The Silos, an industrial heritage building located in the Shekou Industrial Park in Shenzhen, China, was formerly a glass factory building that became industrial ruins. In November 2022, L&A Group transformed this industrial site into China’s first industrial site digital museum, its first metaverse experience centre, and a new landmark of Shenzhen digital cultural tourism. When the first phase of exhibition closed on May 31, 2023, the Silos had brought real profits to L&A Group by using the metaverse as the main selling point. However, considering the waning metaverse mania in China, the Silos needed to design and position its next selling point. Could L&A achieve strategic upgrading and sustainable development of this project?
In 2022, Runhua Group was a well-known automobile dealer in China with a large market share in the traditional fuel vehicle market. The recent surge of new energy (i.e., plug-in electric) vehicles was having a strong impact on the company’s main business. The high number of new automobile companies entering this promising market was threatening the dealership model, the traditional sales and distribution channel that dominated the market. Runhua Group had always held a long-term vision and a cautious attitude. However, it had to make a decision on how to respond to the subversive changes in the automotive industry in a timely manner. What should be the company’s strategy for the new energy vehicle business? How should it select which new energy brands to partner with?
Xiaomi was a famous Chinese consumer electronics and intelligent manufacturing business group. Since Xiaomi announced its entry into the intelligent electric vehicle industry on March 30, 2021, the topic of its boundary-spanning car manufacturing had attracted wide attention. Could Xiaomi seize the cusp of new energy vehicle development and grab a piece of the pie in this fiercely competitive market? Compared with other players with different backgrounds and strengths in this industry, had Xiaomi missed the best time window to enter? In order to become a top seller, how should Xiaomi position its new energy vehicles and design its competitive strategy? Could Xiaomi easily transfer its existing advantages and resources to its new business?
On June 5, 2021, an eleven-story building developed by the BROAD Group was completed in Changsha, China, in just 28 hours and 45 minutes. This building, known as the Holon Building, had the advantages of a long lifespan, short construction period, strong earthquake and typhoon resistance, low cost, high comfort and energy savings, and global transportability. Because of its standardized installation and 100 per cent factory prefabrication of all modules, Holon was well suited to various types of buildings. However, as a newly emerging technology, the Holon Building needed time and great effort to gain wide acceptance. BROAD's chairman and chief executive officer, Zhang Yue, was wondering about the feasibility of Holon buildings’ global market expansion.
In March 2021, the wine trade war between China and Australia was escalating, and the competitive landscape in China’s wine market had changed dramatically in just three months. Asa Top, a Chinese import company that had represented certain Australian wineries for over a decade, had to rethink its marketing strategy. The general manager of Asa Top did not know when the recent trade friction between China Australia would end. After the Chinese government introduced its new tariff policy on Australian wine, other participants in the Chinese wine market had quickly reacted to claim Australian wine’s market share in China. How should Asa Top deal with the impact of the duties, reduce the losses, and explore future co-operation with Australia’s winemakers?
Hongxing ERKE Industrial Co., Ltd. (ERKE), founded in 2000, was the first large Chinese sportswear company to list overseas. Despite the difficulties it faced caused by poor management and the decline of its brand influence, ERKE donated ¥50 million worth of aid to disaster-hit areas in Henan, China, shortly after severe flooding in the province in July 2021. The donation caused an unprecedented online event in China and ignited the enthusiasm of netizens for buying ERKE products. Millions of netizens rushed to ERKE’s livestreaming studios and expressed their gratitude and support for the company through “wild consumption.” ERKE became representative in consumers’ minds of excellent domestic products that were part of Chinese fashion trends. Why had ERKE’s donation become such a hot topic and triggered a consumption binge in China? On the heels of this situation, how should ERKE use the opportunity to achieve a long-term competitive advantage in the future?
In May 2020, Chinese state-owned Shandong Gold Group was attempting to acquire the Canadian gold mining company TMAC Resources, whose gold mines were located in the High Arctic. If this acquisition took place, it would be the first time Shandong Gold Group would operate a gold mine outside of China. However, it would be a challenge for Shandong Gold Group to operate a mine in such a hard-to-navigate polar environment. As well, there were other lingering questions: How would the company handle the relationships with the indigenous Inuit people during the development stage of the project? Would Shandong Gold Group’s potential acquisition of TMAC Resources be successful, considering the Canadian government’s recent strengthening of its reviews of foreign acquisitions of Canadian companies? Would Shandong Gold Group’s state-owned identity increase the uncertainty of this potential transaction?
