This case sequel is a shorter, more focused, "decision-forcing" version of The Turnaround Artist: Craig Coy Tackles Political Influence at Massport (Case Program, 1896.0). Like its more comprehensive counterpart, it addresses a set of decisions facing Craig Coy, a business executive, retired Coast Guard officer, and former White House security adviser, when he was named executive director of the Massachusetts Port Authority, or "Massport," on April 11, 2002. The appointment came at a time of significant turmoil at Massport, the state authority responsible for managing Boston's Logan International Airport and several other regional transportation resources. The two airline jets hijacked in the attack on the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001 had departed from Logan. Massport had not been responsible for the security practices that had allowed the terrorists to board the jetliners with weapons, but the authority had, in recent years, repeatedly come under fire for political excesses and patronage. These long-tolerated vagaries-when vaulted into the national spotlight-suddenly appeared tawdry and intolerable to state officials and lawmakers. Coy's mandate, when hired a few months later, was to stop to the excesses of the past, to improve safety and security, to run the Authority in businesslike fashion-in sum, to effect a "cultural turnaround." This case describes a string of choices Coy had to make early in his tenure that pertained to the people-management side of his challenge. For example, Coy had to decide the extent to which he wanted to fire top managers at the authority and bring in his own team. He had to find a way to signal the shift to new priorities. And he had to decide what to do when elected officials-whose support was crucial to Massport in a number of respects-called up and asked the authority to hire their constituents. HKS Case Number 1901.1
Craig Coy, a business executive, retired Coast Guard officer, and former White House security adviser, was named executive director of the Massachusetts Port Authority, or "Massport," on April 11, 2002. The appointment came at a time of significant turmoil at Massport, the state authority responsible for managing Boston's Logan International Airport and several other regional transportation resources. The two airline jets hijacked in the attack on the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001 had departed from Logan. Massport had not been responsible for the security practices that had allowed the terrorists to board the jetliners with weapons, but the authority had, in recent years, repeatedly come under fire for political excesses and patronage. These long-tolerated vagaries-when vaulted into the national spotlight-suddenly appeared tawdry and intolerable to state officials and lawmakers. Coy's mandate, when hired a few months later, was to stop to the excesses of the past, to improve safety and security, to run the Authority in businesslike fashion-in sum, to effect a "cultural turnaround." The case takes a comprehensive look at Coy's approach. He immediately focused the authority on a major, challenging initiative; instituted a number of classic business reforms; and drew a sharp line in the sand with respect to political favors. Coy also had to confront some of his own assumptions about what it meant to act in Massport's best interests. Was it always best to leave politics at the door? This was Coy's impulse. But in certain situations, he reluctantly came to accept that a more complex stance was required. HKS Case Number 1896.0
In January 2003, President George W. Bush was finalizing a groundbreaking proposal for Medicare, the federal health insurance program for the elderly. Under the terms of the plan, Medicare would offer a major new benefit: prescription drug coverage-a long-sought but elusive goal for seniors and their advocates. By any measure, this would seem a surprising initiative coming from a politically conservative White House. If approved by Congress, the benefit would represent the largest expansion of Medicare, or of any federal entitlement program, since its enactment almost 40 years earlier. But the Bush proposal also represented a departure from the popular government insurance program - it aimed to inject market forces into Medicare by encouraging beneficiaries to enroll in government-subsidized private health plans that would compete directly with the traditional government-run, fee-for-service program. The drug benefit would be the chief inducement for seniors to make the switch to private plans. For Bush, the stakes were high. During the 2000 presidential campaign, he had pledged to overhaul the Medicare program and to add prescription drug coverage. Seeking to deliver on that promise, Bush had put his Medicare proposal at the top of his domestic agenda for 2003. Even with its emphasis on market-driven solutions, the plan would have to win over conservative Republicans, who resisted the notion of expanding an already large and costly government program, especially in a time of soaring budget deficits. It was also likely to get a cool reception from most Democrats, who viewed private sector competition as the first step in the dismantling of Medicare as an entitlement program. Republicans had the upper hand: for the first time in decades, the GOP controlled not only the White House, but both chambers of Congress as well. HKS Case Number 1870.0
In January 2003, President George W. Bush was finalizing a groundbreaking proposal for Medicare, the federal health insurance program for the elderly. Under the terms of the plan, Medicare would offer a major new benefit: prescription drug coverage-a long-sought but elusive goal for seniors and their advocates. By any measure, this would seem a surprising initiative coming from a politically conservative White House. If approved by Congress, the benefit would represent the largest expansion of Medicare, or of any federal entitlement program, since its enactment almost 40 years earlier. But the Bush proposal also represented a departure from the popular government insurance program - it aimed to inject market forces into Medicare by encouraging beneficiaries to enroll in government-subsidized private health plans that would compete directly with the traditional government-run, fee-for-service program. The drug benefit would be the chief inducement for seniors to make the switch to private plans. For Bush, the stakes were high. During the 2000 presidential campaign, he had pledged to overhaul the Medicare program and to add prescription drug coverage. Seeking to deliver on that promise, Bush had put his Medicare proposal at the top of his domestic agenda for 2003. Even with its emphasis on market-driven solutions, the plan would have to win over conservative Republicans, who resisted the notion of expanding an already large and costly government program, especially in a time of soaring budget deficits. It was also likely to get a cool reception from most Democrats, who viewed private sector competition as the first step in the dismantling of Medicare as an entitlement program. Republicans had the upper hand: for the first time in decades, the GOP controlled not only the White House, but both chambers of Congress as well. HKS Case Number 1870.1
