The case describes the journey of Zola, an online wedding registry designed to greatly improve the clunky and impersonal wedding registry process. With innovative features such as group gifting, scheduled delivery, and honeymoon donations, Zola was described as the registry for Millenials. As the company achieved significant traction and looked to scale, it had to choose from three distinct strategic growth paths to pursue: 1) become the go-to registry site for all major life events; 2) become the online home department store for Millenials; 3) become the premier all things wedding website. As well, the CEO and her team needed to decide whether and how to raise capital in the context of this strategic decision.

Josie Sung and Greg McNamara founded Denver-based Lighthouse Systems in 2006 shortly after graduating from the Stanford Graduate School of Business in 2005. After exploring several ideas, they landed on a technology solution for helping large corporations better communicate with their customers. However, after running into a few roadblocks in the early days, the company pivoted as it learned more about its customers' needs. Now, almost seven years after its founding, Lighthouse had finally found its sweet spot with the launch of a mobile-based app that would allow companies to deliver valuable content to their employees (similar to a company intranet) via any electronic device. By the spring of 2013, Lighthouse had gained steady momentum, with 30 percent quarter-over-quarter sales growth, and it was on track to reach $150 million in revenue by year end. With the potential to really take off, Josie and Greg decided it was time to bring on a senior sales executive to drive revenue growth to the next level. In November 2013, Tristan Jones joined Lighthouse as the company's vice president of sales and quickly made a significant impact on the organization. After closing one of the company's largest deals in 2014, Tristan delivered outstanding results throughout the first half of 2015, and served as a valued member of Josie's eight-person management team. However, Josie is faced with a challenging situation when Tristan violates the company's gifting policy on more than one occasion. Should she find a way to accommodate her best salesperson so as to not sacrifice company performance, or terminate her top performer and deal with the fallout that will inevitably follow?

Mary Jones was the CEO of the Richardson County Community Association (RCCA), a nonprofit with assets of $250 million and annual grants totaling $50 million to charitable organizations in Richardson County, Colorado. As CEO of RCCA, Jones engaged personally with over 250 donors per year. She described her job as primarily one of relationship management, and at times, those relationships could prove challenging. In the RCCA Vignettes, Jones's first difficult situation deals with her board member, David Jacobs, who recently assumed the role of board chair. Jacobs had begun to assign the RCCA staff his own small projects and, after making his "rounds," he would sit down in Jones's office, expecting her to drop whatever she was doing in order to interact with him. Jones would need to find a way to diplomatically yet effectively convey her feelings about Jacobs's behavior. In the second vignette, Jones receives a $1 million stock donation from an esteemed donor, Leo Farnand, who asks her to hold the stock until the recently-announced sale of his company is complete. Jones and the board agree to make an exception to the company policy given the size of the donation and hold the stock. However, after delays in the sale, Jones decides she must sell the stock against Farnand's wishes. The vignette ends with Jones preparing for what will undoubtedly be an unpleasant conversation with one of RCCA's largest donors.

Coley Andrews could never have anticipated when he cofounded Pacific Lake Partners, a search fund investment firm, in 2009, that he would spend as much time managing people as he would the firm's investment strategy. Pacific Lake had grown its portfolio to include 30 operating companies plus 30 active search funds in the six years since its launch, and Andrews interacted regularly with many of the CEOs, either as a board member or as an informal advisor. Though several of Pacific Lake's transactions involved complex financial structures, Andrews had learned that few issues were more difficult than some of the interpersonal challenges that confronted him from time to time. In the first vignette, Andrews learns that a searcher with whom Pacific Lake has made a soft commitment to invest has falsified part of his resume. Andrews and his partner, Jim Southern, decide to withdraw their commitment from the searcher and send a letter out notifying the investor group of the news. Andrews must prepare for how to respond to what will inevitably be an onslaught of calls. In the second vignette, Andrews learns that a fellow board member has withheld knowledge about serious indiscretions committed by the CEO, including sexual harassment and relations with a female employee. Andrews must decide how to best confront his board member with this disturbing news.

