The collapse of central authority in the Soviet Union in 1991 ushered in a period of revolutionary transformations for the states that emerged in its wake. The leaders of Russia, the USSR's successor, struggled to reestablish central authority while also seeking to avoid further disintegration, establish a democratic polity, and institute a market economy across the next several years. Russia would navigate further economic crisis and a swiftly evolving geopolitical order as it returned to the world stage. The case examines the different governance approaches adopted by Presidents Boris Yeltsin, Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, and concludes with a discussion of Russia's strategic challenges and opportunities in 2019. The case focuses on problems of state authority; fiscal capacity; institutionalization of political parties; relations between the federal center and provincial governments; relations between the state and big business; economic policy; international relations; and models of economic development.

The United States could enhance or threaten China's energy security but China was unsure of the U.S. intentions. China and the United States were both friends and potential foes. In the meantime, Russia's own ambivalent relationship with the United States and its Western allies worsened. In this context, China and Russia grew closer. Bilateral ties in the energy trade quickly improved: Russian oil exports expanded, while disagreements on the terms of natural gas supplies were resolved. The case describes the impact of the interplay of great power politics, domestic political considerations, and economic factors on the efforts of the Chinese and Russian energy companies to expand business ties.

The 2014 Ukraine crisis once again exposed the mutually limiting knot-a web of commercial relationships and oil and gas pipelines-that historically tied the European Union and Russia closely. In this crisis, a familiar conundrum preoccupied minds in the corridors of power in Western capitals: how to compel Russia to respect the Western geopolitical preferences without harming European allies? The answer, as in the past, pointed to the lack of viable short-term solutions and the longer term need for gaining energy independence without sacrificing energy security in the EU. The case chronicles latest efforts, and its unintended consequences, by all-union authorities in Brussels to untie the Russian knot by implanting American inventions in the European soil: liberalized, transparent natural gas markets and shale gas production. Executives of European and Russian energy companies present their views.

In the fall of 2013, the people of Ukraine disagreed passionately whether their country should intensify ties with the European Union or Russia. After President Yanukovych rejected the free trade agreement with the EU in November, thousands of Ukrainians peacefully protested. But the protest movement morphed into a violent, deadly confrontation in January, culminating in February in mass slaughter, an overthrow of government, foreign invasion, and international crisis. The four months that shook Ukraine is a case study on the interrelated problems of geopolitical struggle, politics of economic pacts and clash of regional economic blocks, post-imperial disintegration and trade, and identity and interdependence.

Russia and China are neighbors with complementary needs: Russia has an abundance of energy resources, which China needs to fuel its industry. The case analyzes the evolution of the China-Russia energy relations in the post-Cold War period, with an emphasis on the political factors, external and domestic, impeding and contributing to the full realization of the potential of energy ties between Russia and China.

In an overview of natural gas as a fossil fuel and traded commodity, the case describes various regional markets of natural gas, highlighting diversity of price formation mechanisms across and within those markets. Recent changes in the economics of unconventional natural gas extraction-"the shale revolution"-could potentially remake those markets, steering the world toward the "golden age" of natural gas.

Russian and German energy firms initiated the Nord Stream natural gas pipeline project with strong political support from their home governments but encountered resistance from other states. Although the pipeline would connect Russia with Germany directly, the project was not simply a bilateral matter. First, a need to secure construction permits in multiple jurisdictions around the Baltic Sea involved other countries. And second, Germany's membership in the European Union entailed compliance with goals and values of the entire union, which stressed the imperative of collective action in energy matters and dangers of succumbing to "national reflexes." Thus the implications of the project became a matter of concern to the entire European Union but Europeans struggled to articulate the meaning of Nord Stream: was it a "separate peace" between Russia and Germany to the detriment of the rest, or was it a pan-European deal to the benefit of all? As the case chronicles, the success of Nord Stream depended on the ability of its creators to ensure that latter view prevailed over the former.

Nabucco natural gas pipeline, initiated by a group of European energy companies, was intended to connect the broad gas-rich region of the Middle East and Central Asia to Europe for the first time, which would diversify supply sources. At the same time, an Italian-Russian consortium announced South Stream natural gas pipeline, which would diversify transport routes for the delivery of Russian gas to Europe. To win support, backers of Nabucco and South Stream insisted that their projects were aimed at fulfilling goals of the energy policy of the EU (reduction of use of fossil fuels to combat climate change and guaranteed physical availability and affordability of imported fossil fuels). But, as the case demonstrates, both projects progressed slowly, encountering many technological and commercial challenges, which, however, were eclipsed by the extreme politicization of Nabucco and South Stream: pipelines became a factor in domestic politics of several European nations and figured prominently in relations between the EU, EU states, Russia, Turkey, former Soviet republics in Caucasus and Central Asia, and the United States. Although they would comprise only a small part in the overall architecture of Europe's energy security, the case of Nabucco and South Stream reveals the limits of the ambitious energy policy of the EU.

