In 2009, two young entrepreneurs created Convene, a New York based company with an innovative business model that catered to an underserved segment of the local meetings industry. They were in the unique position of having no real direct competitors and a tight grip on a niche market within a US$15 billion industry. However, to achieve their growth ambitions for the company, the duo had to deftly navigate the changing competitive landscape, identifying which players could become real competitors and which could be co-opted into becoming partners and clients. They also needed to adapt their business model to capture these opportunities. Over time, their expensive expansion standards and operating costs began to present a nagging concern: With only so much capital available each year, just how quickly could Convene really grow? Would the capital intensiveness of their current model stymie the rapid growth that they so desperately wanted (and needed) to achieve in order to establish a nationally recognized brand?
In 2009, two young entrepreneurs created Convene, a New York-based company with an innovative business model that catered to an underserved segment of the local meetings industry. They were in the unique position of having no real direct competitors and a tight grip on a niche market within a US$15 billion industry. However, to achieve their growth ambitions for the company, the duo had to deftly navigate the changing competitive landscape, identifying which players could become real competitors and which could be co-opted into becoming partners and clients. They also needed to adapt their business model to capture these opportunities. Over time, their expensive expansion standards and operating costs began to present a nagging concern: With only so much capital available each year, just how quickly could Convene really grow? Would the capital intensiveness of their current model stymie the rapid growth that they so desperately wanted (and needed) to achieve in order to establish a nationally recognized brand?
In fall 2009, the new president and chief executive officer of PAR Springer-Miller Systems, based in Stowe, Vermont, is tasked with leading the most significant innovation effort the company has undertaken since its founding in 1984. The company is a leading provider of property management, point-of-sale and spa management systems for high-end hotels, resorts, spas and casinos worldwide, but its legacy products are based on outdated technology and subject to increasing customer complaints; at the same time, the global recession has negatively affected the high-end market. In his first year, the new president has made significant progress in restructuring the organization and shifting its culture to a more entrepreneurial one. He is ready to begin the development of an entirely new product but has to decide on strategy, in particular deciding on the best market on which to focus the new software product and then mapping out a plan to execute its development and launch. How can he elicit a radical innovation from a team of management and employees so culturally rooted in their past accomplishments and legacy products? Should he look for a technology partner and develop the new product in a different location? Can the legacy products be kept up and running long enough for the new product to generate sufficient sales that they can be retired? These are the issues that must be addressed or the company may well face a dire future. See A Case 9B14C022.
In fall 2009, the new president and chief executive officer of PAR Springer-Miller Systems, based in Stowe, Vermont, is tasked with leading the most significant innovation effort the company has undertaken since its founding in 1984. The company is a leading provider of property management, point-of-sale and spa management systems for high-end hotels, resorts, spas and casinos worldwide, but its legacy products are based on outdated technology and subject to increasing customer complaints; at the same time, the global recession has negatively affected the high-end market. In his first year, the new president has made significant progress in restructuring the organization and shifting its culture to a more entrepreneurial one. He is ready to begin the development of an entirely new product but has to decide on strategy, in particular deciding on the best market on which to focus the new software product and then mapping out a plan to execute its development and launch. How can he elicit a radical innovation from a team of management and employees so culturally rooted in their past accomplishments and legacy products? Should he look for a technology partner and develop the new product in a different location? Can the legacy products be kept up and running long enough for the new product to generate sufficient sales that they can be retired? These are the issues that must be addressed or the company may well face a dire future. See B Case 9B14C023.
In fall 2009, the new president and chief executive officer of PAR Springer-Miller Systems, based in Stowe, Vermont, is tasked with leading the most significant innovation effort the company has undertaken since its founding in 1984. The company is a leading provider of property management, point-of-sale and spa management systems for high-end hotels, resorts, spas and casinos worldwide, but its legacy products are based on outdated technology and subject to increasing customer complaints; at the same time, the global recession has negatively affected the high-end market. In his first year, the new president has made significant progress in restructuring the organization and shifting its culture to a more entrepreneurial one. He is ready to begin the development of an entirely new product but has to decide on strategy, in particular deciding on the best market on which to focus the new software product and then mapping out a plan to execute its development and launch. How can he elicit a radical innovation from a team of management and employees so culturally rooted in their past accomplishments and legacy products? Should he look for a technology partner and develop the new product in a different location? Can the legacy products be kept up and running long enough for the new product to generate sufficient sales that they can be retired? These are the issues that must be addressed or the company may well face a dire future.<br><br>See B Case 9B14C023.
In fall 2009, the new president and chief executive officer of PAR Springer-Miller Systems, based in Stowe, Vermont, is tasked with leading the most significant innovation effort the company has undertaken since its founding in 1984. The company is a leading provider of property management, point-of-sale and spa management systems for high-end hotels, resorts, spas and casinos worldwide, but its legacy products are based on outdated technology and subject to increasing customer complaints; at the same time, the global recession has negatively affected the high-end market. In his first year, the new president has made significant progress in restructuring the organization and shifting its culture to a more entrepreneurial one. He is ready to begin the development of an entirely new product but has to decide on strategy, in particular deciding on the best market on which to focus the new software product and then mapping out a plan to execute its development and launch. How can he elicit a radical innovation from a team of management and employees so culturally rooted in their past accomplishments and legacy products? Should he look for a technology partner and develop the new product in a different location? Can the legacy products be kept up and running long enough for the new product to generate sufficient sales that they can be retired? These are the issues that must be addressed or the company may well face a dire future.<br><br>See A Case 9B14C022.
Marissa Mayer has been asked to think about factors that were impacting Google's ability to innovate and adjust its strategy so that the organization could remain one of the world's foremost leaders in technology. In an industry (and at a company) that was changing and growing exponentially, it would be difficult to pinpoint specific variables and trends. But Mayer knew that one element crucial to Google's ongoing success would be its ability to recruit the best talent available and foster an environment that would encourage that talent to generate the best ideas. As Mayer contemplated how to ensure this, she considered that women currently represented only a small fraction of Google's engineers, suggesting a missed opportunity.
Cantel Inc. had just been granted a license from the Canadian Department of Communications to provide a national air network for a new mass communications technology, cellular radio communications. In devising a marketing strategy, the management team questioned whether the company should be involved in the provision of a complete cellular package, including the promotion, sales, installation and maintenance of both cellular telephones and network subscriptions. In addition, they were considering alternative distribution channels for bringing cellular to potential end users, and pricing and promotional programs were not yet finalized.