The Healthy Buildings case profiles Janet Rodriguez, CEO and founder of Healthy Buildings, a green building materials supplier. In her role as CEO, Rodriguez faces two difficult issues involving her employees. The first issue deals with Fred Payton, Healthy Buildings's COO, and Marcia Vannis, the company's vice president of marketing. It soon becomes apparent that Payton and Vannis have a tumultuous relationship, with Payton frequently undermining her in front of other employees within the organization, and complaining that Vannis was Rodriguez's "teacher's pet." Rodriguez invites both employees to lunch to talk out their differences, but the result is underwhelming. She must now decide how to help them repair their relationship so that they can all move on with the business of the company. In the second vignette, Rodriguez reads in the weekend paper's police blotter that her vice president of business development, Leslie Dorrin, had been arrested for a DUI on Friday evening. That same morning, Rodriguez receives a call from Dorrin letting her know what happened, at which point Rodriguez must determine how to proceed with the news that one of her valued employees has been charged with a serious offense.

Jack Swain, the newly appointed CEO of Starling Systems, a call center software solutions company, had a problem. Swain had recently hired in a new VP of operations, Felicia Shaw, and while she had instituted a number of much-needed changes within the organization, she had not been well-received by the tight-knit customer service team. Specifically, Starling System's top performing customer service representative, Judith Fenton, was not happy and her productivity had dropped sharply as a result. Jack had a brief discussion with Judith at the coffee bar one morning, where she revealed her discontent with Felicia's "hovering" and "harping," declaring that she could not work with her any more. The vignette ends with Jack getting ready to plan his conversation with Felicia.

Virsto, a storage virtualization company, was founded in 2007 by Mark Davis, Alex Miroshnichenko, and Serge Pashenkov. Davis founded Virsto after managing a series of technology startups, many of which were ultimately acquired by big name players such as Dell and HP. Virsto represented the first venture Davis built from the ground up, and it was intended to do for storage virtualization what VMware had done for server virtualization. At the beginning of Davis' journey, he and his cofounders faced a daunting decision: slow the pace of product development to wait for the market leader, VMware, to develop the functionality whereby Virsto's product could "plug in" to VMware's hypervisor, or go to market immediately with Microsoft Hyper-V, a new entrant with a still uncertain future. Davis gambled on immediate commercialization via a second-tier player vs. waiting around for VMware. While his decision brought Virsto to market more rapidly, the team soon found that Virsto's product far exceeded the needs of Microsoft's audience. Therefore, in 2011, Virsto was poised and ready when VMware announced the capability to integrate with external products, and Virsto quickly saw its market potential explode. VMware, which had been working on its own storage product that had yet to gain traction, saw the tremendous potential of acquiring Virsto to accelerate its storage solution. As VMware's interest to acquire Virsto crystallized into an extremely low-ball offer, Davis faced the difficult decision of whether he could negotiate a price with VMware that would make his investors, employees, and stakeholders happy, find another higher-paying acquirer, or allow the company to continue to build market value as the clear leader in storage virtualization.

