In March 2023, Daikin India had reached the milestone of US$1 billion in turnover. It aimed to surpass $2 billion in the next three years. It had fared poorly in the Indian market since its entry in 2000, but after joining the company in 2010, Kanwal Jeet Jawa, the first Indian and inpatriate on the Japanese board of directors, had turned around Daikin's Indian subsidiary. Did Daikin's decision to make India an export hub and to replicate the Indian model for Africa and the Middle East make sense? What role should India play in Daikin's response to the "China plus one" strategy? Given that the AC industry grew through incremental innovation, how could Daikin compete with its rivals and grow sustainably in India and other emerging markets?

In March 2023, Daikin India had reached the milestone of US$1 billion in turnover. It aimed to surpass $2 billion in the next three years. It had fared poorly in the Indian market since its entry in 2000, but after joining the company in 2010, Kanwal Jeet Jawa, the first Indian and inpatriate on the Japanese board of directors, had turned around Daikin’s Indian subsidiary. Did Daikin’s decision to make India an export hub and to replicate the Indian model for Africa and the Middle East make sense? What role should India play in Daikin’s response to the “China plus one” strategy? Given that the AC industry grew through incremental innovation, how could Daikin compete with its rivals and grow sustainably in India and other emerging markets?

In May 2021, Asahi Group Holdings, Limited (Asahi), a Japanese global beer, spirits, soft drinks, and food company, shifted its focus to non-alcoholic beers. The shift was made after spending US$20 billion to acquire premium beer brands from Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, a Belgian multinational drinks and brewing company. The Japanese beer market had been shrinking for decades with Japan's declining population, and more recently, the market had shrunk further because of restrictions imposed during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. In response, domestic beer producers were looking abroad for better market opportunities.<br><br>Asahi needed a strategy to compete against the Belgian beer giant. Considerations included whether to pursue growth in Asahi's core beer business or diversify in the food industry, how to position a growing portfolio of products to minimize cannibalization, whether to shift focus from the premium to the lower-mass beer market, and how to approach the potential Chinese beer market. Regardless of growth strategy, Asahi needed to deal with a loss in share value, triggered by investors nervous about Asahi's acquisition spree. To regain investor trust, Asahi needed to manage its financial leverage.

In May 2021, Claire Reid, the founder of social enterprise start-up Reel Gardening, spoke about her ambitious ten-year plan to help secure nutritious food for impoverished people in South Africa and elsewhere in the world. Reel Gardening produced and sold a paper strip packed with seeds and fertilizer. Although the company had grown significantly, it had to manage the dual mission of social contribution and financial sustainability. The company had to determine whether expansion would shift it away from its social mission. Should Reid pursue an ambitious growth strategy, or should she keep the company small, grow it slowly, and focus on the larger social impact? Going forward, how should the company manage its growth, both strategically and financially?

In May 2021, Claire Reid, the founder of social enterprise start-up Reel Gardening, spoke about her ambitious ten-year plan to help secure nutritious food for impoverished people in South Africa and elsewhere in the world. Reel Gardening produced and sold a paper strip packed with seeds and fertilizer. Although the company had grown significantly, it had to manage the dual mission of social contribution and financial sustainability. The company had to determine whether expansion would shift it away from its social mission. Should Reid pursue an ambitious growth strategy, or should she keep the company small, grow it slowly, and focus on the larger social impact? Going forward, how should the company manage its growth, both strategically and financially?

In May 2021, Asahi Group Holdings, Limited (Asahi), a Japanese global beer, spirits, soft drinks, and food company, shifted its focus to non-alcoholic beers. The shift was made after spending US$20 billion to acquire premium beer brands from Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, a Belgian multinational drinks and brewing company.<br><br>The Japanese beer market had been shrinking for decades with Japan’s declining population, and more recently, the market had shrunk further because of restrictions imposed during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. In response, domestic beer producers were looking abroad for better market opportunities.<br><br>Asahi needed a strategy to compete against the Belgian beer giant. Considerations included whether to pursue growth in Asahi’s core beer business or diversify in the food industry, how to position a growing portfolio of products to minimize cannibalization, whether to shift focus from the premium to the lower-mass beer market, and how to approach the potential Chinese beer market. Regardless of growth strategy, Asahi needed to deal with a loss in share value, triggered by investors nervous about Asahi’s acquisition spree. To regain investor trust, Asahi needed to manage its financial leverage.

