Peter Löscher became CEO of Siemens in July, 2007. It was one of the most turbulent times in the company's history as the company was reeling from a compliance scandal involving hundreds of millions of Euros in suspected bribes, and had to pay billions of Euros in fines and fees to clear its name. Further, the company's operating groups were underperforming their peers in terms of profitability, and had been for some time. Adding to the challenges, Löscher was the first outsider to run Siemens since the company's founding in 1847. After his arrival, Löscher moved quickly to assess the organization, a global, multi-line technology and engineering firm with over 475,000 employees and over €66,487 million of revenue and €3,345 million of net income. Klaus Kleinfeld, the previous CEO, had improved company performance, driven the company to become more globally focused, and sold off underperforming and non-core assets. However, his tenure was cut short by the bribery scandal. When Löscher arrived, he felt the company was overly complex, individuals lacked accountability and significant tension existed between headquarters and the regions. Löscher took advantage of the crisis to reorganize the company from 10 operating groups to 3 sectors, introduce regional clusters to enable smaller markets to focus on sales, establish the "right of way" of the global business, simplify financial reporting, and enhance the sales effort to market verticals. In addition to the changes that Löscher made to the company structure, he transformed employees' attitudes and renewed the entrepreneurial and innovative spirit among managers in the organization.

Peter Löscher became CEO of Siemens in July, 2007. It was one of the most turbulent times in the company's history as the company was reeling from a compliance scandal involving hundreds of millions of Euros in suspected bribes, and had to pay billions of Euros in fines and fees to clear its name. Further, the company's operating groups were underperforming their peers in terms of profitability, and had been for some time. Adding to the challenges, Löscher was the first outsider to run Siemens since the company's founding in 1847. After his arrival, Löscher moved quickly to assess the organization, a global, multi-line technology and engineering firm with over 475,000 employees and over €66,487 million of revenue and €3,345 million of net income. Klaus Kleinfeld, the previous CEO, had improved company performance, driven the company to become more globally focused, and sold off underperforming and non-core assets. However, his tenure was cut short by the bribery scandal. When Löscher arrived, he felt the company was overly complex, individuals lacked accountability and significant tension existed between headquarters and the regions. Löscher took advantage of the crisis to reorganize the company from 10 operating groups to 3 sectors, introduce regional clusters to enable smaller markets to focus on sales, establish the "right of way" of the global business, simplify financial reporting, and enhance the sales effort to market verticals. In addition to the changes that Löscher made to the company structure, he transformed employees' attitudes and renewed the entrepreneurial and innovative spirit among managers in the organization.

This case focuses on an opportunity that American Electric Power (AEP) has to invest, with The Nature Conservancy (TNC), in one of the world's first projects for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD). The proposed plan was to protect 812,000 hectares of rich, biologically diverse forest land, known as Bosque Rojo, in central Peru. This project would address the two issues targeted by REDD by ending both deforestation from the local communities' conversion of land from forest to farmland and forest degradation from commercial logging. REDD projects offered a substantial opportunity to mitigate climate change, as deforestation and forest degradation contributed approximately 15-20 percent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Protecting Bosque Rojo could prevent the release of millions of tons of carbon dioxide (CO2). The project partners and investors would obtain certified offset credits equivalent to the reduction in emissions over the 30-year project lifetime. Among U.S. power companies, AEP had one of the highest levels of CO2 emissions. It estimated its 2009 emissions would reach 150M metric tonnes. With climate change legislation on the horizon, it wanted to set an example for Congress to show that REDD offsets could lead to cost-effective reduction in GHG emissions, and also gain experience in the international REDD scene. AEP expected to have to substantially reduce its own emissions (e.g. by substituting wind power for coal in electricity generation) or obtain offset credits either on the open market or through direct participation in external emission reduction projects. AEP believed that REDD projects would be much cheaper than any of its other options to obtain offset credits. To confirm this belief, the company needed to calculate a net present value (NPV) for the project, understand the project's risks, and determine if Bosque Rojo was, indeed, the best use of company funds.