Virsto, a storage virtualization company, was founded in 2007 by Mark Davis, Alex Miroshnichenko, and Serge Pashenkov. Davis founded Virsto after managing a series of technology startups, many of which were ultimately acquired by big name players such as Dell and HP. Virsto represented the first venture Davis built from the ground up, and it was intended to do for storage virtualization what VMware had done for server virtualization. At the beginning of Davis' journey, he and his cofounders faced a daunting decision: slow the pace of product development to wait for the market leader, VMware, to develop the functionality whereby Virsto's product could "plug in" to VMware's hypervisor, or go to market immediately with Microsoft Hyper-V, a new entrant with a still uncertain future. Davis gambled on immediate commercialization via a second-tier player vs. waiting around for VMware. While his decision brought Virsto to market more rapidly, the team soon found that Virsto's product far exceeded the needs of Microsoft's audience. Therefore, in 2011, Virsto was poised and ready when VMware announced the capability to integrate with external products, and Virsto quickly saw its market potential explode. VMware, which had been working on its own storage product that had yet to gain traction, saw the tremendous potential of acquiring Virsto to accelerate its storage solution. As VMware's interest to acquire Virsto crystallized into an extremely low-ball offer, Davis faced the difficult decision of whether he could negotiate a price with VMware that would make his investors, employees, and stakeholders happy, find another higher-paying acquirer, or allow the company to continue to build market value as the clear leader in storage virtualization. Part B describes the challenging negotiations that Davis went through with VMware to finally arrive at a price before both sides reached the dreaded "deal fatigue." After presenting the price to his board, one board member

The Tiny Prints case describes the founding of the online stationery company in 2004, through its growth and evolution to 2007. The three cofounders bootstrapped the company from the beginning, primarily so that they could retain control over the decision-making and strategic direction of the company. While that decision allowed the cofounders flexibility and independence, it also led to capital constraints and a "good enough" culture that had a variety of positive and negative implications for the company. Ultimately, Tiny Prints was able to grow because of its very specific focus on the birth announcement, and later holiday, market, an emphasis on customer service and innovations in design and distribution. As of 2007, the founders faced questions regarding their future growth strategy, particularly given increasing competition in the market, and were at an inflection point where they needed to consider the important decision of bringing in outside capital. Part B of the case explores the management team's decision to move forward with a purchase offer from Shutterfly or to maintain control of the company and continue to grow organically.

The SurveyMonkey case portrays the evolution of the company from its founding in 1999 through to 2014. SurveyMonkey was launched by Ryan Finley, a young computer science graduate from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, to address the dearth of easy-to-use, affordable online survey tools on the market. In 2009, Finley sold the company to Spectrum Equity and Bain Capital Ventures, having recognized the need for a partner to help the company achieve its full potential. David Goldberg, an entrepreneur and former Yahoo! executive, took the helm as CEO and immediately put in place his plan to set the company on track to scale at a consistent and rapid pace of growth. Goldberg's primary initiatives in the early days were to hire a strong management team, rebuild the entire technology platform, and expand internationally. As it made substantial progress on these fronts, SurveyMonkey completed several acquisitions and began to expand its feature set and product offerings to include SurveyMonkey Audience (panels of survey respondents) and survey templates, among others. The company completed an $800 million secondary financing raise in 2012 to provide liquidity to employees and investors in lieu of an IPO and charged forward in its efforts to transform its survey tool to a full-blown platform. Though SurveyMonkey had established itself as the dominant player in the direct-to-consumer market by 2013, it began building out an enterprise offering to compete against the other large players in the growing enterprise feedback management space. Having achieved tremendous growth in its 15-year history, the majority of which took place since the 2009 acquisition, as Goldberg and his team looked ahead to 2014, they faced the critical question of how to prioritize SurveyMonkey's avenues for growth-international expansion, quality initiatives, enterprise, platform growth-so as to best position the company to achieve its full potential.

The MobiChair case describes the story of Lucy Ahn and Josh McKinnon, graduates of Stanford's Graduate School of Business who are also in a relationship, who take on the role of co-CEOs of a power wheelchair company after being offered the position by a mentor who is on the company's board. MobiChair is facing stalled growth and the board hopes to revive the company with new leadership. Though hesitant at first, the couple decides to take on the challenge and soon find themselves faced with a series of interpersonal issues and conflicts that threaten to overwhelm them. From their very first meeting with MobiChair's top three vice presidents, Ahn and McKinnon pick up on red flags that indicate the company operates with a "good enough" culture where 6-hour workdays, a focus on the tactical rather than the strategic, and reluctance to change are all the norm. In the second vignette, McKinnon must deal with an HR manager who defies instituting an employee recognition program McKinnon has requested. On a trip to the company's East Coast office, Ahn and McKinnon are alarmed to find that several top managers are underperforming and need to be replaced, after having assured the West Coast staff that they will not be shutting down any offices of undergoing layoffs. Finally, the co-CEOs are faced with an ultimatum from the controller which forces them to decide whether they can manage without her, or whether they must tolerate her antics until a suitable replacement is found.