In September 2019, Thomas Cook Group Plc (Thomas Cook), an iconic 178-year-old travel company based in London, United Kingdom, ceased its business after a failed negotiation to fund its huge debt of £1.7 billion (US$2.25 billion). The collapse caused about 9,000 employees in the United Kingdom to lose their jobs and made it necessary to repatriate about 150,000 holiday travellers. The company had experienced several profit warnings during the tenure of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Manny Fontenla-Novoa, who was replaced as CEO by Harriet Green, an outsider, in 2012. Between 2012 and 2014, the company’s share price rose from historic lows of about £14 to £130. However, the board unexpectedly asked Green to leave the company before completing her turnaround strategy and appointed Peter Fankhauser, an insider, as the new CEO, calling the departure a “hand-over from a turnaround specialist to a travel expert.” Despite his efforts, Fankhauser also failed to revive Thomas Cook. Who or what led to the collapse of Thomas Cook? Among the three CEOs, who should be held responsible, and on what grounds?

In September 2019, Thomas Cook Group Plc (Thomas Cook), an iconic 178-year-old travel company based in London, United Kingdom, ceased its business after a failed negotiation to fund its huge debt of £1.7 billion (US$2.25 billion). The collapse caused about 9,000 employees in the United Kingdom to lose their jobs and made it necessary to repatriate about 150,000 holiday travellers. The company had experienced several profit warnings during the tenure of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Manny Fontenla-Novoa, who was replaced as CEO by Harriet Green, an outsider, in 2012. Between 2012 and 2014, the company's share price rose from historic lows of about £14 to £130. However, the board unexpectedly asked Green to leave the company before completing her turnaround strategy and appointed Peter Fankhauser, an insider, as the new CEO, calling the departure a "hand-over from a turnaround specialist to a travel expert." Despite his efforts, Fankhauser also failed to revive Thomas Cook. Who or what led to the collapse of Thomas Cook? Among the three CEOs, who should be held responsible, and on what grounds?

In June 2021, the chief executive officer (CEO) of the Peruvian-based Austral Group S.A.A. (Austral), one of the six largest producers and traders in marine-based foods and ingredients in the Republic of Peru, was concerned about two major ongoing challenges: gender equality and cross-generation employees. In May 2006, Austral merged with and became a subsidiary of Austevoll Seafood ASA (Austevoll), the world-leading Norwegian conglomerate in the fishery and seafood industry. After the merger, Austral improved its foundations of human resources (HR). The newly merged entity built a common organizational culture and created a bond to engage workers in its new culture. In 2007, the company introduced a 10-year plan to drive structural changes in human resource management (HRM). The CEO’s current issue is how to overcome the two outstanding challenges to move the company forward and make it sustainable for the future.

In June 2021, the chief executive officer (CEO) of the Peruvian-based Austral Group S.A.A. (Austral), one of the six largest producers and traders in marine-based foods and ingredients in the Republic of Peru, was concerned about two major ongoing challenges: gender equality and cross-generation employees. In May 2006, Austral merged with and became a subsidiary of Austevoll Seafood ASA (Austevoll), the world-leading Norwegian conglomerate in the fishery and seafood industry. After the merger, Austral improved its foundations of human resources (HR). The newly merged entity built a common organizational culture and created a bond to engage workers in its new culture. In 2007, the company introduced a 10-year plan to drive structural changes in human resource management (HRM). The CEO's current issue is how to overcome the two outstanding challenges to move the company forward and make it sustainable for the future.

