In July 2013, more than 150 negotiators from the European Union and the United States converged in Washington, D.C. to begin crafting what could become the world's largest free trade agreement-the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Billed as a transformational trade accord, the TTIP would go beyond tariffs to cut non-tariff barriers, expand trade in services, streamline regulatory standards, and incorporate trade elements to suit a rapidly evolving global economy. American and European leaders had pushed for the TTIP in the hope that it would provide a much-needed boost to struggling American and European economies, which were mired in recession and high unemployment since 2008, and buckling under rising competition from China. But the negotiators, faced a sobering reality, "the reason we have not had a trade agreement like this between ourselves in the last several decades isn't because nobody thought of it," said Michael Froman, United States Trade Representative. "It's because there have always been issues that have tripped us up." Under intense political pressure and rising public scrutiny, will the negotiating teams be able to reduce trade barriers between the two economic giants? This case explores how in the absence of multilateral trade liberalization, regional trade agreements are becoming increasingly popular. With an in-depth account of the political and technical challenges in negotiating a mega regional accord, the case questions if political will or the need for economic growth can overcome longtime barriers to deeper trade integration.

"Shaping the Future of Solar Power: Climate Change, Industrial Policy and Free Trade (Part B)," is the second of a two part case but may also be taught on its own. In May 2013, European Union Trade Commissioner, Karel De Gucht faced a career defining choice. Soon, he would have to announce a decision on the EU's biggest anti-dumping case, initiated by a group of European solar panel makers against Chinese manufacturers. De Gucht was aware that imposing tariffs on Chinese solar companies could set off a wider trade war between two of the world's largest economies. Part B of the case highlights the tensions between the E.U. and China on sale of solar panels, echoing the politically charged solar battles between the U.S. and China in 2012. The negotiated solar trade settlement between the E.U. and China offers insights into the political realities behind industrial policies, action on climate change, and free trade. Case number 2008.0

When Solyndra, a California-based solar panel maker, filed for bankruptcy in 2011, the U.S. government was left with more than half a billion dollars in unpaid debt. The bankruptcy was a major embarrassment for the Obama administration which had touted renewable energy companies like Solyndra as the wave of the future, and had invested billions of dollars in government loan guarantees to promote them. The Chinese government, however, had outpaced the U.S. in providing loan guarantees and subsidies to solar manufacturers and helped transform the country's nascent solar manufacturing industry into a world leader. Chinese dominance in the solar market ultimately triggered a high-stakes trade war between the United States and China but neither country could contain the massive downturn in the solar market that began in 2012. The case provides an in-depth account of the complex and often competing agendas on climate change, industrial policy and free trade which fueled the politically charged trade battles between the U.S. and China. Against the backdrop of the global environmental challenge, the case includes details on the Obama administration's signature energy subsidy program and the factors that led to Solyndra's collapse. It also traces the rise of China's solar industry as well as the trade complaints made by the U.S. against China at the World Trade Organization and the subsequent Department of Commerce decision to impose penalties against Chinese solar panel makers.

This is an abridged version of note NR14-04-1771.0. On December 11, 2001, China became a member of the World Trade Organization. Many say the 1999 US-China bilateral trade agreement and the vote in Congress to permanently establish normal trade relations with China paved the way for China''s WTO accession. Even though China was not a WTO member, the United States had granted China Most Favored Nation trading status (MFN) since 1979. However, under US law, China''s trade status required an annual renewal that often became a focal point in Congress for protests over human rights issues, security concerns, and the growing US trade deficit with China. In order to support China''s WTO accession, the United States had to commit to non-discriminatory treatment by agreeing to make China''s MFN status permanent-known as PNTR or Permanent Normal Trade Status-thereby giving up the right to annual reviews. The vote in Congress generated a lobbying battle on Capitol Hill of historical proportions. Why did PNTR pass? What role should trade agreements play in promoting human rights, enhancing domestic reform, encouraging the rule of law, and promoting national security? How were the US-China bilateral agreement and the PNTR vote linked to other key negotiations? What is the role of trade in advancing America''s economic interests? (Revised August 2005) HKS Case Number 1771.3

