This case describes a medium size business that manufactures animal feed for commercial and companion animals. The company has been growing rapidly, and is considering whether or not to implement an ERP system. Ozark currently uses an IT system built and refined in-house, and though less flexible than desired, allowed for some specific functionality the company used, such as a pricing system tied to the company's commodity hedging positions on a real time, as well as off the shelf systems for recording financial transactions and reporting, purchasing, warehouse management, and manufacturing execution. The case provides an overview of ERP systems and implementation. Ozark is deciding among 3 ERP options; different senior executives support different options.

Ambicultural organizations and executives go a step beyond simply embracing different thoughts and behaviors-they transcend divisions to integrate such "opposites" as competition and cooperation, East and West or Chinese and American business approaches and strategies. They combine the best of two or more entities-cultures, ideas, practices-while avoiding the shortcomings of each.

This case describes the implementation of a results-only work environment (ROWE) at Mabel's Labels, a successful entrepreneurial firm in Canada. Under ROWE, employee performance is managed by examining outcomes and accomplishments, not by measuring the amount of time people spend at the workplace. The case provides details of the change process and ROWE implementation. The change leader views ROWE as a strategic initiative to enhance the organizational culture and is pleased with employee attitudes and productivity under ROWE. She wonders, however, what next steps are needed to mitigate emerging issues, such as employee coordination, team building and the assimilation of new employees.

More than a decade after its launch, DonorsChoose.org is a successful, well-known and well-regarded charitable organization that supports U.S. public schools. Yet in the years since the organization's inception, the charity environment has changed, leading the organization's chief marketing officer to investigate how to further clarify the brand in a shifting space. The case centres on findings delivered by a branding agency regarding a possible change to the organization's tagline. Faced with a lengthy report on the branding agency's findings, the chief marketing officer needs to decide on the organization's next steps.

More than a decade after its launch, DonorsChoose.org is a successful, well-known and well-regarded charitable organization that supports U.S. public schools. Yet in the years since the organization’s inception, the charity environment has changed, leading the organization’s chief marketing officer to investigate how to further clarify the brand in a shifting space. The case centres on findings delivered by a branding agency regarding a possible change to the organization’s tagline. Faced with a lengthy report on the branding agency’s findings, the chief marketing officer needs to decide on the organization’s next steps.

On October 1, 2013 at a meeting of ruling party officials, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said that he had decided to go ahead with a plan to increase the sales tax from 5% to 8%, beginning April 1, 2014. This tax hike had become law in August 2012, under then-Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda. Abe, faced with a choice he did not ask for, sought to make a decision he could live with. Deciding whether to raise the tax had proven very hard for him. He had to take extraordinary care weighing conditions. The Bank of Japan had already fired the first "arrow" of Abenomics, an unconventional easing of the money supply. The second, fiscal stimulus, was constrained by Japan's fiscal rebalancing goals. With regards to the third arrow, a strategy for economic growth, the government was still working out how to break entrenched regulations in farming and employment. Until the very last moment, Abe had to consider whether a tax increase would lead Japan back into the deep valley of deflation and economic stagnation.

We Sell Everything in Software (WSES) Inc. dealt with innovative off-the-shelf products and had a high growth trajectory. They had a healthy pipeline and their annual marketing spend of $500 million was allocated on the basis of conversion probabilities at flat 6% of the expected sales value. WSES did not have a structured approach for calculating sales conversion probabilities - it followed the gut feelings of its marketing and sales team. Therefore, it incurred high marketing cost including travel costs, client visits, time spent by the sales team/technical experts/support staff, and logistics costs. Jack, the CEO of WSES, was worried that despite having such a huge expenditure list, the sales conversion possibilities based on the pipeline was at best an ancillary information, as there was no substance in justifying the ''gut feeling''. Thus, Jack was not too convinced of this method and was exploring multiple options with Ben, Vice President, Marketing. Considering that WSES pursued around 1,000 opportunities every year, which they either won or lost, Jack felt the need to have these data that they had collated over the years validated and thereby interpreted. Thus, WSES engaged Mark with a Ph.D. in statistics to understand if they could determine a structured approach to compute conversion probabilities and devise an optimal way to allocate marketing spend such that even with significant reduction in marketing spend, the objectives on expected values on sales and profits were met.

