Until recently most incumbent industrial companies didn't use highly advanced software in their products. But now the sector's leaders have begun applying generative AI and machine learning to all kinds of data-including text, 3D images, video, and sound-to create complex, innovative designs and solve customer problems with unprecedented speed. Success involves much more than installing computers in products, however. It requires fusion strategies, which join what manufacturers do best-creating physical products-with what digital firms do best: mining giant data sets for critical insights. There are four kinds of fusion strategies: Fusion products, like smart glass, are designed from scratch to collect and leverage information on product use in real time. Fusion services, like Rolls-Royce's service for increasing the fuel efficiency of aircraft, deliver immediate customized recommendations from AI. Fusion systems, like Honeywell's for building management, integrate machines from multiple suppliers in ways that enhance them all. And fusion solutions, such as Deere's for increasing yields for farmers, combine products, services, and systems with partner companies' innovations in ways that greatly improve customers' performance.

PepsiCo is among the few global, established companies that have delivered superior financial performance while meeting the needs of all stakeholders. It has always invested for the long term and delivered results in the short term. The layer that author Indra Nooyi added, first as SVP for corporate strategy and then as CEO, was a focus on sustainability--defined here as satisfying multiple stakeholder interests to ensure the long-term viability of a company. Called Performance with Purpose (PwP), it is based on four pillars: delivering superior financial returns (financial sustainability); transforming the product portfolio by making more-healthful, more-nutritious foods and beverages while reducing the sugar, salt, and fat in PepsiCo products (human sustainability); limiting environmental impact by conserving water and reducing the company's carbon footprint and plastic waste (environmental sustainability); and lifting people up by offering new types of support to women and families inside the company and in the communities it serves (talent sustainability).

Although most manufacturers are beginning to flirt with digital technologies, not one has successfully pulled off a digital transformation. CEOs still have to figure out its art - and science - forcing them to draw up their game plans on the fly, which inevitably leads to tension and trauma. But they are learning. Here's how GE has navigated its own digital transformation process.

The U.S. health care system needs reform, but too often experts focus on top-down solutions stemming from federal policy changes. Such efforts alone, however, cannot fix a wasteful and misdirected system. What's needed is innovation driven by doctors, nurses, administrators, entrepreneurs, and even patients who are devising new solutions to daily challenges. This article looks at two examples of bottom-up innovation, each involving a radical transformation of health care delivery. The University of Mississippi Medical Center created a homegrown telehealth network to increase patient access to care; Iora Health developed a new business model that doubled down on primary care to reap large savings in secondary and tertiary care. These successful initiatives--one from an incumbent health care provider and one from a business start-up--demonstrate the potential of creative leaders to reshape the U.S. health system.

Snapchat's initial public offering, which provided shares with no voting rights, is a culmination of the growing trend of dual-class shares. It contradicts the precept of one-share, one-vote that is essential for corporate democracy. Snapchat's action caused an uproar among influential investors. In January 2017, a coalition of the world's biggest money managers, which together control more than $17 trillion in assets, demanded a total ban on dual-class shares. We reason that the increasing prominence of dual-class stock is explained by the confluence of three economic trends: the growing importance of intangible investments, the rise of activist investors, and the decline of staggered boards and poison pills. A dual-class structure offers immunity against proxy contests initiated by short-term investors. It enables managers to ignore capital market pressures and to avoid myopic actions such as cutting research and development, which hurt companies in the long term. Thus, a dual-class structure is optimal in certain scenarios. We put forth alternatives to dual-class structure that enable managers to maintain control while retaining focus on sustainable value creation.

Most leaders recognize that innovation entails optimizing their existing business while at the same time, innovating to create new value for the future. Professor and author Vijay Govindarajan argues that an important third step must be added: proactively letting go of yesterday's beliefs. In this wide-ranging interview, he describes his Three Box Solution, which addresses all three required steps. The problem, he says, is that most of today's leaders focus on Box 1 and ignore the other two boxes. He also explains the difference between linear and non-linear innovation, the role of 'weak signals' in the environment, and the concept of 'reverse innovation'.