The collapse of central authority in the Soviet Union in 1991 ushered in a period of revolutionary transformations for the states that emerged in its wake. The leaders of Russia, the USSR's successor, since then have struggled to reestablish central authority while also seeking to avoid further disintegration, establish a democratic polity, and institute a market economy. The case contrasts different approaches adopted by Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin and concludes with a vision outlined by Russia's third post-Soviet president, Dmitry Medvedev. The case focuses on problems of state authority; fiscal capacity; institutionalization of political parties; relations between the federal center and provincial governments; relations between the state and big business; economic policy; and models of economic development.

In March 2009, the government of Iraq decided to hold its first oil field auctions. The auctions were for service contracts on the country's southern oil fields; the winner would obtain the right to produce oil above a certain target for a fixed fee. The bidders competed on the fee charged per barrel and the amount by which they promised to increase production. At the same time, the Kurdish regional government continued to sign Production Sharing Agreements with foreign companies for its oil fields, unrecognized by the national government. In a context of continuing (if much reduced) political violence and legislative deadlock in the national parliament, three actors needed to make key decisions. Jean Claude Gandur, the CEO of Addax Petroleum, needed to decide whether to continue investing in the Kurdish region in light of Baghdad's continuing opposition. The Iraqi oil minister, Hussein al-Shahristani, needed to design the oil auctions in such a way that oil companies would be moved to invest, and invest quickly, despite the lack of a national oil law. Finally, the American secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, needed to decide what Iraqi oil policy would be in the best interest of the United States, and what levers (if any) the U.S. government could pull in order to insure that such a policy would be carried out. What would the three actors decide, and how would their decisions affect the future of Iraq and the world oil market?

The first round of bidding on the rights to develop Iraq's oil field did not go as planned. All the bidding groups wanted to charge a fee per barrel that the Iraqi government considered too high. As a result, the Iraqi government conducted the auction a second time, this time making it clear that it would not consider fees above $2.00 per barrel. (In addition, the winner needed to deposit $500 million with the Iraqi oil ministry.) Only one bid was accepted: a consortium of the company formerly known as British Petroleum (now BP), the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), and the Iraqi-state-owned South Oil Company. The consortium had previously bid $3.99 for the same field. It now had to negotiate the actual terms of the contract with the Iraqi government. In addition, the executives in London and Beijing needed to decide whether it made sense to exercise the option they had just purchased. Would they be throwing good money after bad by investing in the Rumaila super-giant field at such a low fee per barrel, or would there be strategic returns down the line?

Although the global trend toward liberalization of electric utilities forced Enel, the largest power company in Italy, to give up some of its assets in its home base, it also opened up many opportunities abroad, including in Russia, one of the largest electricity markets in the world. The case outlines Enel's internationalization strategy and then focuses on one piece of the company's strategic puzzle of global expansion: acquisition of major power-generation assets in the course of the break-up of RAO UES, the Russian electricity monopoly. The case highlights the decision-making process by the company executives in the context of possible political risks to foreign investment in Russian strategic industries and economic risks to investment in the yet-to-be-formed liberalized and deregulated electricity market in Russia.

Critics have accused Gazprom, the world's largest natural gas producer, of eschewing market principles in favor of the foreign policy priorities of the Russian government, ever since the energy giant cut off the supply to Ukraine in January of 2006. The purported motive for the decision, however, seems to indicate the opposite: the company claimed that it had no other choice because the sides failed to conclude a contract on the terms of future trade. The case takes a look back in history for clues that may resolve this paradox. It highlights how politics shaped the economics of natural gas trade in the former Soviet Union and Europe since the late 1960s until the end of the 1990s; sketches the story of the creation of Gazprom by the first post-Soviet government of Russia; and describes how the erection of new sovereign borders in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, coupled with political and economic transition, created major problems in the gas trade between the former Soviet republics, emerging with the greatest intensity in the Russian-Ukrainian relations.

President Putin publicly stated that Gazprom, the largest natural gas producer in the world, was a powerful political lever of the Russian state in the world and a keystone in the foundation of the country's energy security. Thus the top leadership of Russia has charted the course of the company's future away from the seemingly imminent dismemberment, privatization, and, by implication, de-monopolization toward a challenging combination of strengthened state control, professional, transparent management, and a major expansion. The case explores how in 2000-2008 Gazprom's management has pursued the strategy defined by the politicians. Gazprom's impressive expansion strategy envisioned diversification of markets, products, transportation routes, and modes of delivery. The challenges were equally formidable: massive investment needs, a possibility of a production shortfall, and a chronic problem with the transit state of Ukraine, to name a few. In fact, Gazprom's ambitiousness fully reflected the ambitiousness of Russia as a whole, characteristic of the Putin era.

The case describes the resolution to the January 2006 gas crisis, precipitated by the decision of Gazprom, the largest natural gas producer in the world, to cut off gas supply to Ukraine because of disagreement on the terms of future trade. The case also narrates the events that have followed: the adoption by Gazprom of a comprehensive policy to renegotiate prices with the rest of the former Soviet states; the erratic relationship with Ukraine, dependent on the internal political configuration in the latter at any given time; and a persistence of Gazprom's negative image in the world.