In 2016, the German utility RWE undertook a carve-out in which substantial parts of the company's assets and liabilities were offered to the general public as part of an IPO. The case describes the developments in the German energy landscape that led RWE to this unusual move. The case also examines how investors responded to this carve-out in terms of the valuations attached to RWE and the new subsidiary.
In 2016, the €75 billion French multinational energy conglomerate ENGIE was massively transforming its strategic and operational imperatives toward renewable energy. The 200-year old company owned Europe's biggest natural gas pipeline and was a major global producer and supplier of natural gas and other energy sources. ENGIE had announced the transformation in 2014-following a sharp drop in global fossil fuel prices-viewing it as the beginning of a new era in energy. ENGIE set goals to double renewable power capacity for Europe over the next decade, rapidly expand its renewable footprint in high growth regions such as India and China, slash its lines of businesses based on commodities, and reduce exploration of oil and gas. CEO Isabelle Kocher's vision followed her belief that "the name of the game was to take the lead in the new energy world." The case is set in mid-2015, when top management, convinced that ENGIE needed to build a strong global portfolio quickly, acquired nine-year old French energy company Solairedirect for €200 million. The acquisition made ENGIE the number one solar company in France and gave it an international presence and product pipeline. Solairedirect had a profitable business model-different from ENGIE's-that enabled it to rapidly build utility scale solar photovoltaic installations at competitive prices. ENGIE believed that buying the smaller company would bring an entrepreneurial spirit and new way of thinking to the company. However, ENGIE had just reorganized along mostly geographical business units, and Solairedirect did not fit into that organizational structure. Also, when ENGIE acquired Solairedirect, the solar company had just experienced an unsuccessful IPO attempt. The questions arose as to whether a company in that situation was a good acquisition target; whether ENGIE paid the right price for it; and how, and to what extent, Solairedirect could or should be integrated into the larger organization.
In 2015, Generation Investment Management celebrated the successful 10-year track record of its flagship Global Equity Fund, which outperformed its benchmark index by over 500 basis points per year. A mainstream investment firm whose founders included former United States Vice President Al Gore and former head of Goldman Sachs Asset Management David Blood, Generation integrated qualitative sustainability factors such as environmental, social, and governance issues with traditional financial equity analysis. Along the way, Generation proved to skeptics that it was capable of building a mission-driven investment firm that prioritized returns and delivered superior results. Generation faced a significant challenge to its long-term investment focus during the global financial crisis in 2008. One of its largest holdings, the Irish industrial panel manufacturer Kingspan Group, saw its equity price drop almost 65 percent in one year. Confronted with this precipitous drop, the Global Equity Fund team decided that it needed to revisit its analytical process and question what, if anything, it had missed. This case provides an overview of Generation's philosophy, culture and organizational structure. It includes an in-depth look at the Global Equity Fund's qualitative and quantitative investment process that utilizes the Kingspan Group investment as an example. Optional Excel spreadsheets are available to enable students to analyze Generation's valuation methodology in greater detail.
Between 2010 and 2012, SolarCity experienced tremendous growth in an industry that was generally perceived to be struggling. Many other solar start-ups were failing-Solyndra, which had received a $535M loan from the U.S. government, was the highest profile failure, declaring bankruptcy in September, 2011. Lyndon Rive noted, "Investors have been burned so badly from the solar sector. We've faced that stigma while selling our company to investors." Despite that burn, however, SolarCity went forward with an initial public offering (IPO) in December of 2012 at an IPO price of $8.00 per share. By end of the second quarter, 2014, SolarCity operated in 15 states and the District of Columbia and boasted 140,000 customers. It controlled 36 percent of the residential solar market but had never posted a profit-in 2013 it had a net loss of almost $152 million. SolarCity's growth, however, drove the stock price up, hitting a high of $86.14 in February 2014. The company's continued lack of positive accounting earnings, yet impressive stock returns, left analysts and industry observers wondering: Was SolarCity already making money on installations like the Partnership Flip Model or was the company's share price primarily a bet on the future with lower solar installations costs? This case describes SolarCity's business model and summarizes key issues in the solar industry. It looks at tax equity financing, detailing the Partnership Flip Model which SolarCity used for about two thirds of the funds it had raised by 2014. The Partnership Flip Model is represented in an Excel spreadsheet that students manipulate to understand the implications of various factors.