"Planned opportunism" is the author's term for responding to an unpredictable future by paying attention to weak signals--early evidence of emerging trends from which it is possible to deduce important changes in demography, technology, customer tastes and needs, and economic, environmental, regulatory, and political forces. That attention gives rise to fresh perspectives and nonlinear thinking, which help an organization imagine and plan for various plausible futures. Planned opportunism is a discipline that creates a "circulatory system" for new ideas; develops the capacity to prioritize, investigate, and act on those ideas; and builds an adaptive culture that embraces continual change. Govindarajan illustrates his thesis with several compelling company stories. For example, Tata Consultancy Services decided to divest its fast-growing call-center operations at the height of the boom in that business, because its leaders could see that technologies were moving to the cloud and that global enterprises would eventually demand higher-level, more strategic outsourced services. Call centers would just get in the way of that future. And Hasbro, the toy and game maker, acted on numerous technological and demographic shifts in the 1990s to significantly outpace its leading competitor, Mattel.

Multinationals are starting to catch on to the logic of reverse innovation, in which products are designed first for consumers in low-income countries and then adapted into disruptive offerings for developed economies. But only a handful of companies have managed to do it successfully until now. In this article an MIT engineering professor and a Tuck professor of management explain why. After conducting a three-year study of reverse innovation projects, they've concluded that the main hurdle facing product developers is a mindset. Western designers, who usually create products by following time-tested methods, struggle to overcome the constraints and leverage the freedoms of emerging markets. They tend to fall into common mental traps that prevent the development of reverse innovations: matching segments to existing products, lowering price by removing features, failing to think through all the technical requirements, neglecting stakeholders, and refusing to believe products created for low-income markets could have global appeal. But companies can avoid these traps, the authors found, by adhering to five design principles. The success of several new products illustrates how. One is the Leveraged Freedom Chair, a low-cost wheelchair that can navigate rugged terrain in places with poor infrastructure; a modified version is taking Western markets by storm.

India might appear to be the last place on earth where you would find health care innovation. Although government programs have finally brought some infectious diseases under control, the nation's ability to meet the basic medical needs of its citizens remains abysmal. However, necessity spawns innovation. Despite the pressing demand and constrained supply, a few relatively new Indian hospitals have devised ways of providing world-class health care affordably--and to scale. The authors identified more than 40 hospitals in India with innovative strategies and selected nine that were consistently providing high-quality care at ultralow prices. To deliver on those dual commitments, the Indian exemplars developed three powerful organizational advantages: a hub-and-spoke configuration of assets, an innovative way of determining who should do what, and a focus on cost-effectiveness rather than just cost cutting. Those moves don't require changes in legislation; only a commitment to reverse the inexorable rise in costs. Indian hospitals, doctors, and administrators have traditionally looked to the West for advances in medical knowledge, but it's time the West looked to India for innovations in health care delivery.

Reverse innovation-developing ideas in an emerging market and coaxing them to flow uphill to Western markets-poses immense challenges, because it requires a company to overcome the institutionalized thinking that guides its actions. That's why the experience of the automobile-infotainment division of Harman International is so impressive. The U.S.-based business, known for ultrasophisticated dashboard audiovisual systems designed by German engineers, developed a radically simpler and cheaper way of creating products in emerging markets and then applied what it had learned in the process to its product-­development centers in the West. Harman did this using a two-part approach: radical change from below combined with astute leadership from above. A small team based in India and China set audacious goals, created a new organizational structure, and adopted new design methods, while the chief executive, Dinesh C. Paliwal, rebranded the company's future, shifted the corporate center of gravity to emerging markets, made sure that legacy units continued to thrive, and averted conflict between old and new.

Fending off new competitors is a perennial struggle for established companies. Govindarajan and Trimble, of Dartmouth's Tuck School of Business, explain why: Many corporations become too comfortable with their existing business models and neglect the necessary work of radically reinventing them. The authors map out an alternative in their "three boxes" framework. They argue that while a CEO manages the present (box 1), he or she must also selectively forget the past (box 2) in order to create the future (box 3). Infosys chairman N.R. Narayana Murthy mastered the three boxes to reinvigorate his company and greatly increased its chances of enduring for generations.