This case focuses on an opportunity that American Electric Power (AEP) has to invest, with The Nature Conservancy (TNC), in one of the world's first projects for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD). The proposed plan was to protect 812,000 hectares of rich, biologically diverse forest land, known as Bosque Rojo, in central Peru. This project would address the two issues targeted by REDD by ending both deforestation from the local communities' conversion of land from forest to farmland and forest degradation from commercial logging. REDD projects offered a substantial opportunity to mitigate climate change, as deforestation and forest degradation contributed approximately 15-20 percent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Protecting Bosque Rojo could prevent the release of millions of tons of carbon dioxide (CO2). The project partners and investors would obtain certified offset credits equivalent to the reduction in emissions over the 30-year project lifetime. Among U.S. power companies, AEP had one of the highest levels of CO2 emissions. It estimated its 2009 emissions would reach 150M metric tonnes. With climate change legislation on the horizon, it wanted to set an example for Congress to show that REDD offsets could lead to cost-effective reduction in GHG emissions, and also gain experience in the international REDD scene. AEP expected to have to substantially reduce its own emissions (e.g. by substituting wind power for coal in electricity generation) or obtain offset credits either on the open market or through direct participation in external emission reduction projects. AEP believed that REDD projects would be much cheaper than any of its other options to obtain offset credits. To confirm this belief, the company needed to calculate a net present value (NPV) for the project, understand the project's risks, and determine if Bosque Rojo was, indeed, the best use of company funds.

Daniel Lurie headed down Highway 101 in June 2009 to investigate a potential grantee in East Palo Alto, California. As he drove, he reflected on the progress that the nonprofit organization he founded, Tipping Point Community (Tipping Point), had made in just four years of fighting to reduce poverty in the local community. It had raised a total of more than $14 million for recipient organizations, including $3 million from its main donor event in April 2009, and its profile was gaining increasing recognition in the San Francisco Bay Area. He was thinking about Tipping Point's most recent board meeting, where the board members were more relentless than ever regarding the organization's strategy and results, particularly in the areas of performance measurement, sustainability, and key funding. Tipping Point had a tremendous amount of room for improvement and growth. It was difficult to quantify its impact on the target community, which―despite Tipping Point's efforts―was struggling with homelessness, children in need of medical assistance, and limited mobility. With 600,000 people living in poverty in the Bay Area, Tipping Point's goals would not easily be met.

Gilead Sciences launched Truvada, a combination pill incorporating Gilead's individual antiviral drugs, Viread and Emtriva, in the U.S. in 2004. This involved gaining FDA approval, setting a national price, and negotiating reimbursement levels with private and public insurers. While these activities had been resource intensive, their completion meant that Gilead was able to sell Truvada, a combination HIV/AIDS therapy, across the entire United States, approximately 50 percent of the worldwide market. The remaining 50% of Truvada's potential commercial success, however, would be pursued in Europe. Europe presented a more complex environment for reimbursement than the U.S. for three reasons. First, the reimbursement process differed in each European country as to required submissions and approaches to pricing. Second, the average time between the beginning and end of reimbursement negotiations was highly variable across European countries. Third, the local office for Gilead in each European country had its own estimate as to the likely length of negotiations and level of reimbursed price for Truvada, making it challenging to devise and communicate a consolidated strategy across the organization. Gilead needed to determine the order by which it would pursue reimbursement approval for Truvada in Germany, France and Spain. Germany's regulatory authority used a "free pricing" approach. In France and Spain, the government health ministers often (though not always) referenced neighboring markets' prices for a given product in order to determine the product's domestic reimbursable amount. . The approach Gilead decided upon would not only determine the future for Truvada in Europe but also would have a significant impact on the company's future financial health.

