Nick Lazaris becomes Keurig's third CEO in three years, after one founder was fired and the other decided to leave the company. He inherits a company that has made several abortive attempts to launch its new coffee brewing system. Now, problems with crucial suppliers threaten the next proposed launch plan.
By 1996, Du Pont had spent six years helping licensee manufacturers to develop the Chinese market for nonstick cookware. Although Du Pont Teflon brand coating held 80% of the nonstick market, the nonstick market overall represented 2% of the Chinese cookware market. Moreover, the amount of money spent on developing the nonstick market exceeded the revenue that Du Pont received in the Chinese market. If Du Pont decided to take a different role in the market, it faced many obstacles that required significant additional investment. It appeared that the Chinese market offered tremendous opportunity, but it would require new efforts, skills, distribution channels, and patience. Dupont's decision represented a move from being moderately involved in developing the Chinese nonstick cookware market to taking a very active leadership role in the market.
Eastman Kodak has suffered significant declines in film market share at the hands of lower-priced branded producers and private label products. The case presents Kodak's proposal to launch a new economy brand of film to combat these rivals. A rewritten version of an earlier case.
In the global economy, having a workforce that is fluent in the ways of the world is a competitive necessity. That's why more and more companies are sending more and more professionals abroad. But international assignments don't come cheap: on average, expatriates cost a company two to three times what they would cost in equivalent positions back home. Most companies, however, get anemic returns on their expat investments. The authors discovered that an alarming number of assignments fail in one way or another--some expats return home early, others finish but don't perform as well as expected, and many leave their companies within a year of repatriation. To find out why, the authors recently focused on the small number of companies that manage their expats successfully. They found that all those companies follow three general practices: 1) When they send people abroad, the goal is not just to put out fires. Once expats have doused the flames, they are expected to generate new knowledge for the organization or to acquire skills that will help them become leaders. 2) They assign overseas posts to people whose technical skills are matched or exceeded by their cross-cultural skills. 3) They recognize that repatriation is a time of upheaval for most expats, and they use a variety of programs to help their people readjust. Companies that follow these practices share a conviction that sustained growth rests on the shoulders of individuals with international experience. As a result, they are poised to capture tomorrow's global market opportunities by making their investments in international assignments successful today.
In today's competitive markets, every company has an action plan. Yet for most managers, the processes used to create these plans don't work. The root of the problem, suggests Campbell, may be that too many companies benchmark their processes and by doing so, prevent managers from focusing on what is unique to their situation. Good planning processes, the author argues, are not generic processes but ones in which both analytic techniques and organizational processes are carefully tailored to the needs of individual businesses and to the skills of corporate managers. The author cites examples of three companies that have successfully individualized their processes: Granada, Dow Chemical Company, and Emerson Electric. A mature electrical-products business such as Emerson, he says, has different planning needs than a fast-growing entertainment business like Granada or a highly cyclical chemicals business like Dow. Different chief executives may have different insights about how to go about adding value. Take the CEOs of Granada and Dow. Both set tough targets to stretch their businesses, but the way each CEO gets his managers to commit to his targets differs considerably. Bad planning can actively destroy value, the author says. It wastes people's time and money. It sends the wrong signals to managers. It can even lead managers to follow bad advice. That's why managers should go to the effort of reexamining and possibly changing their company's planning process.
The arrival of a multinational corporation often looks like a death sentence to local companies in an emerging market. After all, how can they compete in the face of the vast financial and technological resources, the seasoned management, and the powerful brands of, say, a Compaq or a Johnson & Johnson? But local companies often have more options than they might think, say the authors. Those options vary, depending on the strength of globalization pressures in an industry and the nature of a company's competitive assets. In the worst case, when globalization pressures are strong and a company has no competitive assets that it can transfer to other countries, it needs to retreat to a locally oriented link within the value chain. But if globalization pressures are weak, the company may be able to defend its market share by leveraging the advantages it enjoys in its home market. Many companies in emerging markets have assets that can work well in other countries. Those that operate in industries where the pressures to globalize are weak may be able to extend their success to a limited number of other markets that are similar to their home base. And those operating in global markets may be able to contend head-on with multinational rivals. By better understanding the relationship between their company's assets and the industry they operate in, executives from emerging markets can gain a clearer picture of the options they really have when multinationals come to stay.