HBR asked top management thinkers to share what they were resolved to accomplish in 2011. Here are their answers: Joseph E. Stiglitz will be crafting a new postcrisis paradigm for macroeconomics whereby rational individuals interact with imperfect and asymmetric information. Herminia Ibarra will be looking for hard evidence of how "soft" leadership creates value. Eric Schmidt will be planning to scale mobile technology by developing fast networks and providing low-cost smartphones in the poorest parts of the world. Michael Porter will be using modern cost accounting to uncover-and lower-the real costs of health care. Vijay Govindarajan will be trying to prototype a $300 house to replace the world's poorest slums, provide healthy living, and foster education. Dan Ariely will be investigating consumers' distaste for genetically modified salmon, synthetic pharmaceuticals, and other products that aren't "natural." Laura D. Tyson will be promoting the establishment of a national infrastructure investment bank. Esther Duflo will be striving to increase full immunization in poor areas of India. Clay Shirky will be studying how to design internet platforms that foster civility. Klaus Schwab will be undertaking to create a Risk Response Network through which decision makers around the world can pool knowledge about the risks they face. Jack Ma will be working to instill a strong set of values in his 19,000 young employees and to help clean up China's environment. Thomas H. Davenport will be researching big judgment calls that turned out well and how organizations arrived at them. A.G. Lafley will be proselytizing to make company boards take leadership succession seriously. Eleven additional contributors to the Agenda, along with special audio and video features, can be found at hbr.org/2011-agenda.

Special teams dedicated to innovation initiatives inevitably run into conflict with the rest of the organization. The people responsible for ongoing operations view the innovators as undisciplined upstarts. The innovators dismiss the operations people as bureaucratic dinosaurs. It's natural to separate the two warring groups. But it's also dead wrong, say Tuck Business School's Govindarajan and Trimble. Nearly all innovation initiatives build on a firm's existing resources and know-how. When a group is asked to innovate in isolation, the corporation forfeits its main advantage over smaller, nimbler rivals-its mammoth asset base. The best approach is to set up a partnership between the dedicated team and the people who maintain excellence in ongoing operations, the company's performance engine. Such partnerships were key to the successful launch of new offerings by legal publisher Westlaw, Lucent Technologies, and WD-40. There are three steps to making the partnership work: First, decide which tasks the performance engine can handle, assigning it only those that flow along the same path as ongoing operations. Next, assemble a dedicated team to carry out the rest, being careful to bring in outside perspectives and create new norms. Last, proactively manage conflicts. The key here is having an innovation leader who can collaborate well with the performance engine and a senior executive who supports the dedicated team, prioritizes the company's long-term interests, and adjudicates contests for resources.

For decades, General Electric and other industrial-goods manufacturers based in rich countries grew by developing high-end products at home and distributing them globally, with some adaptations to local conditions - an approach known as glocalization. Now they must do an about-face and learn to bring low-end products created specifically for emerging markets into wealthy markets. That process, called reverse innovation, isn't easy to master. It requires a decentralized, local-market focus that clashes with the centralized, product-focused structure that multinationals have evolved for glocalization. In this article, Immelt, GE's CEO, and Govindarajan and Trimble, of Dartmouth's Tuck School of Business, describe how GE has dealt with that challenge. An anomaly within the ultrasound unit of GE Healthcare provided the blueprint. Because China's poorly funded rural clinics couldn't afford the company's sophisticated ultrasound machines, a local team built a cheap, portable ultrasound out of a laptop equipped with special peripherals and software. It not only became a hit in China but jump-started growth in the developed world by pioneering applications for situations where portability is critical, such as at accident sites. The team succeeded because a top executive championed it and gave it unprecedented autonomy. GE has since set up more than a dozen similar operations in an effort to expand beyond the premium segments in developing countries - and to preempt emerging giants from disrupting GE's sales at home.

A manager may have a great idea but the only thing that will really matter is great execution. Here's sound advice for making the execution as brilliant as the idea.

Many companies assume that once they've launched a major innovation, growth will soon follow. It's not that simple. High-potential new businesses within established companies face stiff headwinds well after their inception. That's why a company's emphasis must shift: from ideas to execution and from leadership excellence to organizational excellence. The authors spent five years chronicling new businesses at the New York Times Co., Analog Devices, Corning, Hasbro, and other organizations. They found that a breakthrough new business (referred to as NewCo) rarely coexists gracefully with the established business in the company (called CoreCo). The unnatural combination creates three specific challenges--forgetting, borrowing, and learning--that NewCo must meet to survive and grow. NewCo must first forget some of what made CoreCo successful. NewCo must also borrow some of CoreCo's assets--usually in one or two key areas that will give NewCo a crucial competitive advantage. Incremental cost reductions, for example, are never a sufficient justification for borrowing. Finally, NewCo must be prepared to learn some things from scratch. Because strategic experiments are highly uncertain endeavors, NewCo will face several critical unknowns. The more rapidly it can resolve those unknowns--that is, the faster it can learn--the sooner it will zero in on a winning business model or exit a hopeless situation. Managers can accelerate this learning by planning more simply and more often and by comparing predicted and actual trends.

