This technical note provides a history and context for corporate venture capital (CVC) investment, or the practice of corporations making equity investments in startup companies outside their core business. The note outlines the growth of CVC, from its inception in the 1960s through its maturation today, and explores companies' motivations for making these types of investments, which typically involve a combination of both financial and strategic goals. In addition, the note explores how CVC units within companies are structured, how they evaluate and finance investment opportunities, and how they generate business value for the parent company.
In January 2005 Dr. Mean Chhi Vun, director of the Cambodian National Center for HIV/AIDS, Dermatology and STDs (NCHADS), needed to decide how to control the spread of HIV/AIDS and save the lives of thousands of Cambodians who were dying from it each year. In the seven years since Dr. Vun had been appointed director, NCHADS had built an organization that was transparent and efficient, had implemented a nationwide 100 percent condom use program, had established a system that allowed individuals to voluntarily seek confidential counseling and testing, and had instituted a set of guidelines and procedures for staff at health facilities to refer HIV-positive patients to treatment clinics and link them with NGOs providing financial and psychosocial support. Now, however, Dr. Vun faced decisions about three initiatives that were critical to expanding care and treatment programs in his country. First, he needed to decide how to quickly and cost-effectively improve the national HIV/AIDS laboratory support infrastructure. Second, Dr. Vun needed to improve logistics and supply management in order to get the best prices and ensure patients had access to life-saving medicines. Finally, he needed to figure out how to provide sustainable care and treatment to the thousands of Cambodian children living with HIV/AIDS.
The case describes the evolution between 1999 and 2008 of a family-owned contract manufacturing company into a publicly traded, US$400 million global firm. The son of the founder, Bernie Auyung, assumed the CEO position with the company during this period and has worked with his father to build a broader, professional management team. In the process the company has applied a range of leading-edge innovation management and strategy tools that put it far ahead of most Chinese peer companies. Computime provides an exceptional model for other companies in developing countries looking to evolve from a low-cost competitor into a global leading company with its own technologies and brands. Students are asked to assume Bernie's role and suggest the path forward. The teaching note describes what the team actually did, and addresses the questions raised at the end of the case.
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. How can established organizations build successful new businesses on an ongoing basis? In their study of nearly 30 corporations as diverse as Google, DuPont, and Cargill, the authors identified two dimensions under the direct control of management that consistently differentiated how companies approach corporate entrepreneurship. The first is organizational ownership: Will the primary ownership for the creation of new businesses be focused in a designated group, or will it be diffused across the organization? The second is resource authority: Will projects be funded from a dedicated corporate pool of money or in an ad hoc manner, perhaps through business-unit budgets? Together the two dimensions generate a matrix with four basic models of corporate entrepreneurship: the opportunist, the enabler, the advocate, and the producer. In the opportunist model (example: Zimmer Holdings), the company has no deliberate approach to corporate entrepreneurship, and new businesses are built mainly from the grassroots efforts of a few "project champions." Enabler companies (example: Google), provide funding and senior executive attention to prospective projects. In the advocate model (example: DuPont), the company strongly evangelizes for corporate entrepreneurship, but business units provide the primary funding. Lastly, producer companies (example: Cargill), establish and support a full-service group with a mandate for corporate entrepreneurship. Each of the four models has a different objective, function, and set of challenges. Whichever model is chosen, the crucial thing to remember is that corporate entrepreneurship needs to be nurtured and managed as a strategic, deliberate act.
The case compares two U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) programs from the 1970s and 1980s: (1) "stealth" combat aircraft, capable of evading detection or engagement by anti-aircraft systems, and (2) precision attack of hardened ground vehicles from "standoff" distances, i.e., far behind the battle lines. Conceived at roughly the same time, motivated by the same strategic challenge, and initially driven by the same DoD organization, stealth combat aircraft progressed from idea to deployment in less than eight years-an astounding pace for a complex military system-while a demonstrated system for standoff precision strike against mobile ground targets was not fully implemented. The case highlights the critical role of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), part of the DoD, regarded as one of the most innovative entities in the U.S. federal government.
The case describes the evolution between 1999 and 2005 of an unusual innovation team within the office of the Chief Information Officer of BP. The team leader, Vice President and Chief Technology Officer (CTO) Phiroz Darukhanavala ("Daru"), eschewed a large group and a venture budget in favor of a small, lean team intimately engaged with BP's business units. The case described several mechanisms created by the CTO office during its early evolution, aimed at expanding executives' appreciation of emerging technology capabilities, building a network of relationships through which emerging technologies are scouted and vetted, and providing structured mechanisms for technology transfer. In late 2005 the CIO's Advisory Group challenged the CTO office to "keep reinventing yourselves." Students are asked to assume Daru's role and suggest new processes and structures to continue the evolution of the CTO office. The teaching note describes what the team actually did, and addresses questions raised at the end of the case.
