In June 2009, Greenpeace accused the cattle industry of contributing to deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Big brands that bought beef and leather were named as silent partners to the practice. Pressure from Greenpeace and the Brazilian government led to major changes. Meatpackers Bertin, JBS, Marfrig, and Minerva, responsible for one-third of exports, agreed to stop purchasing directly and indirectly from ranches that cleared more forest than legally permitted, and committed to buying from direct and indirect suppliers that reduced deforestation to zero. Fernando Sampaio, executive director of Abiec, the Brazilian Beef Exporters Association, worked closely with meatpackers that exported beef to comply with deforestation agreements. While Abiec's mission was to grow the export sector, his members were now asked to take an active role in curbing deforestation. Progress was promising. Deforestation dropped by over 80 percent from 2004 to 2014, attributable in part to the cattle agreements. This was clear progress, since the cattle sector in the Amazon was one of the largest drivers of global deforestation. Yet, traceability of animal movements among farms and slaughterhouses was a big challenge. Some non-compliant ranches were selling to slaughterhouses without full monitoring systems. Other non-compliant ranches were selling cattle into legitimate supply chains through licensed ranches. By mid-2015, Brazilian Amazon deforestation had grown by 16 percent compared to the prior year, demonstrating that gains were fragile. How could Abiec, which represented 29 meatpackers responsible for 70 percent of slaughtering and 93 percent of exports, persuade more members to adopt a zero-deforestation policy and demand supplier compliance? Sampaio's goal of growing sales for his members while curbing deforestation was complex and required working with many beef value chain actors.

Before opening its first store in India in 1996, McDonald's spent six years building its supply chain. During that time, the company worked to successfully source as many ingredients as possible from India. However, French fries ("MacFries") were a particularly tough product to source locally-and importing fries was undesirable for both cost and availability reasons. Growing potatoes suitable for use as fries was challenging in India. By 2007, 11 years after opening its first restaurant, the MacFry was finally being produced in India. McDonald's main MacFry supplier was the Canadian company McCain, which spent many years working on potato agronomy and with farmers to build up supply in India. From 2007 to 2011, local MacFry production increased from none to 75 percent of sales. Despite the strides made, in 2011 Abhijit Upadhye, McDonald's then senior director of Supply Chain India was still a worried man. Double-digit food inflation in India had been putting cost pressure on the company. McDonald's had aggressive growth plans for the coming years. The company had 240 restaurants, and planned to more than double by 2014. The MacFry was the single largest procurement item, so having a 100 percent local supply was critical to avoiding high import duties. The question that troubled him was: "Will I ever be able to eliminate imported fries from my supply chain?" This case describes McDonald's India and McCain India's efforts to optimize the MacFry supply chain by increasing local supply in a fast-growing emerging market using agronomy, farmer relationship development and value chain innovation.