Organizations struggle when trying to manage a mature business and a related new venture simultaneously. The endeavor is fraught with contradiction and paradox. To succeed, the organization's leaders must deal with two conflicting pressures. The new venture must forget much of what has made the mature business successful, which argues for isolating the new venture from the mature business. However, the new venture also must borrow resources from the mature business, which argues for integrating the two units. Based on in-depth field research at 10 organizations, this article shows how to identify what to forget and what to borrow and describes an organizational design that facilitates both.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. The conventional planning process does not work for strategic experiments that are truly bleeding edge. Nevertheless, many companies cling to what they know--planning that holds managers responsible for numbers. But that is not practical for entering completely new territory, when numbers are essentially pulled out of a hat and their underlying assumptions rarely revisited. A better approach to planning comes from researchers at Dartmouth College's Tuck School of Business. It emphasizes learning instead of numbers, and it draws on in-depth studies of such companies as New York Times Digital, Thomson Corp., Corning, and Analog Devices. Their approach, theory-focused planning, diverges from conventional planning in six critical ways. Companies that use it concentrate on a few critical unknowns instead of the usual horde of details in conventional plans; they focus on the theory underlining the predictions rather than the predictions themselves; they look for trends rather than numerical benchmarks; they review the plan often, in response to important new data, instead of annually; in that review, they consider the experiment over time instead of just for the current period; and they emphasize leading indicators rather than financials. Companies still hold managers of strategic experiments responsible for performance, but performance is gauged according to how quickly managers learn from new data. To be successful in uncharted waters, the ability to learn from experience is paramount.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Mastering the management of a global business team calls for confronting several unique challenges that tend to exacerbate the more common problems facing all teams, point out authors Vijay Govindarajan, director of the Center for Global Leadership at Dartmouth College's Tuck School, and Anil Gupta, a professor of strategy and global e-business at the University of Maryland's Robert H. Smith School of Business. Of the 70 global business teams studied by the authors, about one-third rated their performances as largely unsuccessful. How can companies reverse the generally weak performance of faltering global teams? The authors' survey of 58 senior executives from five U.S. and four European multinational organizations reveals some hard-earned insights that may benefit your cross-border endeavors. When global business teams fail, it is often due to a lack of trust among team members. As a result, executives guiding global teams must institute processes that emphasize the cultivation of trust. Also high on the list of culpable factors are the hindrances to communication that geographical, cultural, and language differences cause. Even in the case of teams whose members speak the same language, differences in semantics, accents, tone, pitch, and dialects can be impediments. To mitigate the corrosive effects of these cross-cultural impediments, executives are advised to craft a cross-border team's charter, composition, and process carefully--with each aspect equally emphasized. The authors elaborate on how these work holistically to increase the odds that your global business teams will become high-performing sources of invaluable multinational experience leading to competitive advantage.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Unless an enterprise generates new knowledge and pumps it efficiently throughout its network, it will soon be playing tomorrow's game with yesterday's tools. Many rely on an information technology infrastructure; but no matter how sophisticated, it is not the key to effective knowledge management. Success, say the authors, depends more on the social system in which people operate--the social ecology of a company. Social ecology drives people's expectations, defines who will fit in, shapes individuals' freedom to pursue actions without prior approval, and affects how they interact with both insiders and outsiders. Focusing on Nucor Corp.'s success in the 1980s and 1990s, the authors suggest that it was the company's social ecology that contributed to it becoming one of the most efficient steel producers in the world. Through effective management of knowledge, Nucor developed and constantly upgraded its main strategic and proprietary competencies: plant construction and start-up know-how, manufacturing process expertise, and the ability to adopt breakthrough technologies earlier than competitors. Nucor's social ecology also allowed, among other things, excellence in the tasks associated with sharing and mobilizing knowledge: identifying opportunities to share knowledge, encouraging individuals to share knowledge, building effective and efficient transmission channels, and convincing individuals to accept and use the knowledge received. The authors explain how others can maximize knowledge sharing by setting stretch goals, providing high-powered incentives, cultivating empowerment, equipping every unit with a well-defined "sandbox" for experimentation, and cultivating an internal market for ideas. It's a difficult challenge. But its very difficulty means that companies tackling it successfully will have a competitive advantage that rivals cannot beat merely by buying the same software.