Between 2017 and 2019, The Walt Disney Company (Disney) faced two major scandals that threatened to damage its family-friendly brand image. Disney’s brand value decreased by 5 per cent from 2017 to 2018, although it remained the most valuable media brand worldwide. In November 2017, John Lasseter, Disney’s executive producer, was accused of illegal sexual misconduct at its Pixar Animation Studios (Pixar). Following the allegations, Lasseter left the company in December 2018. Further, during the June and September of 2018, Rian Johnson, the writer and director of The Last Jedi for Disney’s subsidiary, Lucasfilm Ltd. LLC (Lucasfilm), posted unprofessional, aggressive, and insulting responses on his personal Twitter account to fans who hated the film. In April 2019, Disney chief executive officer (CEO) Robert Iger announced that no new Star Wars movies written or directed by Johnson would be put into development. Why did Disney not take immediate action to address these two scandals? How should Disney mitigate the losses stemming from the two scandals and prevent them from happening again? What should Disney do to further grow its sustainably?

Between 2017 and 2019, The Walt Disney Company (Disney) faced two major scandals that threatened to damage its family-friendly brand image. Disney's brand value decreased by 5 per cent from 2017 to 2018, although it remained the most valuable media brand worldwide. In November 2017, John Lasseter, Disney's executive producer, was accused of illegal sexual misconduct at its Pixar Animation Studios (Pixar). Following the allegations, Lasseter left the company in December 2018. Further, during the June and September of 2018, Rian Johnson, the writer and director of The Last Jedi for Disney's subsidiary, Lucasfilm Ltd. LLC (Lucasfilm), posted unprofessional, aggressive, and insulting responses on his personal Twitter account to fans who hated the film. In April 2019, Disney chief executive officer (CEO) Robert Iger announced that no new Star Wars movies written or directed by Johnson would be put into development. Why did Disney not take immediate action to address these two scandals? How should Disney mitigate the losses stemming from the two scandals and prevent them from happening again? What should Disney do to further grow its sustainably?

In June 2019, Tata Consultancy Services Limited (TCS), a leading Indian global information technology (IT) services, consulting, and business solutions provider, announced that it would increase its shareholding in Tata Consultancy Services Japan Limited (TCS Japan) from 51 per cent to 66 per cent. Established in July 2014, TCS Japan was a joint venture between TCS and Mitsubishi Corporation (MC), one of Japan's largest integrated business enterprises. This collaboration was not TCS's first foray into Japan's IT industry; the company had entered the Japanese market in 1987, but with a wholly owned subsidiary. Why did TCS give up a part of its full ownership and control to MC in 2014? Was such an alliance a merger of equals or more a sale of the Japanese branch to a stronger local suitor? Why did the company reclaim its ownership in 2019 through an increase in equity holding? To penetrate the Japanese IT services market and compete with local giants, should TCS have acquired another medium-sized Japanese company instead of joint venturing with MC? Or, should it have continued operating in the Japanese market alone through the wholly owned subsidiary?

In June 2019, Tata Consultancy Services Limited (TCS), a leading Indian global information technology (IT) services, consulting, and business solutions provider, announced that it would increase its shareholding in Tata Consultancy Services Japan Limited (TCS Japan) from 51 per cent to 66 per cent. Established in July 2014, TCS Japan was a joint venture between TCS and Mitsubishi Corporation (MC), one of Japan’s largest integrated business enterprises. This collaboration was not TCS’s first foray into Japan’s IT industry; the company had entered the Japanese market in 1987, but with a wholly owned subsidiary. Why did TCS give up a part of its full ownership and control to MC in 2014? Was such an alliance a merger of equals or more a sale of the Japanese branch to a stronger local suitor? Why did the company reclaim its ownership in 2019 through an increase in equity holding? To penetrate the Japanese IT services market and compete with local giants, should TCS have acquired another medium-sized Japanese company instead of joint venturing with MC? Or, should it have continued operating in the Japanese market alone through the wholly owned subsidiary?

