Organic Wellness Products Private Limited (Organic Wellness) was founded in 2015 with the aim to create a sustainable venture for organic products that would boost agricultural entrepreneurship and benefit society by generating rural employment and value creation. By May 2018, Organic Wellness’s market had grown considerably, and the company was exporting to 27 countries around the world and had a pan-Indian presence. While its innovative marketing strategy—free of big spending—had worked well for the organization, the founder needed to decide if he would continue with the same style of cause-related marketing, or whether it was time to invest in marketing channels to create better consumer outreach.

Organic Wellness Products Private Limited (Organic Wellness) was founded in 2015 with the aim to create a sustainable venture for organic products that would boost agricultural entrepreneurship and benefit society by generating rural employment and value creation. By May 2018, Organic Wellness's market had grown considerably, and the company was exporting to 27 countries around the world and had a pan-Indian presence. While its innovative marketing strategy-free of big spending-had worked well for the organization, the founder needed to decide if he would continue with the same style of cause-related marketing, or whether it was time to invest in marketing channels to create better consumer outreach.

By 2016, the Indian taxi market was beginning to move from the unorganized sector to the organized sector, as evidenced by the emergence of radio cab services (cab operators that hired salaried drivers and used call centres for bookings) and cab aggregators (e.g., Uber and Ola Cabs). Initially, the market had only a few players, but the competition turned fierce after the entry of Ola Cabs and Uber led to major disruptions. None of the aggregators had yet achieved a positive bottom line, but industry reports and a speculated compound annual growth rate of 25–30 per cent suggested a bright future for the industry, provided the stakeholders could strategically tap into the opportunities. <br><br>A small taxi firm, Kanika International Tour and Travel Pvt. Ltd. (KITT), needed to come to terms with its falling market share, difficulties in retaining drivers, and decreasing profitability. In light of the intensifying competition, should KITT and other independent players hold on to their business, or should they join the aggregators?

By 2016, the Indian taxi market was beginning to move from the unorganized sector to the organized sector, as evidenced by the emergence of radio cab services (cab operators that hired salaried drivers and used call centres for bookings) and cab aggregators (e.g., Uber and Ola Cabs). Initially, the market had only a few players, but the competition turned fierce after the entry of Ola Cabs and Uber led to major disruptions. None of the aggregators had yet achieved a positive bottom line, but industry reports and a speculated compound annual growth rate of 25-30 per cent suggested a bright future for the industry, provided the stakeholders could strategically tap into the opportunities. A small taxi firm, Kanika International Tour and Travel Pvt. Ltd. (KITT), needed to come to terms with its falling market share, difficulties in retaining drivers, and decreasing profitability. In light of the intensifying competition, should KITT and other independent players hold on to their business, or should they join the aggregators?

When ICICI, an Indian private bank, entered the retail banking market in the 1990's with little technology infrastructure, capital, and retail expertise, had expected it to succeed. Public-sector banks, holding 75 percent of deposits, were dominating the retail banking market, and foreign giants had cornered the market for high-net-worth individuals living in the major cities across India. With a strategy to offer credit cards to the middle class, abolish annual fees, and enter into partnerships with major retailers, ICICI quickly proved the skeptics wrong. Revenues per employee grew to over $9 million compared to about $3 million for the Bank of India and slightly below $160,000 for Standard Chartered. The lofty number one position was achieved by Vaidyanathan, ICICI's head of retail, and his team. Their progressive initiatives were focused on developing new products and improving consumer service experiences. As the 2008-2009 financial crisis tripled the percentage of nonperforming assets in the Indian banking industry, Vaidyanathan had to plan how ICICI would adapt to the new environment and maintain industry leadership.