When announcing their agreement to merge in December 2021, creating a clear leader in global pest control, UK-based Rentokil and Tennessee-based Terminix described extensive benefits of the cross-border combination. The companies touted the advantages of their combined scale, their complementary portfolios of products, regions and technologies, and the significant cost synergies. Yet, the markets seemed entirely unimpressed, with Rentokil's share price down 9% in the hours after the deal was announced. While the boards of both companies had recommended the merger, it would now be up to shareholders to decide. Was this deal a lifeline for long-suffering Terminix investors, who were increasingly apprehensive about the company's ability to improve performance? Was this the right moment for Rentokil to pursue such a large deal rather than continue with its historical approach of gradually consolidating the market? In short, would this proposed combination create value, and if so, for whom?
This technical note provides an overview of key analytical approaches that are useful in assessing the appropriateness of a firm's capital structure and funding plan. This note introduces basic quantitative tools and metrics that are commonly used as inputs to this broader financial planning process. These tools can be useful as part of an initial assessment of a firm's financial health, as well.
This case examines Delta Air Lines' response as demand for its services plummeted in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, with a focus on the company's funding needs and capital structure. Following a series of initial actions, the company's cash "burn" had reduced from $100 million per day at the start of the pandemic to approximately $27 million per day by the summer of 2020; in addition, Delta had amassed significant liquidity and amended its financial covenants. However, the company's shares were trading at roughly half their pre-crisis levels, rating agencies had downgraded Delta's credit rating to "junk" status, and a second wave of coronavirus infections was underway in the United States. Now, management would have to determine if Delta was sufficiently well-positioned to survive and eventually compete in the post-COVID recovery ... or if they needed to take further action to prepare for a prolonged crisis. How should the company manage its capital structure in the face of such industry uncertainty? What actions should be pursued to mitigate the financial and operational risks? Should the company raise additional funding, and if so, of what kind and from whom? How should various stakeholders' concerns be prioritized and reconciled, ranging from shareholders to employees to government?
Considers the decision faced by state pension fund manager Rod Calhoun as he decides whether to invest $200 million in Bain Capital's eleventh global buyout fund: Bain Capital Fund XI. For the fund, Bain was offering its limited partners a choice among three different fee structures: first, a "conventional" fee structure of a 1.5% management fee with 20% carried interest and a 7% preferred rate of return; second, a 1% management fee with 30% carried interest and a 7% preferred rate of return; or third, a 0.5% management fee, 30% carried interest, and a 0% preferred rate of return. Should Calhoun invest in Bain? If he should, which fee structure should Calhoun choose?