uncertain times suggest four ways to get your employees to face their fear, outrun hesitant competitors, and seize advantage.

Our annual survey of ideas and trends that will make an impact on business: Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Tyagi believe consumer credit should be made as safe as any other product. Paul Collier and Jean-Louis Warnholz reveal an increasingly investment-friendly climate in sub-Saharan Africa. Amy J.C. Cuddy asserts that warmth and competence are not mutually exclusive. John Sviokla predicts a surge of peer-to-peer lending in the wake of the financial crisis. Noah J. Goldstein explains the impact of social pressure on customers' behavior. Raymond Fisman urges the creation of a global forensic economics lab modeled on Interpol. Paul Saffo warns of a brain drain out of the U.S. Gurdeep Singh Pall and Rita Gunther McGrath contemplate the ramifications of immortalizing business meetings in searchable, high-quality digital video. Janine M. Benyus and Gunter A.M. Pauli illustrate the advantages of innovation copied from nature. Michael I. Norton observes that an investment of effort can lead to unduly glorifying its results. Peter Schwartz dispels the illusion that global temperatures are actually falling. Nicholas A. Christakis shows that personal influence wanes beyond three degrees of separation. Marcelo Suarez-Orozco sees the migrant millions as untapped brand emissaries to their relatives back home. Ian Bremmer and Juan Pujadas chart the growing influence of state capitalism in four industry sectors. Steve Jurvetson shares a fun way to stimulate the growth of new brain cells. Lew McCreary spotlights the interior designs of two adventurous architects who aim to counteract the degenerative effects of physical comfort. Tom Ilube explains the semantic web - a quiet revolution in technology that will radically change the internet. Alex Pentland weighs the benefits of combining two distinct kinds of social networking. Thomas H. Davenport and Bala Iyer look at the offshore outsourcing of decision making. R. Stanley Williams envisions a central nervous system for the earth.

Large-scale IT projects are highly uncertain and vulnerable to the laws of unintended consequences. But the risks can be contained and the opportunities still realized, as long as uncertainty is respected and taken into account. As this author writes, there are practical, proven approaches that allow you to accept uncertainty but maintain good project discipline.

The major reason for failure in initiating new growth projects in uncertain environments is the basic tenet of classic project management-the initial strategy is assumed to be correct, and large sums are expended without dealing with the fundamental assumptions. Discovery-driven planning is vastly different from conventional planning. In conventional planning, success means delivering numbers close to what you thought you would deliver. In discovery-driven planning, success means generating the maximum amount of useful learning for the minimum expenditure. Discovery-driven planning is most useful when the situation is highly uncertain.

The high failure rate among new business ventures is usually chalked up to the fundamental uncertainty of the process. In actuality, say McGrath and Keil, flawed ways of assessing and managing ventures may account for the disappointing amount of value they generate. Instead of taking the go/no-go approach, whereby a project either advances toward launch or is killed, decision makers should consider a range of alternatives: recycling the venture by aiming it at a new target market; spinning it off to other owners or a joint venture; spinning it into an established business unit; or salvaging useful elements such as technologies, capabilities, knowledge, and patents. Firms that excel in value extraction--the "value captors" whose practices and mind-set this article explores--have created formal processes to systematically mine successes, failures, and everything in between. They know that a venture should be treated like a scientific experiment, in which learning plays a critical role. They are ready to seize new opportunities if a venture falters on its original course. They foster networks to promote cooperation and collaboration between established business leaders and venture teams and involve people from throughout the company in the venture review process. They don't allow financial criteria to dominate the reviews, and they recognize that the best people to launch a business may not be the ones who developed the idea. If your innovation pipeline is dry, your promising projects are being strangled for lack of a speedy payback, or someone else has made a fabulous business out of a slightly altered idea that you abandoned, consider the value captor's path.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Launching new ventures outside a corporation's core business is risky and failure prone, yet, it is often perceived as vital to innovation and organic growth. Can investing in new ventures add value to a company despite the risks? To explore that question, the authors conducted an in-depth study of corporate venturing at Nokia Corp. between 1998 and 2002. The research yielded a number of lessons about corporate venturing. For example, Nokia discovered that looking at the success or failure of an individual project as a business was the wrong way to evaluate the effectiveness of the venturing program. Whether they succeeded as businesses, Nokia's corporate ventures often added important capabilities to the core business, such as familiarity with a new customer segment for the company. In fact, seemingly unrelated investments sometimes led to technologies that later benefited the company's core business. The authors conclude that, to extract value from corporate ventures, companies must use different management practices than in their established businesses, structure new ventures so that they don't face pressure to deliver immediate results, and emphasize learning. Although 70% of Nokia's corporate venturing investments during the period studied were either discontinued or completely divested, the capabilities and technologies developed nonetheless played an important role in helping the company's core businesses respond to change.

