• Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc.: Case (A) Incentive Compensation, Acquisitions, and Financial Performance

    From 2008 to 2015, Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc. (Valeant) was a Wall Street darling under the leadership of CEO Michael Pearson. The company's stock price soared as Pearson went on an acquisition spree. Critics questioned Valeant's capacity for organic growth and its lack of commitment to research and development (R&D). In October 2015, investors began losing confidence when Valeant was subpoenaed to testify before the U.S. Senate Committee about its price-gouging practice. On-going investigations by the U.S. House Committee and Attorney's Offices regarding Valeant's patient assistance program and business relationships with Philidor Rx Services also contributed to the company's downfall. In May 2016, Valeant hired Joseph Papa to replace Pearson as CEO. One of Papa's top priorities was to pay down the $30 billion debt amassed to finance the company's acquisitions. In Case (A), students learn about the company's executive incentive compensation philosophy, acquisitions, and governance practices and are asked to assess the financial impact of Valeant's acquisitions. In Case (B), students are asked to identify the factors driving Valeant's stock price down and to assess the company's ability to pay down its $30 billion debt.
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  • Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc.: Case (B) Corporate Crisis in 2015 and 2016

    Supplement to case HEC199. From 2008 to 2015, Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc. (Valeant) was a Wall Street darling under the leadership of CEO Michael Pearson. The company's stock price soared as Pearson went on an acquisition spree. Critics questioned Valeant's capacity for organic growth and its lack of commitment to research and development (R&D). In October 2015, investors began losing confidence when Valeant was subpoenaed to testify before the U.S. Senate Committee about its price-gouging practice. On-going investigations by the U.S. House Committee and Attorney's Offices regarding Valeant's patient assistance program and business relationships with Philidor Rx Services also contributed to the company's downfall. In May 2016, Valeant hired Joseph Papa to replace Pearson as CEO. One of Papa's top priorities was to pay down the $30 billion debt amassed to finance the company's acquisitions. In Case (A), students learn about the company's executive incentive compensation philosophy, acquisitions, and governance practices and are asked to assess the financial impact of Valeant's acquisitions. In Case (B), students are asked to identify the factors driving Valeant's stock price down and to assess the company's ability to pay down its $30 billion debt.
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  • Governance Reform at Research in Motion (RIM) Ltd.

    The case looks at the board structure of Research in Motion Limited (RIM) since the probe of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) into the company's stock option granting practices in late 2006. Institutional investors, more specifically Northwest & Ethical Investments LP (NEI), were concerned about RIM's leadership and board structure in 2011 not because of non-compliance with regulations or accounting errors, but because of the drastic fall of the company's share price (see TN-Exhibit 1). Indeed, 2011 was a challenging year for RIM (see TN-Exhibit 2 for a list of events affecting RIM in 2011) as its launch of its tablet PlayBook was not as successful as compared to Apple's iPad 2. There was also increasing competition from Apple's iPhone 4S and other smartphones using the Android platform. In addition, a number of executives left the company in summer and early fall. There was also a service disruption, due to a failure of core switch in RIM's infrastructure, which interrupted email messages and internet services for millions of BlackBerry users over five continents in October 2011. Apart from these serious strategic and operational issues, institutional investors, more specifically NEI, questioned the dominance of executives on RIM's Board and asked for a split of the Chair and Co-CEO roles. In order to avert a showdown with shareholders at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) on July 12, 2011, RIM made an agreement with NEI to establish "a committee of independent directors to study its board structure, the merits of a lead director versus a chair, and the 'business necessity' for the company's co-CEOs to hold 'significant' board-level titles". This sets the theme of the case, i.e., assess RIM's board structure in 2011 and recommend resolutions to be included in the report due on January 31, 2012 to address the governance issues raised by NEI.
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