Since its official launch in January 2000, Baidu.com, Inc. (Baidu) quickly grew to become the leading Internet search engine in China. After three rounds of private funding, Baidu registered to go public on the NASDAQ Stock Market (Ticker Symbol: BIDU) on August 5, 2005. This case can be used for at least three types of courses: business valuation, entrepreneurship in emerging markets, or doing business in China. When used for a business valuation or corporate finance course, the case highlights issues involved in the valuation of early-stage companies in emerging growth industries and economies. When used for an entrepreneurship course, the case highlights the opportunities and challenges of starting and growing ventures in emerging markets; it also illustrates how a start-up company can take an existing entrepreneurial idea and proven business model from another country and successfully adapt it to the home market. Three steps in this successful adaptation are: (1) leveraging its local knowledge and expertise, (2) creating a unique competitive advantage for the venture, and (3) creating an entry barrier for its competitors. In a course on doing business in China, the case highlights the strategies for business success in China and the role of culture, government, economy, legal and financial systems, and consumer market in shaping these strategies.

The case describes the strategic situation facing Carlos Ghosn and the Renault-Nissan Alliance in 2008 and beyond. One set of strategic issues concerns how to exploit to a greater extent the potential of the novel organization form - a sort of supra-corporate ecological system - that the Alliance represents. A second set of strategic issues concerns the further evolution of the Alliance - what Ghosn calls the "fourth stage" - in light of the dynamic forces that are reshaping the global automotive industry, and especially the issue of how to further scale-up the Alliance. A third set of strategic issues concerns developing further the strategic leadership capability of the Alliance and the evolving role of Carlos Ghosn as CEO of both Renault and Nissan.

This case has been developed to facilitate a negotiation exercise related to the formation of partnership deals in the healthcare industry. It is based on actual information, but reflects a hypothetical situation involving two companies and a product that have all been disguised. The scenario described within the case involves Pharmac, a large pharmaceutical company, and Respire, a small medical start-up. Pharmac and Respire began negotiating a partnership to develop and eventually market an inhaled form of parathyroid hormone (PTH) to treat osteoporosis. If successful, this product would improve the available options for the treatment of osteoporosis. It was also expected to produce "blockbuster" sales since it would make PTH, an already extremely effective treatment option, more convenient and appealing to a large segment of untreated patients who were injection-averse (injection was the standard delivery mechanism for this drug). Development of the product was highly speculative and was expected to take six to seven years due to early stage development of the inhalable delivery system and the multi-year Phase III fracture trials required for approval. Pharmac had released the first man-made, injectable form of parathyroid hormone, called Strocal, in 2002. However, no one had yet developed a non-injectable version of PTH, despite efforts by Pharmac and other companies that spanned more than a decade. Respire's goal was to be the first company to solve this problem by developing an inhaled formulation and a device to deliver Strocal through the lungs in a safe, effective, and reproducible manner. Enough information is provided within the case to enable students to negotiate terms for royalties, milestones, exclusivity provisions, and an equity investment. At the end of OIT-81A, information known to Pharmac (but not to Respire) is provided. In OIT-81B, information known to Respire (but not to Pharmac) is given.

This case has been developed to facilitate a negotiation exercise related to the formation of partnership deals in the healthcare industry. It is based on actual information, but reflects a hypothetical situation involving two companies and a product that have all been disguised. The scenario described within the case involves Pharmac, a large pharmaceutical company, and Respire, a small medical start-up. Pharmac and Respire began negotiating a partnership to develop and eventually market an inhaled form of parathyroid hormone (PTH) to treat osteoporosis. If successful, this product would improve the available options for the treatment of osteoporosis. It was also expected to produce "blockbuster" sales since it would make PTH, an already extremely effective treatment option, more convenient and appealing to a large segment of untreated patients who were injection-averse (injection was the standard delivery mechanism for this drug). Development of the product was highly speculative and was expected to take six to seven years due to early stage development of the inhalable delivery system and the multi-year Phase III fracture trials required for approval. Pharmac had released the first man-made, injectable form of parathyroid hormone, called Strocal, in 2002. However, no one had yet developed a non-injectable version of PTH, despite efforts by Pharmac and other companies that spanned more than a decade. Respire's goal was to be the first company to solve this problem by developing an inhaled formulation and a device to deliver Strocal through the lungs in a safe, effective, and reproducible manner. Enough information is provided within the case to enable students to negotiate terms for royalties, milestones, exclusivity provisions, and an equity investment. At the end of OIT-81A, information known to Pharmac (but not to Respire) is provided. In OIT-81B, information known to Respire (but not to Pharmac) is given.