Between 2010 and 2012, SolarCity experienced tremendous growth in an industry that was generally perceived to be struggling. Many other solar start-ups were failing-Solyndra, which had received a $535M loan from the U.S. government, was the highest profile failure, declaring bankruptcy in September, 2011. Lyndon Rive noted, "Investors have been burned so badly from the solar sector. We've faced that stigma while selling our company to investors." Despite that burn, however, SolarCity went forward with an initial public offering (IPO) in December of 2012 at an IPO price of $8.00 per share. By end of the second quarter, 2014, SolarCity operated in 15 states and the District of Columbia and boasted 140,000 customers. It controlled 36 percent of the residential solar market but had never posted a profit-in 2013 it had a net loss of almost $152 million.
This case illustrates the tragedy of the commons through an interactive game to be played by students. At a United Nations world climate conference, students are divided into 10 regional blocs. With less than a day to go and no agreement among the regional blocs in sight, students use data in the case to advise the countries in their bloc regarding the collective level of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions they should adopt. When a last minute carbon tax proposal circulates, students must also recommend whether or not their bloc should sign onto the proposal. This case package includes an Excel Spreadsheet that students can use to understand the impact on Net Domestic Product (NDP) of different carbon emissions levels. Due to the need to work in groups, the case can also serve as an icebreaker.
In 2012, KiOR was in the process of starting biofuels production at its first plant in Columbus, Mississippi. This initial plant was to provide a commercial scale proof-of-concept of KiOR's production technology, and the company expected to build another set of plants in Natchez, MS using "copy exact" principles. These latter plants would be three times the size of the Columbus plants, and KiOR anticipated a number of improvements in its production methodology. Among these were (1) an increase in its conversion yield, or the volume of biofuel that it could produce from an inputted ton of biomass feedstock, and (2) a decrease in input costs. KiOR biofuels earned Renewable Identification Number (RIN) credits associated with the Renewable Fuel Standard 2 (RFS2) administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Since RINs had a market value, the RFS2 provided a subsidy to KiOR. However, it was unclear whether the credits would retain a value beyond 2022, and KiOR was in a race to realize the potential improvements in production technology and costs before RIN support vanished. This case examines the breakeven cost of the KiOR production technology, with and without cost improvements and with and without RIN support. It provides representative assumptions that students can use to analyze KiOR's business model and its sensitivity to policy support. The case package includes an Excel workbook that can be given to students to explore sensitivity analyses around technological and RIN value uncertainties.
Environmental stewardship was part of REI's culture since the company was founded, and integral to its corporate purpose. In 2005, REI began carefully measuring its environmental impact, establishing aggressive sustainability goals, and implementing programs to achieve these goals. The corporate social responsibility group, which oversaw the environmental sustainability program, took the approach that social and financial objectives should not be viewed as tradeoffs. For instance, growth objectives (increasing the number of stores and sales per store) should not come at the expense of energy consumption objectives for flat or decreasing corporate energy usage. Insisting that both objectives be met would lead to creating thinking and innovative solutions. The case describes the environmental stewardship program at REI, its objectives, and philosophy of implementation.
In 2010, Recreational Equipment, Inc. (REI) considered adding photovoltaic solar panels to the roofs of some of its facilities. This was driven by both financial and environmental considerations. In 2008, the company had added solar panels to 11 buildings in a project ("Phase 1") that was justified largely as a learning exercise. The new project ("Phase 2") would have to meet both financial and environmental objectives. The case describes the company's experience with solar power generation as well as providing representative assumptions for parameters in the financial analysis. An Excel spreadsheet is available for students, incorporating the basic analytical methodology used by REI.
In December 2003, the management teams at the automotive and steel businesses of The Timken Corp., headquartered in Canton, Ohio, were principally in agreement that market price was the appropriate instrument for valuing internal steel transfers. At the same time, both management teams had reservations about details of the implementation of market-based transfer pricing as it stood. Asks students to assess whether the transfer pricing policy for steel transfers inhibited the automotive division from exercising its market power as a purchaser of bearings quality steel. Also asks students to comment on the usefulness of the Minimum Rule, assess Timken's policy of market-based transfer pricing rules for steel, and compare cost-based transfer prices to market-based prices.
In March 1996, the ASIC division of Sub-Micron Devices received an inquiry from Western Digital: would ASIC be willing to supply 3 million chips annually for a period of 3 years at a price of $40/chip? ASIC's controller, Gary Ravenport, convened a meeting with Peter Parks, his assistant, to review the profitability of the Western Digital proposal.