In March 2023, Daikin India had reached the milestone of US$1 billion in turnover. It aimed to surpass $2 billion in the next three years. It had fared poorly in the Indian market since its entry in 2000, but after joining the company in 2010, Kanwal Jeet Jawa, the first Indian and inpatriate on the Japanese board of directors, had turned around Daikin’s Indian subsidiary. Did Daikin’s decision to make India an export hub and to replicate the Indian model for Africa and the Middle East make sense? What role should India play in Daikin’s response to the “China plus one” strategy? Given that the AC industry grew through incremental innovation, how could Daikin compete with its rivals and grow sustainably in India and other emerging markets?
In May 2021, Claire Reid, the founder of social enterprise start-up Reel Gardening, spoke about her ambitious ten-year plan to help secure nutritious food for impoverished people in South Africa and elsewhere in the world. Reel Gardening produced and sold a paper strip packed with seeds and fertilizer. Although the company had grown significantly, it had to manage the dual mission of social contribution and financial sustainability. The company had to determine whether expansion would shift it away from its social mission. Should Reid pursue an ambitious growth strategy, or should she keep the company small, grow it slowly, and focus on the larger social impact? Going forward, how should the company manage its growth, both strategically and financially?
In May 2021, Asahi Group Holdings, Limited (Asahi), a Japanese global beer, spirits, soft drinks, and food company, shifted its focus to non-alcoholic beers. The shift was made after spending US$20 billion to acquire premium beer brands from Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, a Belgian multinational drinks and brewing company.<br><br>The Japanese beer market had been shrinking for decades with Japan’s declining population, and more recently, the market had shrunk further because of restrictions imposed during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. In response, domestic beer producers were looking abroad for better market opportunities.<br><br>Asahi needed a strategy to compete against the Belgian beer giant. Considerations included whether to pursue growth in Asahi’s core beer business or diversify in the food industry, how to position a growing portfolio of products to minimize cannibalization, whether to shift focus from the premium to the lower-mass beer market, and how to approach the potential Chinese beer market. Regardless of growth strategy, Asahi needed to deal with a loss in share value, triggered by investors nervous about Asahi’s acquisition spree. To regain investor trust, Asahi needed to manage its financial leverage.
In September 2019, Thomas Cook Group Plc (Thomas Cook), an iconic 178-year-old travel company based in London, United Kingdom, ceased its business after a failed negotiation to fund its huge debt of £1.7 billion (US$2.25 billion). The collapse caused about 9,000 employees in the United Kingdom to lose their jobs and made it necessary to repatriate about 150,000 holiday travellers. The company had experienced several profit warnings during the tenure of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Manny Fontenla-Novoa, who was replaced as CEO by Harriet Green, an outsider, in 2012. Between 2012 and 2014, the company’s share price rose from historic lows of about £14 to £130. However, the board unexpectedly asked Green to leave the company before completing her turnaround strategy and appointed Peter Fankhauser, an insider, as the new CEO, calling the departure a “hand-over from a turnaround specialist to a travel expert.” Despite his efforts, Fankhauser also failed to revive Thomas Cook. Who or what led to the collapse of Thomas Cook? Among the three CEOs, who should be held responsible, and on what grounds?
In June 2021, the chief executive officer (CEO) of the Peruvian-based Austral Group S.A.A. (Austral), one of the six largest producers and traders in marine-based foods and ingredients in the Republic of Peru, was concerned about two major ongoing challenges: gender equality and cross-generation employees. In May 2006, Austral merged with and became a subsidiary of Austevoll Seafood ASA (Austevoll), the world-leading Norwegian conglomerate in the fishery and seafood industry. After the merger, Austral improved its foundations of human resources (HR). The newly merged entity built a common organizational culture and created a bond to engage workers in its new culture. In 2007, the company introduced a 10-year plan to drive structural changes in human resource management (HRM). The CEO’s current issue is how to overcome the two outstanding challenges to move the company forward and make it sustainable for the future.
