Bhasin was the head of GE Capital in India when, in the late 1990s, he had a vision for the future of a small division that was providing back-office services such as processing car loans and credit card transactions for the local market. GE Capital was the first foreign-owned financial services company that had been allowed into India, and as an experiment by the government, it was hypervulnerable to changes in policy and philosophy. Bhasin wanted to find a safe and sustainable means of growth. The eager, ambitious talent pool he could see all around him, both inside the company and across India, gave him an idea: Why not take advantage of it to offer support services to GE Capital all over the world? The people he turned to for advice were uniformly discouraging. How, they asked, could he build a facility on the scale he would need, hire huge numbers of people and train them to Six Sigma standards on products they knew nothing about, and gain access to telecommunications and infrastructure at a level then unheard of in India? Undaunted, Bhasin pressed on, and today Genpact, which was spun off from GE Capital in 2005, directly employs 43,000 people and serves 400 other companies in 13 countries.

When an executive makes a big bet, he or she typically relies on the judgment of a team that has put together a proposal for a strategic course of action. After all, the team will have delved into the pros and cons much more deeply than the executive has time to do. The problem is, biases invariably creep into any team's reasoning-and often dangerously distort its thinking. A team that has fallen in love with its recommendation, for instance, may subconsciously dismiss evidence that contradicts its theories, give far too much weight to one piece of data, or make faulty comparisons to another business case. That's why, with important decisions, executives need to conduct a careful review not only of the content of recommendations but of the recommendation process. To that end, the authors-Kahneman, who won a Nobel Prize in economics for his work on cognitive biases; Lovallo of the University of Sydney; and Sibony of McKinsey-have put together a 12-question checklist intended to unearth and neutralize defects in teams' thinking. These questions help leaders examine whether a team has explored alternatives appropriately, gathered all the right information, and used well-grounded numbers to support its case. They also highlight considerations such as whether the team might be unduly influenced by self-interest, overconfidence, or attachment to past decisions. By using this practical tool, executives will build decision processes over time that reduce the effects of biases and upgrade the quality of decisions their organizations make. The payoffs can be significant: A recent McKinsey study of more than 1,000 business investments, for instance, showed that when companies worked to reduce the effects of bias, they raised their returns on investment by seven percentage points. Executives need to realize that the judgment of even highly experienced, superbly competent managers can be fallible. A disciplined decision-making process, not individual genius, is the key to good strategy.

In the early 2000s, faced with an alarming gap between its growth goals and what its innovation pipeline was delivering, Procter & Gamble created a "new-growth factory"-a network of novel structures and capabilities to rapidly shepherd new products and even business models from inception to market. The resulting innovations range from a 33-cent razor for customers in emerging economies to Tide Dry Cleaners-establishments with drive-through windows and 24-hour drop-off and pickup. Brown, who is P&G's chief technology officer, and Anthony describe the factory's components and practices: new-business-creation groups, entrepreneurial "guides" to help them, an innovation manual, a disruptive-innovation "college," and more. They also offer six lessons for leaders seeking to set up new-growth factories of their own. Although the factory is still ramping up, its early successes suggest that collective creativity can be managed-and can generate sustainable sources of revenue growth no matter how big a company becomes.

Although most managers publicly acknowledge the need to explore new businesses and markets, the claims of established businesses on company resources almost always come first, especially when times are hard. When top teams allow the tension between core and speculative units to play out at lower levels of management, innovation loses out. At best, leaders of core business units dismiss innovation initiatives as irrelevancies. At worst, they see the new businesses as threats to the firm's core identity and values. Many CEOs take a backseat in debates over resources, ceding much of their power to middle managers, and the company ends up as a collection of feudal baronies. This is a recipe for long-term failure, say the authors. Their research of 12 top management teams at major companies suggests that firms thrive only when senior teams lead ambidextrously-when they foster a state of constant creative conflict between the old and the new. Successful CEOs first develop a broad, forward-looking strategic aspiration that sets ambitious targets both for innovation and core business growth. They then hold the tension between innovation unit demands and core business demands at the very top of the organization. And finally they embrace inconsistency, allowing themselves the latitude to pursue multiple and often conflicting agendas.