No matter how monolithic they may seem, most companies are really engaged in three kinds of businesses. One business attracts customers. Another develops products. The third oversees operations. Although organizationally intertwined, these businesses have conflicting characteristics. It takes a big investment to find and develop a relationship with a customer, so profitability hinges on achieving economies of scope. But speed, not scope, drives the economics of product innovation. And the high fixed costs of capital-intensive infrastructure businesses require economies of scale. Scope, speed, and scale can't be optimized simultaneously, so trade-offs have to be made when the three businesses are bundled into one corporation. Historically, they have been bundled because the interaction costs--the friction--incurred by separating them were too high. But we are on the verge of a worldwide reduction in interaction costs, the authors contend, as electronic networks drive down the costs of communicating and of exchanging data. Activities that companies have always believed were central to their businesses will suddenly be offered by new, specialized competitors that won't have to make trade-offs. Ultimately, the authors predict, traditional businesses will unbundle and then rebundle into large infrastructure and customer-relationship businesses and small, nimble product innovation companies. And executives in many industries will be forced to ask the most basic question about their companies: What business are we really in? Their answer will determine their fate in an increasingly frictionless economy.
The rise of the computer and the increasing importance of intellectual assets have compelled executives to examine the knowledge underlying their businesses and how it is used. Because knowledge management as a conscious practice is so young, however, executives have lacked models to use as guides. To help fill that gap, the authors recently studied knowledge management practices at management consulting firms, health care providers, and computer manufacturers. They found two very different knowledge management strategies in place. In companies that sell relatively standardized products that fill common needs, knowledge is carefully codified and stored in databases, where it can be accessed and used--over and over again--by anyone in the organization. The authors call this the codification strategy. In companies that provide highly customized solutions to unique problems, knowledge is shared mainly through person-to-person contacts; the chief purpose of computers is to help people communicate. They call this the personalization strategy. A company's choice of knowledge management strategy is not arbitrary--it must be driven by the company's competitive strategy. Emphasizing the wrong approach or trying to pursue both can quickly undermine a business. The authors warn that knowledge management should not be isolated in a functional department like HR or IT. They emphasize that the benefits are greatest--to both the company and its customers--when a CEO and other general managers actively choose one of the approaches as a primary strategy.
The theory of complexity, which began as a way to understand complicated natural phenomena, has attracted growing attention in business circles interested in the new economy. In Open Boundaries, Howard Sherman and Ron Schultz of the Santa Fe Center for Emerging Strategies see many parallels between complex natural systems and markets. Both involve so many intricate interactions that outcomes cannot be predicted. The authors advise managers to stop trying to plan and prepare for change and instead build companies into self-organizing teams ready to adapt to whatever opportunities emerge. Thomas Hout of the Boston Consulting Group finds much that is useful in complexity theory, particularly for turbulent industries. But there are limits to the pursuit of flexibility and self-organization, he argues. Flexible, information-driven companies may be too quick to jump at superficially attractive market opportunities that their seasoned rivals wisely shun. And teams, for all their virtues, can't entirely manage themselves. The combination of fast-growing entrepreneurial companies and smart, mobile, ambitious workers creates a workplace that may actually be more fragile than its industrial predecessors. Solutions to workplace problems are more likely to come from good managers than from the teams themselves. Hout also points out that most businesses do not move so fast that foresight, commitment, preemption, deterrence, and other traditional strategic elements no longer build business value. Even in the fastest industries, good managers can still add value by creating the right working conditions to spur creativity. In other words, management still matters a lot, Hout says, even in the new economy.