Between 2017 and 2019, The Walt Disney Company (Disney) faced two major scandals that threatened to damage its family-friendly brand image. Disney’s brand value decreased by 5 per cent from 2017 to 2018, although it remained the most valuable media brand worldwide. In November 2017, John Lasseter, Disney’s executive producer, was accused of illegal sexual misconduct at its Pixar Animation Studios (Pixar). Following the allegations, Lasseter left the company in December 2018. Further, during the June and September of 2018, Rian Johnson, the writer and director of The Last Jedi for Disney’s subsidiary, Lucasfilm Ltd. LLC (Lucasfilm), posted unprofessional, aggressive, and insulting responses on his personal Twitter account to fans who hated the film. In April 2019, Disney chief executive officer (CEO) Robert Iger announced that no new Star Wars movies written or directed by Johnson would be put into development. Why did Disney not take immediate action to address these two scandals? How should Disney mitigate the losses stemming from the two scandals and prevent them from happening again? What should Disney do to further grow its sustainably?
In June 2019, Tata Consultancy Services Limited (TCS), a leading Indian global information technology (IT) services, consulting, and business solutions provider, announced that it would increase its shareholding in Tata Consultancy Services Japan Limited (TCS Japan) from 51 per cent to 66 per cent. Established in July 2014, TCS Japan was a joint venture between TCS and Mitsubishi Corporation (MC), one of Japan’s largest integrated business enterprises. This collaboration was not TCS’s first foray into Japan’s IT industry; the company had entered the Japanese market in 1987, but with a wholly owned subsidiary. Why did TCS give up a part of its full ownership and control to MC in 2014? Was such an alliance a merger of equals or more a sale of the Japanese branch to a stronger local suitor? Why did the company reclaim its ownership in 2019 through an increase in equity holding? To penetrate the Japanese IT services market and compete with local giants, should TCS have acquired another medium-sized Japanese company instead of joint venturing with MC? Or, should it have continued operating in the Japanese market alone through the wholly owned subsidiary?
In FY2018–19, Prabhu Bank, an ‘A’ class Nepalese commercial bank, reported its operating profit of Rs1.74 billion, a significant decrease of 34 per cent from the previous year. The bank had aggressively grown through several mergers with local banks. In 2014, it merged with the problematic Kist Bank, and to everyone’s surprise, managed to recover a large amount of bad debts. In 2016, it decided again to merge with another ailing bank, which raised doubts about the health of the combined entity. The central bank of Nepal had continued to raise the paid-up capital and tighten the rules to strengthen the financial stability. Could Prabhu Bank continue to achieve its ambitious growth and profitability through such aggressive mergers?
In May 2019, Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ) had paused rapid expansion of its massive agile organizational transformation, trying to make the existing program work better. ANZ announced the decision to take the bank agile in May 2017, moving from the traditional command-and-control, risk-based, and process-driven hierarchy to collaborative teamwork. Such decisions came after not only competitive pressures from the disruptive entry of financial technology companies but also a series of internal scandals. Would the agile transformation be a solution for ANZ to respond to these external and internal challenges? How could ANZ be successfully transformed, given its corporate culture that had been deeply rooted for over 180 years?
In October 2018, Tesla, Inc. (Tesla), an American automotive and energy company, received an approval from Shanghai’s mayor to acquire a plot of land to build a new electric-vehicle (EV) factory, which was expected to produce its first cars in three years, and to have initial capacity of about 250,000 vehicles a year. This move was in response to a significant rise in the Chinese EV market and the additional tariffs imposed by the Chinese government during its 2018 trade war with the United States. Since 2013, Tesla had partnered with Panasonic Corporation (Panasonic)—the consumer electronics company and a world leader in battery technology—to build Gigafactory 1 and Gigafactory 2 in the United States for manufacturing Tesla’s batteries. The Chinese automotive market was a business environment much different from any that the Tesla–Panasonic partnership had previously experienced. Given the Chinese government’s regulations, requirements, and incentives, what should be Tesla’s growth strategy in the world’s largest automotive market—China. Should Tesla continue its partnership with Panasonic in China or should it look to derive more potential benefits from other suppliers?