A few years ago the software development company Intuit realized that it needed a new approach to galvanizing customers. The company's Net Promoter Score was faltering, and customer recommendations of new products were especially disappointing. Intuit decided to hold a two-day offsite for the company's top 300 managers with a focus on the role of design in innovation. One of the days was dedicated to a program called Design for Delight. The centerpiece of the day was a PowerPoint presentation by Scott Cook, who realized midway through that he was no Steve Jobs: The managers listened dutifully, but there was little energy in the room. By contrast, an exercise that followed, in which the participants worked through a design challenge by creating prototypes, getting feedback, iterating, and refining, had them mesmerized. The eventual result was an organized program in which a team of nine design thinking coaches-"innovation catalysts"- from across Intuit were made available to help any work group create prototypes, run experiments, and learn from customers. The process includes a "painstorm" (to determine the customer's greatest pain point), a "sol-jam" (to generate and then winnow possible solutions), and a "code-jam" (to write code "good enough" to take to customers within two weeks). Design for Delight has enabled employees throughout Intuit to move from satisfying customers to delighting them.

No investment in innovation is ever a sure bet. Typically, innovation success rates are low, and returns are slow to materialize-if they're generated at all. This makes innovation initiatives hard to justify when money is tight. But even then, it's still possible to launch new offerings that excite customers. The trick is to find the promising assets you already have in hand. According to strategy consultant Lance Bettencourt and consumer-products executive Scott Betten-court, almost every company has previous discoveries with overlooked market potential. The six most common types of in-hand innovations include products that failed to launch because of particular circumstances, which may have changed since then; previously developed capabilities and features addressing customer needs that have recently risen in prominence; products that customers like for unexpected reasons and that could take off if repositioned; extras created for bundled offerings that could be spun out as stand-alone products; separate components that could be combined into an enhanced offering; and overdesigned products that could be simplified to help the company reach new customer segments. With such innovations, much of the work has already been done. They can be brought to market with relatively minimal effort, resources, and risk and swiftly boost a company's bottom line.

A growing body of research shows that end users-customers, clients, patients, and others who benefit from a company's offerings-can be important allies for leaders. By serving as tangible proof of the consequences and purpose of employees' efforts, end users motivate people to work harder, smarter, and more effectively. In his research, the author invited a scholarship recipient to spend five minutes visiting with university fundraising callers, who generally had no contact with the beneficiaries of their efforts. One month later, callers showed, on average, 142% increases in weekly time spent on the phone and 171% increases in money raised. Leaders are not lone heroes who must rally their employees to do great things. They need partners who can enhance the meaning employees derive from their jobs. End users can inspire workers by demonstrating the impact of their efforts, showing appreciation for their work, and eliciting employees' empathy for them. To outsource inspiration effectively, leaders must identify end users (both past and present), collect their stories, introduce them to employees across the organization, and recognize workers' impact on customers' lives.

The "free" business models popularized in the digital world by companies such as Google, Adobe, and Mozilla are spreading to markets in the physical world. How should established companies respond? The authors have found that some are too quick to offer free products of their own. Many more either don't move quickly enough or simply fail to respond at all, even when they have the resources to win a head-to-head battle. Consider the reluctance of almost all U.S. newspapers to counter the attack on their classified advertising business from Craigslist. To determine the level of threat posed by a free-product rival, a company should assess the rate at which its own paying customers are defecting versus how quickly the entrant's user base is growing. Most incumbents can fend off the assault by introducing a better free offering and generating revenues and profits through up-selling, cross-selling, selling access to their customers, and bundling the free product with paid offerings. Embracing free strategies is not easy for managers at established companies. One obstacle is the profit-center structure, which makes it impossible to consider a product's revenues and costs separately. Another is the cost accounting system, which is not good for identifying the actual expense of generating additional offerings. To overcome these challenges, managers can push profit responsibility up, push revenue and cost responsibilities down to separate groups, and step back from the cost accounting system. They may find pricing flexibility they didn't realize they had.

The bottom of the economic pyramid is a risky place for business, but decent profits can be made there if companies link their financial success with their constituencies' well-being. To do that effectively, you must understand the nuances of people's daily lives, say Rangan and Chu, of Harvard Business School, and Petkoski, of the World Bank. Start by dividing the base of the pyramid into three segments according to people's earnings and related personal needs: (1) Low income: 1.4 billion people, $3 to $5 a day, (2) Subsistence: 1.6 billion people, $1 to $3 a day, and (3) Extreme poverty: 1 billion people, less than $1 a day. Next, consider the roles of various groups in the value-creation relationship: consumers, coproducers, and clients. Specific strategies work best with people in certain roles and at particular income levels. Success requires appreciating the diversity at the base of the pyramid and the importance of scale in undertaking ventures there. Witness Manila Water's success in the Philippines and Hindustan Unilever's in South Asia. Failure to appreciate those elements can foil base-of-the-pyramid ventures, as Microsoft and Procter & Gamble each discovered.

