Leaders face a multitude of strategic paradoxes--contradictory pressures that are too often viewed as "either/or" choices. There are "innovation paradoxes," in which the pursuit of new offerings and processes conflicts with the mandate to sustain the tried and true. There are "globalization paradoxes," which involve tensions between local imperatives and boundary-crossing integration. And there are "obligation paradoxes," when the goal of maximizing profits for shareholders clashes with the desire to generate benefits for a broader group of stakeholders. The authors argue that organizational success depends on simultaneously addressing such conflicting demands, not choosing between them. Leaders need to become comfortable with multiple truths and inconsistency. They need to assume that resources are ample rather than scarce. And they need to embrace change instead of seeking stability. All of this will help organizations reach a state of dynamic equilibrium, wherein paradoxes don't impede progress--they spur it. And the way to tap the potential of paradox is to both separate and connect opposing forces: Managers must pull apart the organization's goals and value each of them individually, while also finding linkages and synergies across goals.
Strategic agility evokes contradictions, such as stability-flexibility, commitment-change, and established routines-novel approaches. These competing demands pose challenges that require paradoxical leadership-practices seeking creative, both/and solutions that can enable fast- paced, adaptable decision making. Why is managing paradox critical to strategic agility? And which practices enable leaders to effectively manage tensions? This article describes the paradoxical nature of strategic agility. Drawing from data from five firms, Astro Studios, Digital Divide Data, IBM Global Services Canada, Lego, and Unilever, it proposes leadership practices to effectively respond to these challenges.
Although most managers publicly acknowledge the need to explore new businesses and markets, the claims of established businesses on company resources almost always come first, especially when times are hard. When top teams allow the tension between core and speculative units to play out at lower levels of management, innovation loses out. At best, leaders of core business units dismiss innovation initiatives as irrelevancies. At worst, they see the new businesses as threats to the firm's core identity and values. Many CEOs take a backseat in debates over resources, ceding much of their power to middle managers, and the company ends up as a collection of feudal baronies. This is a recipe for long-term failure, say the authors. Their research of 12 top management teams at major companies suggests that firms thrive only when senior teams lead ambidextrously-when they foster a state of constant creative conflict between the old and the new. Successful CEOs first develop a broad, forward-looking strategic aspiration that sets ambitious targets both for innovation and core business growth. They then hold the tension between innovation unit demands and core business demands at the very top of the organization. And finally they embrace inconsistency, allowing themselves the latitude to pursue multiple and often conflicting agendas.
Focuses on Pierre Urech's efforts to change the division structure at Ciba-Geigy to facilitate the marketing of the new product. Details the relationships Urech cultivates and the strategy he pursues as "product champion." Also describes the restructuring of the research department into small teams to improve product development. Other topics include the marketing of the new product in different regional settings, the emergence of a "dominant design," and a slow-down in subsequent innovation.
Covers the history of Tylenol from the autumn of 1982 through the second tampering incident in February 1986. Also deals with other developments in the history of Johnson & Johnson, especially the acquisition and divestiture of Technicare.
Presents an historical overview of the professional career of James E. Burke, chairman and CEO of Johnson & Johnson. Examines the corporation's handling of three major occurrences--the Tylenol poisonings in 1982 and 1986 and the acquisition and subsequent sale of Technicare, a maker of diagnostic imaging equipment.