This is an abridged version of note NR15-02-1661.0. The focus of international trade negotiations was once quotas and tariffs - how much of a particular product could be imported and the duty levied at the border. As the world economy has experienced deeper integration, attention has shifted away from tariffs and quotas to the complex policies and rules that affect the international movement of goods, services and investment. Such policies include protections for intellectual property rights. Negotiated during the Uruguay Round, the 1994 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) significantly broadened the reach of the trading regime by establishing .a comprehensive set of global trade rules for intellectual property. World Trade Organization (WTO) members are now obliged to adopt policies that protect patents, trademarks, and copyrights. While countries remain free to provide even more protection than the TRIPs requires, the agreement sets minimum standards. 1661.3

In the United States, the president has the Constitutional authority to negotiate international trade agreements. But the Congress has the ultimate authority over trade. This arrangement blunts the negotiating power of the United States in trade talks because other countries know that any commitments made at the table could be altered or rejected by Congress. Therefore, from 1974 to 1993, Congress granted the president fast track authority by committing to an expeditious yes-or-no vote on trade implementing egislation with no amendments or changes in return for regular consultations and timely notification on the part of the administration. However, beginning in the early 1990s, fast track became the subject of fierce political debate and a focal point for concerns about global trade liberalization. HKS Case Number 1660.3

Those familiar with transatlantic trade relations are well aware of the longstanding US-EU dispute over trade in beef. This note traces the history of the quarrel, beginning with the introduction of the use of growth-promoting hormones for raising beef cattle. In 1989, Europe banned the use of these hormones. The ban covered all beef, including meat imported from the United States where growth-enhancing hormones were widely used. In retaliation, the United States imposed punitive tariffs on approximately $100 million worth of European food imports. In the years that followed, the rules changed. New multilateral institutions and agreements were put in place to govern disputes like the beef quarrel such as the SPS Agreement negotiated during the Uruguay Round of trade talks. Despite these changes, the story was very much the same a decade later. Though the new World Trade Organization (WTO) ruled against the European ban, the EU continued to refuse beef raised with growth-promoting hormones. In 1999, once again, the United States imposed punitive tariffs on approximately $117 million on foods imported from Europe. The rules had changed, but the endgame remained much the same. At the core of the dispute lay fundamental disagreements about trade in food. The United States argued that the European regulatory process had been captured by politics. US officials were frustrated by what they saw as a political move to protect the EU beef market by invoking scientifically unsupported claims about the detrimental health effects of hormones. The real issue, Europe retorted, was that the US trade system had been captured by industry-the United States had soured the entire transatlantic trade relationship by capitulating to the demands of the corporate beef lobby. Furthermore, some consumer groups argued that it was not the role of a group of trade lawyers and diplomats at the WTO to make decisions related to health and safety. HKS Case Number 1677.3

On December 11, 2001, China became a member of the World Trade Organization. Many say the 1999 US-China bilateral trade agreement and the vote in Congress to permanently establish normal trade relations with China paved the way for China''s WTO accession. Even though China was not a WTO member, the United States had granted China Most Favored Nation trading status (MFN) since 1979. However, under US law, China''s trade status required an annual renewal that often became a focal point in Congress for protests over human rights issues, security concerns, and the growing US trade deficit with China. In order to support China''s WTO accession, the United States had to commit to non-discriminatory treatment by agreeing to make China''s MFN status permanent-known as PNTR or Permanent Normal Trade Status-thereby giving up the right to annual reviews. The vote in Congress generated a lobbying battle on Capitol Hill of historical proportions. Why did PNTR pass? What role should trade agreements play in promoting human rights, enhancing domestic reform, encouraging the rule of law, and promoting national security? How were the US-China bilateral agreement and the PNTR vote linked to other key negotiations? What is the role of trade in advancing America''s economic interests? (Revised August 2005) HKS Case Number 1771.0

Brazil has just won a cotton case action against the U.S. cotton agriculture program at the World Trade Organization. What does this mean for future agricultural programs in the United States? For future trade policies of the United States, Brazil, and others in the global agribusiness system? The future role of the WTO? Negotiation through litigation? Developed versus developing country trade policies?