Dinesh Agarwal and Brijesh Agrawal ("DA & BA") established IndiaMART with around US$1100 savings in 1996. By 2014, "IndiaMART.com is India's largest online marketplace for Small & Medium Size Businesses". Its revenue for the year ended March 2014 reached US$32 million. "The company offers a platform & tools to over 1.5 million suppliers to generate business leads from over 10 million buyers... (It) has over 2600 employees located across 40+ offices in the country". In keeping with its growth plans, the company evaluates various capital raising activities from time to time, including public or private placement opportunities. Factors that would benefit the company's valuation include a strong track record of year-on-year growth, a sustainable revenue basis from diversified product categories, a strong, huge, and active user base, and a solid conversion rate of buyer- leads to revenue dollars for its suppliers. The downside, though, is that the company has not been generating operational profits for five years since 2010. From scratch to US$32 million revenue, DA & BA have led the company's many evolutions; what are the major considerations in building the present business model? How do they ensure the development of strong networks in every product category of the multiple-sided platform? One criticism of IndiaMART's weakness is easy replicability - what is the founders' response in mitigating risks presented by this weakness? What should IndiaMART do to attract a fair valuation?

<p style="color: rgb(197, 183, 131);"><strong> AWARD WINNER -Bringing Technology to Market Award, European Foundation for Management Development (EFMD) Case Writing Competition</strong></p><br>This case describes how General Electric has developed its China Technology Center over the past decade. The case also elaborates on the changing role of the China Technology Center in General Electric’s global research and development strategy. In 2000, General Electric set up its China Technology Center in Shanghai after bringing its technologies and products to China. In the first few years, the focus of the China Technology Center was to build local engineering teams, learn about customer needs, determine successful marketing strategies, and to develop relationships with local suppliers in order to reduce costs. Over time, the China Technology Center developed its “In China for China” strategy by adjusting its own products and designs to adapt to the local market, while still developing innovative technologies and products to address China’s toughest challenges — such as those encountered in the healthcare industry. This strategy was very successful; some innovations from the China Technology Center were used in other emerging markets as well as in U.S. and European markets — a process that is known as reverse innovation.

This case describes how General Electric has developed its China Technology Center over the past decade. The case also elaborates on the changing role of the China Technology Center in General Electric's global research and development strategy. In 2000, General Electric set up its China Technology Center in Shanghai after bringing its technologies and products to China. In the first few years, the focus of the China Technology Center was to build local engineering teams, learn about customer needs, determine successful marketing strategies, and to develop relationships with local suppliers in order to reduce costs. Over time, the China Technology Center developed its "In China for China" strategy by adjusting its own products and designs to adapt to the local market, while still developing innovative technologies and products to address China's toughest challenges - such as those encountered in the healthcare industry. This strategy was very successful; some innovations from the China Technology Center were used in other emerging markets as well as in U.S. and European markets - a process that is known as reverse innovation.

This case describes the events and conditions surrounding a critical decision that Masao Yoshida, the plant manager of Tokyo Electric Power Company's (TEPCO's) Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, must make on March 12, 2011. A day earlier, a massive 9.0 magnitude earthquake hit the region where the power plant was located. This caused significant damage to the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, disabling both the regular and backup power supply. Without cooling, the nuclear reactors' temperatures would steadily rise, ultimately leading to a meltdown of the reactor core. Yoshida decides to inject fresh water into the reactors using fire engines - a procedure that has never been tried before. He soon recognises that the limited fresh water supply will run out and so decides to replace it with seawater. Less than twenty minutes after the seawater injection has started, Yoshida receives orders from senior management to stop the injection. What should he do?

In October 2008, State Bank of India (SBI), India's largest state-owned bank, makes its foray into Singapore's consumer banking market. A year into operations, Anil Kishora, chief executive officer of SBI, Singapore, is charged to double the remittance earnings in the next 12 months, an onerous task for a young branch that is just finding its feet in a new market. Yet Kishora's team manages to successfully meet the target - remittance volume rose by 96% in ten months. Despite these successes, Kishora is aware of the challenges that lay ahead. Remittances have been a quick win and have yielded the necessary cash flow for the new division. But will the growth from remittance earnings be sustainable over the longer term? How can SBI establish a strong presence and build an identity in Singapore's mature and fiercely competitive market, beyond the remittance story?

In October 2011, NTUC Income, Singapore's largest automotive insurer launches the 'Orange Force'. It is a bold US$3.2 million initiative where a team of 30 expertly trained and distinctively attired motorcycle riders will arrive at an accident scene within minutes to assist and comfort those who have been involved in a road incident. They will then proceed to perform basic first-aid, call up the next-of-kin and/or a tow truck company, and advise the customer on how to record the accident details. The initiative has received an extremely positive response, and NTUC Income recognises that what had been originally envisaged as a fraud- reduction initiative is now a much larger offering in innovative customer service and branding.