This case provides a succinct account of the high profile failure of the Clinton Administration's initiative to reorganize the US health care and health insurance system so as to provide universal coverage at the same time as controlling costs. The case traces the origins of the reform impetus and describes the structure and proposal of the Administration's health care task force, chaired by First Lady Hillary Clinton and directed by Ira Magaziner. The case focuses, however, on the extent and nature of opposition to the plan, particularly from the business community, implicitly raising the questions of how the Administration might have handled matters differently and what factors whether substance or tactics or both allowed the opposition to be successful. The case is a vehicle, too, for discussion of the business-government relationship in the U.S. through its focus both on the nature of the US health insurance system (largely linked to private employment) and on the variety of business and interest groups within the US private sector. HKS Case Number 1600.0
This case provides a succinct account of the high profile failure of the Clinton Administration's initiative to reorganize the US health care and health insurance system so as to provide universal coverage at the same time as controlling costs. The case traces the origins of the reform impetus and describes the structure and proposal of the Administration's health care task force, chaired by First Lady Hillary Clinton and directed by Ira Magaziner. The case focuses, however, on the extent and nature of opposition to the plan, particularly from the business community, implicitly raising the questions of how the Administration might have handled matters differently and what factors whether substance or tactics or both allowed the opposition to be successful. The case is a vehicle, too, for discussion of the business-government relationship in the U.S. through its focus both on the nature of the US health insurance system (largely linked to private employment) and on the variety of business and interest groups within the US private sector. HKS Case Number 1600.0
Shortly after his 1989 inauguration, President George Bush confronts a seemingly intractable dispute which had simmered through the 1980s: how to legislate the clean-up of the so-called "big dirties", large coal-burning Midwest power plants linked to acid rain and a decline in the vitality of lakes and forests in the Northeast. This case describes both the policy innovation which helps to break a long-standing political logjam and the process of negotiation and compromise involving the White House staff (led by White House Special Assistant for Economic and Domestic Policy Roger Porter) and key members of committees of the Congress. Specifically, the case describes how the Bush administration formed an alliance with key environmental groups (such as the Environmental Defense Fund) by embracing the concept of tradeable emission rights-the right to buy and sell permits to emit sulfur dioxide, for instance, one of the key pollutant byproducts of coal-burning. The advent of such "emissions trading", however, can only proceed once agreement is reached on the total amount of pollution reduction to be achieved by the key enabling legislation which will create the permit regime, the Clean Air Act of 1990. This case, in large part, tracks the shaping of that legislation. HKS Case Number 1514.0
In July, 1975, top White House economic officials in the Ford Administration receive information that the Soviet Union, in the face of a disappointing grain harvest, might seek to purchase large amounts of wheat and corn from US suppliers. This case is an insider account of the confluence of economic and political considerations which emerge as officials face the decision as to whether to take any action to discourage grain sale to the Soviets, at a time when the Cold War is raging. The case specifically looks at the question of whether the Administration should seek to link grain exports , which have, arguably, a humanitarian dimension and are highly popular among farm state voters, to broader political and diplomatic objectives. Put another way, should food be used as a tool of diplomatic leverage? Officials-including Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Secretary of Labor John Dunlop, and Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, as well as members of the Council of Economic Advisors-must consider a range of domestic political matters, as well as the potential effects on food prices of a major grain sale. Based in part on The US-USSR Grain Agreement (Roger Porter, Cambridge University Press, 1984), this case is a snapshot of the information-gathering and decision-making processes at the highest level of the United States government. HKS Case Number 1449.0
Faced with the need to dispose of an offshore oil storage installation, the Royal Dutch Shell Corporation develops what it believes is a straightforward and sensible plan: to dump the oil platform deep in the ocean, 150 miles off the northwest coast of Scotland. Doing so avoids a number of problems, including potential environmental threats involved with transporting it and otherwise disposing of it. The British government agrees but the unprecedented plan sparks outrage among environmental groups. HKS Case Number 1369.0
Faced with the need to dispose of an offshore oil storage installation, the Royal Dutch Shell Corporation develops what it believes is a straightforward and sensible plan: to dump the oil platform deep in the ocean, 150 miles off the northwest coast of Scotland. Doing so avoids a number of problems, including potential environmental threats involved with transporting it and otherwise disposing of it. The British government agrees but the unprecedented plan sparks outrage among environmental groups. HKS Case Number 1369.1