If company leaders were granted a single wish, it would surely be for a reliable way to create new growth businesses. Business practitioners' overwhelming interest in this subject prompted the authors to conduct a three-year study of organizational growth--specifically, to find out which growth strategies were most successful. They discovered, somewhat to their surprise, that even companies in mature industries found rich new sources of growth when they reconfigured their unit of business (what they bill customers for) or their key metrics (how they measure success). In this article, the authors outline these and other moves companies can make to redefine their profit drivers and realize low-risk growth. They offer plenty of real-world examples. For instance, once a conventional printing house, Madden Communications not only prints promotional materials for customers but also manages the distribution and installation of those materials on-site. Its revenues grew from $10 million in 1990 to $133 million in 2004, in an industry that many had come to regard as hopelessly mature. The authors also suggest ways to identify your unit of business and associated key metrics and recognize the obstacles to changing them; review the key customer segments you serve; assess the need for new capabilities and the potential for internal resistance to change; and communicate to internal and external constituencies the changes you wish to make in your unit of business or key metrics.

Competition among multinationals these days is likely to be a three-dimensional game of global chess: The moves an organization makes in one market are designed to achieve goals in another in ways that aren't immediately apparent to its rivals. The authors--all management professors--call this approach "competing under strategic interdependence," or CSI. And where this interdependence exists, the complexity of the situation can quickly overwhelm ordinary analysis. Indeed, most business strategists are terrible at anticipating the consequences of interdependent choices, and they're even worse at using interdependency to their advantage. In this article, the authors offer a process for mapping the competitive landscape and anticipating how your company's moves in one market can influence its competitive interactions in others. They outline the six types of CSI campaigns--onslaughts, contests, guerrilla campaigns, feints, gambits, and harvesting--available to any multiproduct or multimarket corporation that wants to compete skillfully. Using data they collected from their studies of consumer-products companies Procter & Gamble and Unilever, the authors describe how to create CSI tables and bubble charts that present a graphical look at the competitive landscape and that may uncover previously hidden opportunities. Smaller organizations that compete with a portfolio of products in just one national or regional market may find the CSI mapping process just as useful for planning their next business moves.

Most profitable strategies are built on differentiation: offering customers something they value that competitors don't have. But most companies concentrate only on their products or services. In fact, a company can differentiate itself at every point where it comes in contact with its customers--from the moment customers realize they need a product to service to the time when they dispose of it. The authors believe that if companies open up their thinking to their customers' entire experience with a product or service--the consumption chain--they can uncover opportunities to position their offerings in ways that neither they nor their competitors thought possible. The authors show how even a mundane product such as candles can be successfully differentiated. By analyzing its customers' experiences and exploring various options, Blyth Industries, for example, has grown from a $2 million U.S. candle manufacturer into a global candle and accessory business with nearly $500 million in sales and a market value of $1.2 billion.

A successful strategy for selling your products or services depends on your ability to get into the minds of your targeted customers. But sometimes the customers themselves do not know what is in their minds. A simple tool called the ACE (Attribute Categorization and Evaluation) Matrix can help managers understand customers' behavior and bring hidden product attributes to the surface. It helps companies see that a product may have different salient attributes for different customer segments. The matrix gives companies an iterative process for validating assumptions about product attributes and for monitoring changes that occur because of competition.

Smart companies may incur huge losses when they enter unknown territory--new alliances, markets, products, technologies. Failures could be prevented or their cost contained if managers approached innovative ventures with the right planning and control tools. Discovery-driven planning is a practical tool that acknowledges the difference between planning for a new venture and for a more conventional business. Using Kao Corp.'s entry into floppy disks, the authors present a step-by-step approach to help companies think differently about planning. Managers should begin with the bottom line and work their way up the income statement, first determining a new venture's profit potential.