In 2012, KiOR was in the process of starting biofuels production at its first plant in Columbus, Mississippi. This initial plant was to provide a commercial scale proof-of-concept of KiOR's production technology, and the company expected to build another set of plants in Natchez, MS using "copy exact" principles. These latter plants would be three times the size of the Columbus plants, and KiOR anticipated a number of improvements in its production methodology. Among these were (1) an increase in its conversion yield, or the volume of biofuel that it could produce from an inputted ton of biomass feedstock, and (2) a decrease in input costs. KiOR biofuels earned Renewable Identification Number (RIN) credits associated with the Renewable Fuel Standard 2 (RFS2) administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Since RINs had a market value, the RFS2 provided a subsidy to KiOR. However, it was unclear whether the credits would retain a value beyond 2022, and KiOR was in a race to realize the potential improvements in production technology and costs before RIN support vanished. This case examines the breakeven cost of the KiOR production technology, with and without cost improvements and with and without RIN support. It provides representative assumptions that students can use to analyze KiOR's business model and its sensitivity to policy support. The case package includes an Excel workbook that can be given to students to explore sensitivity analyses around technological and RIN value uncertainties.

It was the spring of 2010 and Cindy Padnos had just been named to Fast Company's list of "The Most Influential Women in Technology in 2010." Cindy had worked in the venture capital (VC) space for over a decade, launching her own firm, Illuminate Ventures, in 2009 with a focus on early-stage companies in the enterprise cloud computing space. Cindy's portfolio of personal investments was performing well, and if she could perform as well for Illuminate, the future would be bright. Regardless, before she got to make any investments on behalf of Illuminate Ventures I, she would need to raise capital for her fund in one of the most challenging economic times in recent history. While acknowledgements by media outlets like Fast Company never hurt, such accolades were not enough to secure the $35 million that was her target. As she looked back over her professional experiences in the corporate world and ahead to the hundreds of investor meetings that lay before her, Cindy reflected that this was perhaps one of the most difficult, but most rewarding, challenges she had ever undertaken.

The Airbnb case describes the very early days of this startup, beginning with the founders' original concept of renting out air beds and serving breakfast ("Airbed and Breakfast") in their apartment to conference attendees as an alternative to expensive hotel rooms. The founders grew the business by providing finding lodging options in people's homes for attendees of large events such as South by Southwest and the Democratic National Convention. Despite positive reviews and high spikes in activity associated with these events, the founders faced challenges achieving sustainable growth. In early 2009, they joined Y-Combinator and were forced to confront a series of decisions around how to improve the product such that it could grow into a profitable, long-term business.

This case profiles the launch and growth of Tough Mudder, a startup founded by Will Dean and Guy Livingstone in the mud run/adventure challenge space. Dean, an avid triathlete and marathoner, found these solitary endurance events boring, and wanted to come up with a new concept that would bond teams of people together to complete an athletic event that would test not only their physical strengths, but their will, determination and mental grit as well. The case chronicles the meteoric rise of Tough Mudder within the rapidly growing adventure race industry. As Tough Mudder looked ahead to 2013, it faced numerous opportunities and challenges, not the least of which was a move to host events internationally. The company also faced fierce competition and was constantly having to innovate in order to stay at the head of the pack. Finally, rapid growth meant scaling challenges within the organization that would need to be addressed if the company was going to maintain the high level of operational excellence that was so critical to the success of its events.