In January 2017, the Midea Group Co. Ltd. (Midea), a China-based large manufacturer of electrical appliances, completed its acquisition of German-based KUKA AG (KUKA), a large manufacturer of industrial robots. To ease concerns about technologies falling into foreign hands, Midea entered into an alliance with KUKA that ensured KUKA’s independence until 2023. However, within less than a year, KUKA experienced problems in its European and Asian markets. In China, it needed to lower costs. In Europe, a price war slowed down the orders, and the company had insufficient workers to meet demand in the United States and Asia. Some German automotive clients were losing trust in KUKA, and German employees worried about their job security. How could the two companies operate sufficiently independently to maintain their clients' trust, while being integrated enough to improve their efficiencies? How should they be prepared for the expiration of the alliance in 2023?
In July 2015, Tassal Group Limited (Tassal) announced the acquisition of De Costi Seafoods Company (De Costi) in a combination deal of cash and shares. The acquisition would allow Tassal to address a A$4.3 billion Australian seafood market that was much larger than the previously addressable salmon market of $700 million. Tassal had previous experience in species diversification. However, the environmental impacts of its major operations in Macquarie Harbour had been under the scrutiny of the Australian authority. Given the critical harbour issues, should Tassal continue to expand overseas? What were the motives to acquire De Costi? Did Tassal have sufficient capabilities and resources to cope with the high demand for Tasmanian salmon, particularly in the Asian market?
In August 2016, Foxconn Technology Group (Foxconn) acquired a majority stake for US$3.8 billion in Sharp Corporation (Sharp), which was on the verge of bankruptcy. In addition to gaining more liquid crystal display (LCD) capacity, Foxconn was combining Sharp’s advanced technology and marketing resources with its own to expand and move up the value chain in both research and development and brand building. However, the post-acquisition integration to realize such value-creation potentials faced several challenges, including the probability that Sharp’s Japanese style of management might not assimilate well within Foxconn’s organization. Now in 2018, what should Foxconn do to seamlessly integrate the two entities? How could Foxconn achieve its efficiency, cost, and innovation goals while moving toward becoming the technology leader and successfully creating its own global brand?
In 2017, the French film producer and distributor EuropaCorp S.A. (EuropaCorp) announced a historical record loss of €119.9 million. The company had almost doubled its revenues between 2001 and 2010 by using an integrated studio model, but the recent losses had been substantial. After entering into a number of international joint production and marketing ventures, the company reported its highest revenues to date in 2015, only to announce in July 2016 that the company had incurred significant losses and that its revenues were the lowest since 2008. Once again, the company tried to turn itself around, strengthening its position by focusing on the founder’s core business and making some financial adjustments. A capital increase resulted in a positive shift in EuropaCorp’s shareholding structure; however, the company was still experiencing losses and was anticipating a continuing loss into the next year. Was there anything more EuropaCorp could do to change its position?
In 2016, the Japanese company Toyota Tsusho Corporation (TTC) acquired the remaining shares of the French trading company Compagnie Française de l’Afrique Occidentale (CFAO), which was operating in Africa. That same year, TTC registered its first financial loss in 16 years. Several years earlier, in 2012, TTC had participated in CFAO’s equity as its majority shareholder. These strategic moves were all part of TTC’s corporate campaign Vision 2015, "Lead the Next", which aimed specifically to reduce its dependence on its parent group by diversifying to increase earnings from non-automotive businesses, rather than targeting African markets as a long-term sustainability plan. What were the motivations of TTC and CFAO in pursuing these transactions? Was the positive performance that followed the acquisition a result of synergies or just a simple sum of the consolidation and an industry trend? Why did TTC move from preserving CFAO’s operational autonomy in 2012 to delisting and fully internalizing it in 2016? Was there a link between poor performance in 2016 and the acquisition of CFAO? How should CFAO solve the conflict between its existing automotive customers and the Toyota Group as its main rival? How could CFAO defend its leader position from the entry of major competitors from South Korea, India, and China? Although the Vision 2015 campaign was validated, should TTC revise its global vision strategy and 10-year plan in the future, given its bad year in 2016?