On April 1, 2013, the Supreme Court of India rejects Novartis' patent application for its cancer treatment drug, Glivec. Many share the opinion that Indians should have access to cheaper generic alternatives for life-saving drugs and that multinational pharmaceutical companies should not be allowed to benefit from prolonging a drug's patent life. However, these companies often spend decades and invest billions of dollars to develop just a single drug. Novartis' existing business models and pricing strategies in the United States, Western Europe and Japan now need to be re-evaluated for emerging markets such as India; taking into account affordability, limited access to health insurance and government safety nets, different marketing and distribution networks, and the powerful generics lobby. What should Novartis' strategy be in India, and for emerging markets in general?

Rey Holdings Corp. was one of the two leading supermarket chains in Panama, with an estimated 30% market share,39 stores and a five-year aggressive expansion plan. In addition, Rey Holdings held a lower market share in the pharmaceutical and food industries. In 2011, the company was evaluating growth options through: a) point-of-sales and geographical growth; b) expanding product mix and store layout; and c) a strong market entry into the pharmaceutical industry through the acquisition of Metro Corporation.

The chief executive officer of TCL Multimedia, a global TV manufacturer based in China, looked at the company’s first-half financial results with some concern. The results did not meet his expectations, and the company had lost market shares, both in China and internationally. Although he was confident that the new, recently adopted corporate strategy would enable a better future positioning of the company, he knew that without the appropriate supply chain design, the effectiveness of the new corporate strategy could suffer.

A burgeoning mobile application entrepreneur has developed an interesting potential product with her friends. However, when she encounters an investment opportunity, she decides to seek legal advice for the first time in her business life. As a result of her initial meeting with a lawyer, she realizes how unprepared she is and some of the tough questions that she will need to answer.

When Volkswagen’s emissions-hiding scandal surfaced, then-CEO Martin Winterkorn initially tried to ride out his leadership crisis, claiming he had been unaware of the company’s use of pollution-hiding software. Authorities are investigating, but currently no public evidence directly links senior management to the rigging of diesel engines marketed as green technology. Winterkorn eventually agreed to resign to give the company a chance to recover, which might have been worthy of some praise, but then Winterkorn insisted he was “not aware of any wrongdoing on my part.” This article examines why he bears responsibility for the crisis as a leader and examines the related lessons that should be learned. The auto sector is under huge pressure to cut both costs and emissions while also improving vehicle quality and safety. As a result, and as every CEO knows, the temptation to cheat is enormous. But as a leader, it never pays to focus on rewarding results while ignoring how they are achieved, especially when conducting business in environments that are highly competitive. In other words, trust is only a good thing when you have a culture that supports the right behaviour. The essence of good risk management is asking appropriate questions and getting truthful answers. Leaders need to listen to the “whispers” in the organization. The Volkswagen saga is yet another example that all three Cs of leadership — competencies, character and commitment — are essential for good leadership.

In 2001, Toshiyuki Inoko founded the Japanese digital artist collaborative, teamLab, with an aim to achieve a balance between art, science, technology and creativity by creating original digital designs. This involves the use of extremely sophisticated digital media work which can be presented via computers, high definition monitors, and/or projections, depending on the space available for installation. From a small group of five friends that set up the company in 2001, teamLab has since grown to over 400 employees working on more than one hundred projects at any point in time. teamLab's business model appeared to have successfully harnessed the creativity and expertise of its people to deliver innovative and imaginative products that were becoming increasingly popular in the market. But how could the company ensure that it did not let the excitement and novelty of their products wear off, as it was this uniqueness that provided them with a strong competitive edge? Moreover, with growth and success came a different set of challenges. The team had grown, which meant that collaboration among the team members would have to be managed far more systematically, and processes would need to be implemented to manage the growing business effectively - but this could also potentially impede an intrinsically disorderly creative process. How best could Inoko successfully manage the spectacular growth of his company and the challenges that came with it, while nurturing the creative spark?

This case explores the rise and fall of Nebula Inc., a company that industry experts had originally predicted would become the market leader in the hybrid cloud computing market. In its early days, Nebula seemed like a guaranteed success-the founding team included Chris Kemp, who helped start OpenStack (an open source cloud computing project) during his time at NASA. Top-tier angel and VC investors, including Ted Schlein (Kleiner Perkins Caufield and Byers), Andy Bechtolsheim, and Ram Shriram, backed the company from its onset, and the private cloud computing space appeared to be a hot early-stage market. Nebula launched the first version of its product in the spring of 2013 to great fanfare. Pent-up excitement about the underlying technology contributed to approximately $1 million in first quarter revenue. Management was thrilled and thought they were the ones who had finally cracked the hybrid cloud market. However, sales soon began to slow, and many chose to go with competing and older solutions they understood. Through the eyes of Chris Kemp and Gordon Stitt, this case examines how such a hot company, led by founders with impressive backgrounds and supported by some of the most noteworthy investors in Silicon Valley, got lost on its path to success.