A gap has existed between the conventional wisdom about how managers work and the actual behavior of effective managers. Business textbooks suggest that managers operate best when they carefully control their time and work within highly structured environments, but observations of real managers indicate that those who spend their days that way may be undermining their effectiveness. In this HBR Classic, John Kotter explains that managers who limit their interactions to orderly, focused meetings actually shut themselves off from vital information and relationships. He shows how seemingly wasteful activities like chatting in hallways and having impromptu meetings are, in fact, quite efficient. General managers face two fundamental challenges: figuring out what to do despite an enormous amount of potentially relevant information, and getting things done through a large and diverse set of people despite having little direct control over most of them. To tackle these challenges, effective general managers develop flexible agendas and broad networks of relationships. Their agendas enable them to react opportunistically to the flow of events around them because a common framework guides their decisions about where and when to intervene. And their networks allow them to have quick and pointed conversations that give the general managers influence well beyond their formal chain of command. Originally published in 1982, the article's ideas about time management are all the more useful for today's hard-pressed executives. Kotter has added a retrospective commentary highlighting the article's relevance to current concepts of leadership.
So far, Rachel Soltanoff's instincts had been right. As CEO in this fictional case study, she had successfully navigated TradeRite Software's transition from a news service for stockbrokers to a $70 million provider of shrink-wrapped software geared toward both brokers and the growing day-trader market. Now a well-financed start-up, Stocknet.com, was testing a very competitive product that traders could download directly over the Web. And TradeRite's Web site was nothing more than a collection of elaborate marketing brochures. Rachel knew she needed to start selling over the Web. But the e-commerce consultants she had hired to set up her Web store were behind schedule, and their 21-year-old CEO had just resigned. Her product manager, Lisa Bandini, was working overtime to transform TradeRite's entire product line into Web-aware applications to match Stocknet's, and Rachel had $2.5 million to launch them. But the consultants said it would take $5 million just to rent e-commerce capabilities. Ace sales VP Brian Rockart thought the company had already wasted too much time and money--money from his budget--on its Web site. Marketing VP Rob Collins thought TradeRite should focus on its core stockbroker customers. Chief Technical Officer Joe Martinez doesn't want to go ahead without a pilot project. Should Rachel try to convince Brian, Rob, and the rest of the senior management team that e-commerce is the way to go? Four commentators offer advice. In 99209 and 99209Z, commentators David Siegel, Candice Carpenter, David Ticoll, and Jeffrey F. Rayport offer advice on this fictional case.
So far, Rachel Soltanoff's instincts had been right. As CEO in this fictional case study, she had successfully navigated TradeRite Software's transition from a news service for stockbrokers to a $70 million provider of shrink-wrapped software geared toward both brokers and the growing day-trader market. Now a well-financed start-up, Stocknet.com, was testing a very competitive product that traders could download directly over the Web. And TradeRite's Web site was nothing more than a collection of elaborate marketing brochures. Rachel knew she needed to start selling over the Web. But the e-commerce consultants she had hired to set up her Web store were behind schedule, and their 21-year-old CEO had just resigned. Her product manager, Lisa Bandini, was working overtime to transform TradeRite's entire product line into Web-aware applications to match Stocknet's, and Rachel had $2.5 million to launch them. But the consultants said it would take $5 million just to rent e-commerce capabilities. Ace sales VP Brian Rockart thought the company had already wasted too much time and money--money from his budget--on its Web site. Marketing VP Rob Collins thought TradeRite should focus on its core stockbroker customers. Chief Technical Officer Joe Martinez doesn't want to go ahead without a pilot project. Should Rachel try to convince Brian, Rob, and the rest of the senior management team that e-commerce is the way to go? In 99209 and 99209Z, commentators David Siegel, Candice Carpenter, David Ticoll, and Jeffrey F. Rayport offer advice on this fictional case.