In January 2017, Banro Corporation, a Canadian gold mining company in the Democratic Republic of Congo, underwent recapitalization to cope with financial distress, and to optimize its operations of mining assets. Since the commencement of commercial mining in 2009, unexpected social conflicts and operational challenges had led to significantly lower production than expected, with a large cost overrun, while the price of gold declined sharply from 2012. Would the recapitalization enable Banro Corporation to carry out its medium-term strategic plan of incremental growth by operational improvements, through cost reduction and throughput expansion over a five-year horizon? How could the company achieve its long-term goal of being a model of excellence in sustainability?
In 2017, the French automaker Groupe PSA (PSA) agreed to buy loss-making Opel/Vauxhall units from General Motors Company. PSA had just recovered one year earlier from losses it had sustained since the global financial crisis. With the recovery, PSA had launched a new strategic plan with aggressive goals for sustainable profitable growth. However, PSA’s sales were continuing to drop in the important Chinese market due to fierce competition, and the newly acquired units were still making losses. The use of electric cars was on the rise, and the European Commission had proposed a reduction in carbon dioxide emissions. PSA was planning to re-enter the United States, and in Britain, it was facing ambiguous Brexit negotiations, raising concerns about increased costs with importing and exporting parts and finished vehicles. In light of all of these challenges, how could PSA still reach its aggressive goals for sustainable growth?
In April 2016, Alibaba Group Holding Limited (Alibaba) acquired the cash-strapped German e-commerce company Lazada Group (Lazada) to enter the Southeast Asian market and gain an additional source of revenue. Lazada’s value proposition of an effortless shopping experience, combined with rising competition, had caused Lazada to over-invest in logistics infrastructure. The cash injection from Alibaba’s acquisition would allow Lazada to continue to pursue its strategic imperatives while leveraging Alibaba’s online experience and other resources in China. Given the competitive environment in China, was the entry into Southeast Asia through the acquisition of Lazada an appropriate strategy for Alibaba? Had Lazada made the appropriate decision to sell its company to Alibaba? How should Alibaba implement its post-merger integration in 2017?
Since its founding in 1951, Chinese state-owned Jinjiang International (Group) Company Limited (Jinjiang) had become a leading international company in the travel and hospitality industry with business divisions in hotels, transportation, travel, realty, investments, and finance. The Jinjiang brand was well-known in China, and the group had been pursuing a conservative investment approach. However, in response to the Chinese government’s “Going Global” and “One Belt and One Road” policies, and in order to strengthen the firm’s international competitiveness, Jinjiang made a series of aggressive mergers and acquisitions between 2014 and 2016. The acquisitions—especially those of two large hotel groups—had worsened Jinjiang’s debt position, while integration was proving difficult due to the acquired firms’ different corporate cultures and values. The hospitality market was also becoming mature and highly competitive; host-country governments were increasingly wary of foreign state-owned companies acquiring domestic assets. How could Jinjiang overcome these challenges to achieve its aspiration of building a world-class brand, while fulfilling the Chinese government’s political agendas through a series of aggressive globalization efforts?
In September 2015, Groupe Fnac (Fnac), a large French retail chain, announced it had acquired long-time competitor Darty Limited (Darty) in an effort to counter competition from online retailers, particularly American e-commerce giant Amazon.com, Inc. Fnac’s first offer had been declined, but Fnac and Darty negotiated and agreed on a new offer in November 2015. Unexpectedly, in March 2016, a South African-based retail holding company, Steinhoff International Holdings N.V., made a bigger offer. After an intense bidding war, Fnac successfully acquired Darty in April 2016 for 60 per cent over its first offer. The new company, Groupe Fnac Darty, faced several challenges. It needed to convince its stakeholders that the two emblematic competitors could create better value for them, despite their different identities and corporate cultures. How should the combined entity achieve the announced €130 million in annual synergies by 2019? And would the new entity survive the aggressive competition of e-commerce?