In December 1999 Thomson Financial (TF) began a radical transformation from forty-one divisions toward a more integrated firm organized around customer segments. This required active, coordinated involvement from business, organization, and technology functions, as well as sustained investment and execution through the crises of the technology market crash and September 11, 2001. By 2005 TF had emerged as one of the top three financial information firms globally (with Bloomberg and Reuters).
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Faced with the prospects of slow growth, commoditization, and global competition, companies like General Electric Co., Microsoft Corp., and Ford Motor Co. have now emphasized innovation as critical to their future success. But what exactly is innovation? Although the subject has risen to the top of the CEO agenda, many companies have a mistakenly narrow view of it. They might see "innovation" as synonymous with "new product development" or traditional "research and development." But such myopia can lead to the systematic erosion of competitive advantage. As a result, companies in a given industry can come to resemble one another over time. In actuality, business innovation is far broader in scope than product or technological innovation. In fact, a company can innovate along any of 12 different dimensions with respect to its (1) offerings, (2) platform, (3) solutions, (4) customers, (5) customer experience, (6) value capture, (7) processes, (8) organization, (9) supply chain, (10) presence, (11) networking, and (12) brand. Nissan Motor Co., for example, has innovated along the platform dimension, using essentially the same small engine block to power a variety of models, including an upscale mid-size sedan, a large sedan, luxury sedans, a minivan, and a sports coupe. Enterprise Rent-A-Car has innovated along the customers and presence dimensions, placing car rental locations in the neighborhoods where people live and work rather than at airports. Together, the 12 dimensions of innovation can be displayed in a new framework called the "innovation radar," which companies can use to manage the increasingly complex business systems through which they add value.
Wawa, a $4 billion privately held firm, is arguably the most successful convenience store operator in the United States. Explores how senior management decided to build an entirely new gasoline retailing business within the 100+-year-old firm's core business of high-quality prepared foods and beverages. Charges students with defining the business and organization strategy necessary to "mainstream" the newly proven gasoline retailing concept throughout the company.
Tom McKillop, CEO of AstraZeneca, faced the classic quandary of large pharmaceutical firms. Within the year, the firm's patent for Prilosec (active ingredient omeprazole) was expiring. Prilosec was a US$6.2 billion/year blockbuster that revolutionized the treatment of chronic gastro-esophageal reflux disorders (GERD). Severe cost-based competition from generic drug manufacturers was, however, inevitable. Patent expirations were nothing new for the US$15.8 billion in revenues drug firm. AstraZeneca had Nexium, an improvement on the original Prilosec molecule, in the pipeline. Ideally, it would like to move brand-loyal Prilosec customers to Nexium. Additionally, the company had the opportunity to introduce its own version of generic omeprazole, hence becoming the first mover in the generic segment, and/or introduce an over-the-counter (OTC) version of omeprazole. Tactically, AstraZeneca would like to use regulatory incentives and intellectual property rights to strengthen its competitive position. How could the company use its entire portfolio of intellectual properties-including patents and trademarks-to actively manage the priced-based competition and achieve a revenue growth strategy in the GERD market?
Tom McKillop, CEO of AstraZeneca, faced the classic quandary of large pharmaceutical firms. The firm's patent for Prilosec (active ingredient omeprazole) was expiring. Severe cost-based competition from generic drug manufacturers was inevitable. Patent expirations were nothing new for the US$15.8 billion in revenues drug firm, but Prilosec was the firm's most successful drug franchise, with global sales of US$6.2 billion. How could the company innovate its way around the generic cost-based competition and avoid the drop in revenues associated with generic drug market entry? AstraZeneca had other follow-on drugs in the pipeline-namely Nexium, an improvement on the original Prilosec molecule. Additionally, the company had the opportunity to introduce its own version of generic omeprazole, hence becoming the first mover in the generic segment, and/or introduce an OTC version of omeprazole that might tap into other markets. Ideally, AstraZeneca would like to move brand-loyal Prilosec customers to Nexium. In this market, direct-to-consumer advertising has remarkable efficacy. Classical marketing challenges of pricing and promotion need to be resolved for the Nexium launch as well as possible product and place challenges for the generic or OTC opportunity. Which combination of marketing options will allow the firm to best sustain the value of the original omeprazole innovation?