In mid-2020, the organizer of the Qingdao International Beer Festival (QIBF) faced a predicament. The QIBF was an annual festival held every August in Qingdao, China; however, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the organizer had initially abandoned the idea of holding the QIBF in 2020. By the end of March 2020, the spread of the pandemic in China had been basically contained. The organizer then decided to restart the event preparations. However, on June 12, 2020, a second COVID-19 outbreak occurred in Beijing. Could the QIBF be held as expected in August 2020? What should be done to control the pandemic’s spread and coordinate the planning and design work of the festival? Based on this predicament, could the organizer meet the festival's goals while safeguarding the health of all participants?
In 2015, the management of Haier Group (Haier), a Chinese company that designed, developed, manufactured, marketed, and serviced home appliances, faced a dilemma. Established in 2007, Casarte, Haier’s high-end sub-brand, had sustained only a mediocre performance from 2007 to 2014, and its sales revenue had remained low. Had brand cannibalization occurred between Haier’s mid-range to high-end products and Casarte’s high-end offerings? Should Haier continue to develop Casarte, which would require more risk and investment? Or should it cut its losses and discontinue the business, which could hurt Haier’s ability to compete in the high-end market?
Holding a massive beer festival brought the Chinese city of Qingdao and Tsingtao Beer Co. Ltd., China’s most famous beer brand, direct economic benefits and public awareness. However, through the Qingdao International Beer Festival—a natural advertising opportunity—foreign beers benefited as well. To date, Chinese beer brands held less than half of the high-end Chinese beer market. China levied no tariffs on beer imports, which increased the market competition. Were the objectives of Tsingtao Beer and the local government fully aligned with regard to the annual festival? Was the beer festival helping one more than it helped the other? Did it help Tsingtao Beer’s competitors? Should the Qingdao International Beer Festival work to recapture or emphasize some of its own cultural uniqueness?
In May 2018, a China-born entrepreneur living in Canada was at a seaside market in Qingdao, China, inspecting inexpensive pearls. She wondered whether pearls presented a good market opportunity in the West. At markets in China, she consistently found cultured pearls that would cost far more in Canada. This experience led her to wonder whether or not it was feasible to sell pearls on a wholesale basis in Canada, or perhaps through one of many retail options. Or was there a reason why pearls—such a timeless product—did not present more of a dynamic market opportunity in the West?
Hisense Co., Ltd. (Hisense) was the fourth-largest television maker in the world, but its market share and brand recognition remained low in Europe. Therefore, strengthening its branding and improving its sales there were priorities for the Chinese company. In 2013, Hisense was considering whether to establish a strategic alliance with the German high-end television manufacturer Loewe AG (Loewe). Despite having a good reputation, Loewe was suffering severe financial distress and facing possible bankruptcy. If Hisense co-operated with Loewe, it would gain access to Loewe’s distribution network in Europe and utilize co-brand advertising with Loewe. In turn, Loewe would benefit from Hisense’s long-term technical support and gain access to the promising Asian market. Should they proceed?
Before re-entering the Southeast Asian market in 2015, the Hisense-Hitachi joint venture mainly used the well known Hitachi brand to explore overseas markets for the sale of commercial central air conditioners. After the JV had accumulated enough capacity to adopt a product differentiation strategy, they decided to treat the Hisense brand as the focal brand in Southeast Asia and adopted a series of distribution strategies that differed from what they had used to sell Hitachi branded products elsewhere. The (B) case provides a basis for discussing target market selection, and the establishment of varying distribution channels (exclusive vs non-exclusive agents) in different countries. This case can be used with Hisense-Hitachi Joint Venture (A): Expanding Internationally (9B16M169).
In June 2014, Hisense of China and Hitachi of Japan were considering whether their 11-year-old joint venture (JV) should once again assume responsibility for its international sales. After developing a solid central air-conditioner market share in China, in 2009, the JV began to sell in various overseas regions but struggled. In April 2012, the partners agreed to have a Hisense subsidiary (the HIMC) assume full responsibility for selling the JV’s products overseas. However, over the next two years, HIMC’s performance in selling the JV’s products overseas was unsatisfactory. In response, the partners began to discuss whether they should have the JV sell its own products again overseas. Of immediate interest was the Southeast Asian market. This case can be used with Hisense-Hitachi Joint Venture (B): Expanding in Southeast Asia, 9B16M220