On June 24, 2021, Keppel Corporation (Keppel) and Sembcorp Marine Limited (Sembmarine) announced that they had signed a non-binding memorandum of understanding to enter into exclusive talks to merge Sembmarine and Keppel Offshore and Marine (Keppel O&M), a division of Keppel. Separately, but on the same day, Sembmarine also announced an intention to raise S$1.5 billion through a three-for-two renounceable rights issue (up to 18.83 billion new shares) at an exercise price of S$0.08 per share, which was a 35.7 per cent discount to the theoretical ex-rights price and a 58.1 per cent discount to the June 23 closing price of S$0.191.<br><br>Based on the share price reaction to the announcement of the restructuring, what was the market’s perception of the merger? Would it create value? Should Sembmarine raise capital via a rights issue and should shareholders subscribe to the rights issue?
On June 24, 2021, Keppel Corporation (Keppel) and Sembcorp Marine Limited (Sembmarine) announced that they had signed a non-binding memorandum of understanding to enter into exclusive talks to merge Sembmarine and Keppel Offshore and Marine (Keppel O&M), a division of Keppel. Separately, but on the same day, Sembmarine also announced an intention to raise S$1.5 billion through a three-for-two renounceable rights issue (up to 18.83 billion new shares) at an exercise price of S$0.08 per share, which was a 35.7 per cent discount to the theoretical ex-rights price and a 58.1 per cent discount to the June 23 closing price of S$0.191.<br><br>Based on the share price reaction to the announcement of the restructuring, what was the market's perception of the merger? Would it create value? Should Sembmarine raise capital via a rights issue and should shareholders subscribe to the rights issue?
On March 26, 2020, Singapore Airlines was reeling from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. To raise badly needed capital, it announced that its shareholders would be offered S$5.3 billion worth of rights shares and S$3.5 billion of rights mandatory convertible bonds, both of which would be reflected as equity on its balance sheet. Should shareholders take advantage of this offer or not? To make this decision, investors had to analyze the airline’s reasons for choosing this form of equity financing, the impact of this capital-raising exercise, Singapore Airline’s valuation, and the role of sovereign wealth funds in equity financing. Investors would have to decide the appropriate response to the rights issuances.
On March 26, 2020, Singapore Airlines was reeling from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. To raise badly needed capital, it announced that its shareholders would be offered S$5.3 billion worth of rights shares and S$3.5 billion of rights mandatory convertible bonds, both of which would be reflected as equity on its balance sheet. Should shareholders take advantage of this offer or not? To make this decision, investors had to analyze the airline's reasons for choosing this form of equity financing, the impact of this capital-raising exercise, Singapore Airline's valuation, and the role of sovereign wealth funds in equity financing. Investors would have to decide the appropriate response to the rights issuances.
On September 26, 2018, the Chinese hotpot chain Haidilao International Holding Ltd. launched an initial public offering, during a time of ongoing trade tensions between the United States and China, and started trading of the company’s shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The Beijing-based company sold 424.5 million shares at HK$17.8 (US$2.27) per share, which was on the high end of the indicative price range. Its price-to-earnings ratio of 30.2 was higher than that of its peers, which ranged from 16 to 27. In addition, the CSI 300 Index, which monitored the performance of 300 stocks on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, was down 27 per cent year-to-date at that time. Another key factor was that the company’s stock would likely be included on the Stock Connect program that enabled access from Mainland China to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Investors had an opportunity to value the company at the time of the initial public offering launch and analyze the information provided in the company’s prospectus. Based on their assessment, investors had to decide if the company’s stock was a good investment.
On September 6, 2018, a couple was enjoying a meal at a hotpot restaurant in Weifang, Shandong Province, China. The restaurant was a branch of the popular Chinese hotpot restaurant chain owned by Xiabuxiabu Catering Management (China) Holdings Co. Ltd. (Xiabu Xiabu). Halfway through the meal, the pregnant wife found a dead rat in her soup. The news spread on social media, and according to some analysts, Xiabu Xiabu’s share price dropped US$190 million in market value. Had Xiabu Xiabu’s lack of quality assurance undermined the company’s success? How could the company improve its risk and crisis management?
On September 26, 2018, the Chinese hotpot chain Haidilao International Holding Ltd. launched an initial public offering, during a time of ongoing trade tensions between the United States and China, and started trading of the company's shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The Beijing-based company sold 424.5 million shares at HK$17.8 (US$2.27) per share, which was on the high end of the indicative price range. Its price-to-earnings ratio of 30.2 was higher than that of its peers, which ranged from 16 to 27. In addition, the CSI 300 Index, which monitored the performance of 300 stocks on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, was down 27 per cent year-to-date at that time. Another key factor was that the company's stock would likely be included on the Stock Connect program that enabled access from Mainland China to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Investors had an opportunity to value the company at the time of the initial public offering launch and analyze the information provided in the company's prospectus. Based on their assessment, investors had to decide if the company's stock was a good investment.
On September 6, 2018, a couple was enjoying a meal at a hotpot restaurant in Weifang, Shandong Province, China. The restaurant was a branch of the popular Chinese hotpot restaurant chain owned by Xiabuxiabu Catering Management (China) Holdings Co. Ltd. (Xiabu Xiabu). Halfway through the meal, the pregnant wife found a dead rat in her soup. The news spread on social media, and according to some analysts, Xiabu Xiabu's share price dropped US$190 million in market value. Had Xiabu Xiabu's lack of quality assurance undermined the company's success? How could the company improve its risk and crisis management?
On June 8, 2020, Sembcorp Marine Ltd. (SCM) announced a S$2.1 billion recapitalization plan to be followed by a demerger from Sembcorp Industries Ltd (SCI). SCM's business had been significantly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and a collapse in oil prices, resulting in a critical need for liquidity. The recapitalization would be done through a rights issue. The demerger would be conducted through a subsequent share distribution of SCI's stake in the recapitalized SCM to SCI's shareholders. The case seeks to provide a reasonable valuation of SCM based on its past financial performance and other relevant market information. It also analyzes the rationale of the demerger and the impact of the demerger on shareholders of SCM and SCI.
On June 8, 2020, Sembcorp Marine Ltd. (SCM) announced a S$2.1 billion recapitalization plan to be followed by a demerger from Sembcorp Industries Ltd (SCI). SCM’s business had been significantly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and a collapse in oil prices, resulting in a critical need for liquidity. The recapitalization would be done through a rights issue. The demerger would be conducted through a subsequent share distribution of SCI’s stake in the recapitalized SCM to SCI’s shareholders.<br><br>The case seeks to provide a reasonable valuation of SCM based on its past financial performance and other relevant market information. It also analyzes the rationale of the demerger and the impact of the demerger on shareholders of SCM and SCI.
On November 3, 2016, Jacobs Douwe Egberts (JDE) launched a bid for Singapore-based food and beverage company Super Group Ltd. (Super). JDE had already acquired 60 per cent of the shares but needed another 30 per cent in order to delist the company and take it private. The minority shareholders of Super faced the task of evaluating whether the offer from JDE was reasonable and whether they should tender or hold on to their shares. Their decisions would depend on the valuation of Super's shares, based on financial and other relevant and available market information.
On November 3, 2016, Jacobs Douwe Egberts (JDE) launched a bid for Singapore-based food and beverage company Super Group Ltd. (Super). JDE had already acquired 60 per cent of the shares but needed another 30 per cent in order to delist the company and take it private. The minority shareholders of Super faced the task of evaluating whether the offer from JDE was reasonable and whether they should tender or hold on to their shares. Their decisions would depend on the valuation of Super’s shares, based on financial and other relevant and available market information.