Why is it that so many smart, ambitious professionals are less productive and satisfied than they could be? Thomas DeLong, an academic and consultant to executives, and Sara DeLong, a psychiatrist, argue that it's often because they're afraid to demonstrate any sign of weakness. They're reluctant to ask important questions or try new approaches that push them outside their comfort zones. For high achievers, looking stupid or incompetent is anathema. So they stick to the tasks they're good at, even while the rest of the organization may be passing them by. In short, they'd rather do the wrong thing well than do the right thing poorly. They get stuck in this unproductive and unfulfilling pattern and can't break free. Of course, leaders in organizations bear some of the blame for this type of play-it-safe mind-set. They don't always want to hear that a person is struggling, nor do they necessarily reward risk taking, even though they might pay lip service to innovative initiative. The authors outline several steps that individuals can take to shake off fear and paralysis, including looking at past negative experiences from somebody else's point of view and seeking out safe ways to allow themselves to become vulnerable.

Kathy Giusti never had any desire to be an entrepreneur, especially not one in the nonprofit sector. She was on the fast track at a huge corporation-and loving it. Then at, the age of 37, she learned she had a deadly form of blood cancer. That life-altering news would put her on a new path: galvanizing efforts to find a cure. In the process, she would found two nonprofits, building unprecedented discipline into their mode of operation.

Alegre, a leading hotel group in Central and South America, is suffering under the troubled economy, and its newest property, the flagship Palma Cay in Cozumel, is hurting most. Beatriz Soto, Palma Cay's manager, has a plan to boost bookings, but she doesn't have the money to carry it out. Should corporate headquarters grant her additional funds, despite the company's traditionally decentralized operations? Or should Alegre think about launching its very first portfolio-wide campaign? With commentary by Raul Gonzalez, the CEO of Barcelo Hotels & Resorts for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa; and Kevin Lane Keller, the E.B. Osborn Professor of Marketing at Dartmouth's Tuck School of Business.

Adria, the head chef of elBulli-a Spanish restaurant regularly ranked the world's best-on efficient service culture, the best way to nurture talent, and the creative inspiration behind new foods like sea urchin foam and curry ice cream.

Alegre, a leading hotel group in Central and South America, is suffering under the troubled economy, and its newest property, the flagship Palma Cay in Cozumel, is hurting most. Beatriz Soto, Palma Cay's manager, has a plan to boost bookings, but she doesn't have the money to carry it out. Should corporate headquarters grant her additional funds, despite the company's traditionally decentralized operations? Or should Alegre think about launching its very first portfolio-wide campaign? With commentary by Raul Gonzalez, the CEO of Barcelo Hotels & Resorts for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa; and Kevin Lane Keller, the E.B. Osborn Professor of Marketing at Dartmouth's Tuck School of Business.

Alegre, a leading hotel group in Central and South America, is suffering under the troubled economy, and its newest property, the flagship Palma Cay in Cozumel, is hurting most. Beatriz Soto, Palma Cay's manager, has a plan to boost bookings, but she doesn't have the money to carry it out. Should corporate headquarters grant her additional funds, despite the company's traditionally decentralized operations? Or should Alegre think about launching its very first portfolio-wide campaign? With commentary by Raul Gonzalez, the CEO of Barcelo Hotels & Resorts for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa; and Kevin Lane Keller, the E.B. Osborn Professor of Marketing at Dartmouth's Tuck School of Business.

This is part of a case series. 'Everyone says entrepreneurship is about risk-taking. But it's not: it's about minimising risks and taking careful risks.' Terry Rhodes' own words resonated with him as he reflected on the most critical decision of his career at Celtel International. Since its inception in March 1998, Celtel, a wireless service provider, set out to change the way business was done in Africa and to prove the transformative effects business could have on the continent and its people. Rhodes, Co-Founder and Chief Strategy Officer of Celtel, had successfully mitigated the risks and overcome the challenges that deterred other businesses from investing in and contributing to the region. 'We were lucky that our business - mobile telecommunications - was seen as raising money in the West to bring to Africa and build infrastructure,' he explained. As Celtel expanded and moved into more and more markets across Sub-Saharan Africa, its corporate values were continually tested. Up until now, Rhodes had managed to avert corrupt situations using simple but creative tactics. However, the market entry into Guinea in late 1999 had posed a different story. Despite his multiple efforts, negotiations with the Guinean government were now at a standstill and it had become clear to Rhodes that the government expected substantial bribery payments for the deal to move forward. It was now late September 2001 and to add to the dire situation, Celtel's CFO had informed him that losing the Guinea deal might lead the company towards bankruptcy. Rhodes now sat outside the door of the boardroom, waiting to be called in and present his recommendation to the Board concerning the Guinea deal. As he reflected on his available options, Rhodes knew he would have to defend his decision to the Board and would need their full support.