In FY2018-19, Prabhu Bank, an 'A' class Nepalese commercial bank, reported its operating profit of Rs1.74 billion, a significant decrease of 34 per cent from the previous year. The bank had aggressively grown through several mergers with local banks. In 2014, it merged with the problematic Kist Bank, and to everyone's surprise, managed to recover a large amount of bad debts. In 2016, it decided again to merge with another ailing bank, which raised doubts about the health of the combined entity. The central bank of Nepal had continued to raise the paid-up capital and tighten the rules to strengthen the financial stability. Could Prabhu Bank continue to achieve its ambitious growth and profitability through such aggressive mergers?

In FY2018–19, Prabhu Bank, an ‘A’ class Nepalese commercial bank, reported its operating profit of Rs1.74 billion, a significant decrease of 34 per cent from the previous year. The bank had aggressively grown through several mergers with local banks. In 2014, it merged with the problematic Kist Bank, and to everyone’s surprise, managed to recover a large amount of bad debts. In 2016, it decided again to merge with another ailing bank, which raised doubts about the health of the combined entity. The central bank of Nepal had continued to raise the paid-up capital and tighten the rules to strengthen the financial stability. Could Prabhu Bank continue to achieve its ambitious growth and profitability through such aggressive mergers?

In May 2019, Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ) had paused rapid expansion of its massive agile organizational transformation, trying to make the existing program work better. ANZ announced the decision to take the bank agile in May 2017, moving from the traditional command-and-control, risk-based, and process-driven hierarchy to collaborative teamwork. Such decisions came after not only competitive pressures from the disruptive entry of financial technology companies but also a series of internal scandals. Would the agile transformation be a solution for ANZ to respond to these external and internal challenges? How could ANZ be successfully transformed, given its corporate culture that had been deeply rooted for over 180 years?

In May 2019, Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ) had paused rapid expansion of its massive agile organizational transformation, trying to make the existing program work better. ANZ announced the decision to take the bank agile in May 2017, moving from the traditional command-and-control, risk-based, and process-driven hierarchy to collaborative teamwork. Such decisions came after not only competitive pressures from the disruptive entry of financial technology companies but also a series of internal scandals. Would the agile transformation be a solution for ANZ to respond to these external and internal challenges? How could ANZ be successfully transformed, given its corporate culture that had been deeply rooted for over 180 years?

In October 2018, Tesla, Inc. (Tesla), an American automotive and energy company, received an approval from Shanghai’s mayor to acquire a plot of land to build a new electric-vehicle (EV) factory, which was expected to produce its first cars in three years, and to have initial capacity of about 250,000 vehicles a year. This move was in response to a significant rise in the Chinese EV market and the additional tariffs imposed by the Chinese government during its 2018 trade war with the United States. Since 2013, Tesla had partnered with Panasonic Corporation (Panasonic)—the consumer electronics company and a world leader in battery technology—to build Gigafactory 1 and Gigafactory 2 in the United States for manufacturing Tesla’s batteries. The Chinese automotive market was a business environment much different from any that the Tesla–Panasonic partnership had previously experienced. Given the Chinese government’s regulations, requirements, and incentives, what should be Tesla’s growth strategy in the world’s largest automotive market—China. Should Tesla continue its partnership with Panasonic in China or should it look to derive more potential benefits from other suppliers?

In October 2018, Tesla, Inc. (Tesla), an American automotive and energy company, received an approval from Shanghai's mayor to acquire a plot of land to build a new electric-vehicle (EV) factory, which was expected to produce its first cars in three years, and to have initial capacity of about 250,000 vehicles a year. This move was in response to a significant rise in the Chinese EV market and the additional tariffs imposed by the Chinese government during its 2018 trade war with the United States. Since 2013, Tesla had partnered with Panasonic Corporation (Panasonic)-the consumer electronics company and a world leader in battery technology-to build Gigafactory 1 and Gigafactory 2 in the United States for manufacturing Tesla's batteries. The Chinese automotive market was a business environment much different from any that the Tesla-Panasonic partnership had previously experienced. Given the Chinese government's regulations, requirements, and incentives, what should be Tesla's growth strategy in the world's largest automotive market-China. Should Tesla continue its partnership with Panasonic in China or should it look to derive more potential benefits from other suppliers?