The Sunrun case profiles the evolution of this residential solar financing startup, focusing on the company's milestones leading up to the Series A financing round. Founded by two GSB graduates, Ed Fenster and Lynn Jurich, together with one of Fenster's high school classmates, Sunrun applied an innovative model from the commercial sector to residential solar, whereby homeowners could lease the solar panels that Sunrun owned and installed on rooftops. The case goes on to describe the co-founders' journey seeking Series A funding after they have invested their own money and raised outside capital from angel investors. It also provides the perspective of one of the leading VC firms in the Valley with regard to the strengths and weaknesses of the deal. Ultimately, the co-founders faced a decision: Should they accept more favorable terms with lower valuation from VC #1, more onerous terms but a higher valuation from VC #2, or could they afford to wait a bit longer until they closed a partnership to create a tax equity fund (used to fund the solar installations), which would potentially increase their valuation and the overall attractiveness of the investment?

This case, GSB No. E-459, explores the SeaMicro CEO's decision of whether or not to sell the company in early 2012. SeaMicro, a developer of low-power servers, has risen quickly as an innovative and significant force in a server market dominated by giants, including HP and Dell. In the fall of 2011, the company is approached by AMD, the industry's second largest microprocessor manufacturer behind Intel. AMD has faced challenging times in the recent past and is looking to acquire SeaMicro as a way to reinvent itself and establish a leadership position in the rapidly growing cloud computing space. Andrew Feldman, SeaMicro's CEO, must consider the implications of his decision to sell in the context of a variety of factors including his fiduciary duty to his investors and employees, other strategic opportunities with the likes of Dell, Samsung and ARM, and his own future.

The Sustainable Conservation case presents the story of San Francisco-based nonprofit that was founded to solve environmental problems in California through collaborative partnerships between the public and private sector. The nonprofit had built up strong expertise in the agriculture industry, with an early focus on the issues associated with water quality, air pollution, and land use. With a clear track record and a strong team in place, both the board and management team felt that the organization was poised to have even greater impact by expanding its projects and reach across California. Yet, it would clearly need a major influx of capital to execute upon that vision. Ashley and the board had therefore decided in 2011 to undertake the first major fundraising initiative in Sustainable Conservation's 19-year history. As Ashley read through the feedback from donors who had attended a recent event, she realized there were a number of questions yet to be answered to ensure that the initiative was successful.

The Serena and Lily case describes three challenging situations faced by Lily Kanter, CEO of Serena and Lily, a luxury home goods company. The first vignette involves Marta Calfee, one of Lily's first and most dedicated employees. As the company grows, Marta takes on increasing responsibilities, but it soon becomes clear that her title, compensation and domain are all greater than her actual capabilities, and Lily must determine how to scale back or let go one of her most loyal and trusted employees. In the second vignette, Lily deals with an extremely challenging investor/board member whose abrasive style and conflicting ideas about the strategic direction of the company threaten to severely hinder the company's progress. Finally, Lily is trying to recruit a highly valuable consultant to a permanent position at the company, but must figure out how to compete against a lucrative counter-offer from a highly esteemed retailer.

The Tiny Prints case describes the founding of the online stationery company in 2004, through its growth and evolution to 2007. The three cofounders bootstrapped the company from the beginning, primarily so that they could retain control over the decision-making and strategic direction of the company. While that decision allowed the cofounders flexibility and independence, it also led to capital constraints and a "good enough" culture that had a variety of positive and negative implications for the company. Ultimately, Tiny Prints was able to grow because of its very specific focus on the birth announcement, and later holiday, market, an emphasis on customer service and innovations in design and distribution. As of 2007, the founders faced questions regarding their future growth strategy, particularly given increasing competition in the market, and were at an inflection point where they needed to consider the important decision of bringing in outside capital. Part B of the case explores the management team's decision to move forward with a purchase offer from Shutterfly or to maintain control of the company and continue to grow organically.