Case (A) describes the situation at the Northlands Ledger, a newspaper on its way out of business due in large part to its publisher's and editors' focus on what they do and want to keep doing rather than on what their customers (readers and advertisers) want. The value proposition to the reader is that 'we deliver the paper reliably and give you the latest national and international news'. The value proposition to the advertisers is that 'we print your ads accurately and runs them on time'. Both value propositions are outdated, and, even if they were what the customers wanted-which they were not, neither was being executed well. The paper's key performance indicators-circulation, classified ads, and commercial advertising are all in decline despite the fact that the community it serves is growing. The senior management of the Paulus chain that owns this paper has forced the publisher, Allison, to retire and brought another publisher, Potter, in from one of its other papers, The Sun Belt City Star, where Potter was highly successful. However, he cannot simply transfer his success formula from the Star to the Ledger. Case (B) details his efforts and may be used as a classic example of good change management and leadership practices. Potter established a clear-cut set of objectives and formulated a new strategy of responsiveness to readers and advertisers that responded to why they "hired" the paper in the first place. To implement his new strategy he terminated senior managers and others who he did not feel could contribute to the new paper, and made significant changes in key dimensions of implementation: culture, structure, information and decision support systems, incentives, and human resources. Throughout he used a mix of both authoritative and participative change management-a mix that may provoke an interesting class discussion.

Case (A) describes the situation at the Northlands Ledger, a newspaper on its way out of business due in large part to its publisher and editor's focus on what they do and want to keep doing rather than on what their customers (readers and advertisers) want. The value proposition to the reader is that 'we deliver the paper reliably and give you the latest national and international news'. The value proposition to the advertisers is that 'we print your ads accurately and runs them on time'. Both value propositions are outdated, and, even if they were what the customers wanted-which they are not, neither is executed well. The paper's key performance indicators-circulation, classified ads and commercial advertising are all in decline despite the fact that the community it serves is growing. The senior management of the Paulus chain that owns this paper has forced the publisher, Allison, to retire and brought another publisher, Potter, in from one of its other papers, The Sun Belt City Star, where Potter was highly successful. However, he cannot simply transfer his success formula from the Star to the Ledger. Case (B) details his efforts and may be used as a classic example of good change management and leadership practices. Potter established a clear cut set of objectives, formulated a new strategy of responsiveness to readers and advertisers more in line with finding out why they hired the paper in the first place. To implement his new strategy he terminated senior managers and others who he did not feel could contribute to the new paper, and made significant changes in key dimensions of implementation: culture, structure, information and decision support systems, incentives and human resources. Throughout he used a mix of both authoritative and participative change management-a mix that may provoke an interesting class discussion.

Can a company base a major proposal on its good reputation, history with the client, and a perspective that differs from the client's own? Emphasizing both its engineering capability and 80 years' experience, Parsons Brinckerhoff spends one year and $1 million preparing a proposal to build a $17 billion subway line. Competition from four equally qualified firms is stiff, but PB is sure its history and top-level MTA connections make it a shoe-in. Despite MTA's concerns about the finished line's functionality, PB believes the construction of the tunnel itself is the key to winning the bid. In the A case, the firm awaits the good news. The B and C cases reveal the results and the direction the company then chooses to take. (A teaching note is available to registered faculty members.)

Can a company base a major proposal on its good reputation, history with the client, and a perspective that differs from that client's own? Emphasizing both its engineering capability and 80 years' experience, Parsons Brinckerhoff spends one year and $1 million preparing a proposal to build a $17 billion subway line. Competition from four equally qualified firms is stiff, but PB is sure its history and top-level Metropolitan Transit Authority connections make it a shoe-in. Despite MTA's concerns about the finished line's functionality, PB believes the construction of the tunnel itself is the key to winning the bid. In the A case, the firm awaits the good news. The B and C cases reveal the result and the direction the company then chooses to take.