David Pong, co-founder and CEO of a water technology start-up, had good news to share with his team: after several rounds of pitching and evaluation, they had raised seed funding for their social enterprise, Wateroam. David had started Wateroam as a fresh university graduate with two younger co-founders in August 2014. The trio's mission was to tackle the global problem of water scarcity by providing water filtration systems to the rural poor. As a new start-up, Wateroam faced challenges in funding, product innovation, sales and distribution. Wateroam broke even in its second year of operation. In the four years since its formation, the social enterprise, which is based in Singapore, has provided people in 14 countries with access to clean water. Now, with this round of seed funding, Wateroam was poised to enter its next phase of growth and reach out to more underserved communities that were in dire need of clean water. As CEO, David had many important decisions to make. Chief among them was how he should scale up Wateroam, bearing in mind the latter's double bottom line of profitability and social impact.

In May 2018, Singapore's publicly-listed Hyflux Ltd, which was once the world's fifth largest desalination plant supplier, filed for court-supervised reorganisation of its liabilities and businesses. The company's total liabilities had escalated to S$3.4 billion (Including contingent liabilities); while its readily available cash balance was S$18.9 million and its market capitalisation was S$165 million. The court granted the company a debt moratorium, which was extended several times as Hyflux explored options of capital injection from strategic investors, asset sales and rescue financing. The revelation that the once-star company was under water and drowning in debt shocked the stakeholders. How and why did this reversal of fortune happen? Were there any red flags leading to this fallout? How would the financial restructuring affect the stakeholders? Finally, what lessons in financial management could be drawn for the company, creditors, banks and investors?

The case discusses attempts by Singapore Press Holdings Ltd (SPH) to transform its core media business, which was battered by digital disruption. Revenues from SPH's core media business (newspaper subscriptions and advertising revenues) had fallen year after year, as had its share price. What strategy should SPH adopt for its media business and what challenges could it expect? Would digital reinvention be the best course of action and the only way to go? Was SPH mired in a "do-or-die" predicament? The case also provides a concise description of the digital reinvention of the Washington Post, New York Times and South China Morning Post.

The Institute of Technical Education (ITE) was established by the Singapore government as a post-secondary principal provider of vocational and technical education (VTE). This case study chronicles ITE's transformation from a public education institution that was plagued by social stigma into an award-winning institution. It relates how in Singapore, VTE and ITE were destigmatized through a multi-pronged approach that encompassed social marketing, industry partnerships, strategic planning, and government support.

Founded in 1989, Olam International Limited began as a small trader of cashew nuts. Over the years, it grew into a multi-country, multi-product integrated agribusiness. In 2016, Olam was one of the 30 largest Singapore Exchange-listed companies by market capitalization and recorded annual turnover of US$14.2 billion. This case examines Olam's corporate strategy in three chronological phases: (i) 1989-2005 (organic growth); (ii) 2006-2012 (organic and inorganic growth); (iii) 2013-2016 (sustainable growth and generation of positive free cash flow). In November 2012, Olam temporarily put the brakes on its expansion drive following a short seller's attack. The third phase (2013-2016) saw Olam conducting a strategic review, re-calibrating its strategic plan, implementing restructuring initiatives, and working towards new goals and its new vision. During this period, Olam attracted capital from two strategic investors - Singapore's Temasek Holdings and Japan's Mitsubishi Corporation. Besides describing Olam's financing strategy, this case also summarizes Olam's major acquisitions, divestments, joint ventures and greenfield investments. This case may generate a discussion on the challenges that Olam would have to overcome in its quest to become the most differentiated and valuable global agribusiness.

In January 2017, Surbana Jurong Private Limited, a wholly-owned infrastructure consultancy of Singapore's Temasek Holdings, came under the spotlight for terminating 54 of its Singapore-based employees. Surbana Jurong said this was part of a performance review. However, the mass termination raised concerns that the company was retrenching workers under the banner of poor performance so that it wouldn't have to pay additional compensation to its former employees. According to Surbana Jurong, the mass termination was not a retrenchment exercise, but "rather, a small number of poor performers were communicated with and released." The termination episode drew negative reaction from the trade unions and the public, an open rebuke from the Manpower Minister, and a subsequent public commitment from Surbana Jurong to improve its performance management processes. What lessons could Surbana Jurong draw from this episode?

On 27 July 2016, Swiber Holdings Limited, a Singapore Exchange-listed provider of offshore engineering, procurement, installation and construction services for oil and gas companies, filed for voluntary liquidation. Two days later, Swiber withdrew the liquidation application and filed for judicial management instead. Swiber's actions shocked its stakeholders and the market. Its total notes payable was about US$437 million as of 27 July 2016; its debts owed to suppliers and subcontractors were about US$264 million as of 31 May 2016. In contrast, Swiber's market capitalization had shrunk to about US$37 million at the close of 27 July 2016. This case chronicles the rise and fall of Swiber's fortunes, describes the company's financing strategy through the years, and discusses the warning signs that heralded the company's collapse during the prolonged downturn in the oil and gas industry.

Singapore Post Limited (SingPost), Singapore's sole Public Postal Licensee, had set its sights on becoming the regional leader in e-commerce logistics and trusted communications. This goal was achieved through multi-million-dollar acquisitions in warehouses, freight forwarders, and parcel pickup services. Among the acquisitions were the 'Famous Acquisitions' comprising Famous Holdings Pte Ltd, FS Mackenzie Limited, and Famous Pacific Shipping (NZ) Limited. Between December 2015 and May 2016, a chain of events related to the 'Famous Acquisitions' unfolded at SingPost: its public admission of lapses in corporate governance disclosure, a special audit, a corporate governance review, resignation of the lead independent director, and change of the board chairman. The case discusses these events and describes what SingPost subsequently did to improve its corporate governance practices.

This case chronicles the formation and growth of Tiger Airways, a low-cost carrier headquartered in Singapore. It describes the business, managerial and operational challenges faced by Tiger Airways, especially as industry overcapacity became an overriding concern.

The case chronicles the development of Temasek Holdings, an investment company owned by the Singapore government from its inception in 1974 to 2015. It describes the different roles undertaken by the company in Singapore's economic transformation. Temasek functioned by the philosophy that its portfolio companies' decision-making process had to demonstrate transparency and accountability, which were brought about by institutionalizing good corporate governance practices, and not through its own participation in the management of the entities.