So far, Rachel Soltanoff's instincts had been right. As CEO in this fictional case study, she had successfully navigated TradeRite Software's transition from a news service for stockbrokers to a $70 million provider of shrink-wrapped software geared toward both brokers and the growing day-trader market. Now a well-financed start-up, Stocknet.com, was testing a very competitive product that traders could download directly over the Web. And TradeRite's Web site was nothing more than a collection of elaborate marketing brochures. Rachel knew she needed to start selling over the Web. But the e-commerce consultants she had hired to set up her Web store were behind schedule, and their 21-year-old CEO had just resigned. Her product manager, Lisa Bandini, was working overtime to transform TradeRite's entire product line into Web-aware applications to match Stocknet's, and Rachel had $2.5 million to launch them. But the consultants said it would take $5 million just to rent e-commerce capabilities. Ace sales VP Brian Rockart thought the company had already wasted too much time and money--money from his budget--on its Web site. Marketing VP Rob Collins thought TradeRite should focus on its core stockbroker customers. Chief Technical Officer Joe Martinez doesn't want to go ahead without a pilot project. Should Rachel try to convince Brian, Rob, and the rest of the senior management team that e-commerce is the way to go? In 99209 and 99209Z, commentators David Siegel, Candice Carpenter, David Ticoll, and Jeffrey F. Rayport offer advice on this fictional case.
As the stock market began its ascent in the mid-1990s, executive pay--always the subject of heated debate--mounted along with it. That's because among the largest U.S. companies, stock options now account for more than half of total CEO compensation and about 30% of senior operating managers' pay. One problem became particularly clear during the bull market's astonishing run: even below-average performers reap huge gains from stock options when the market is rising rapidly. The author proposes steps to close the gap between existing compensation practices and those needed to promote higher levels of achievement at all levels of the corporation. For top managers, he recommends replacing conventional stock options with options that are tied to a market or peer index. Below-average performers would not be rewarded under such plans; superior performers could, depending on the way plans were structured, receive even more. He notes that managers at the business unit level should not be judged on the company's stock price--over which they have little control--and advocates an approach that accurately measures the value added by each unit. Finally, he suggests how certain indicators of value can be used to measure the contribution of frontline managers and employees. The concept of pay for performance has gained wide acceptance, but the link between incentive pay and superior performance is still too weak. Reforms must be adopted at all levels of the organization. Shareholders will applaud changes in pay schemes that motivate companies to deliver more value.
What happens when the world is changing but your organization isn't? And what if that organization has 340,000 employees in 200 countries? In this interview, Jacques Nasser, the new CEO of Ford Motor Company, talks with HBR senior editor Suzy Wetlaufer about these challenges and explains how his company is overcoming them through a unique education program. Since its very beginnings, says Nasser, Ford has comprised dozens of far-flung divisions and units, each with its own "fiefdom" mind-set. The fiefdoms didn't share information, let alone great ideas. Such behavior stifled creativity and drove up costs. Today's global environment demands a new and different way of doing business, says Nasser, and to that end, Ford has launched a multifaceted teaching initiative that will reach every one of Ford's employees by year-end. The goal of the program: to help employees view the company in its entirety as shareholders do, and then act that way, too. At the heart of the initiative is the teachable point of view, a five-part written explanation of what a person knows and believes about what it takes to succeed in business. It is more than just a document to be discussed and then filed. It has proven to be a powerful tool for organizational transformation, and not only at Ford. In a commentary accompanying Nasser's interview, Noel Tichy, leadership expert and consultant to Ford, describes the building blocks of the teachable point of view and explores how it can be implemented in any organization determined to change for the better.
Faced with vexing financial challenges in 1993, British Aerospace (BAe) is determined to shed its loss-making automaker, Rover. It offers to sell its stake in Rover to Honda, Rover's partner since 1979, but Honda is reluctant to raise its stake in Rover. Meanwhile, BMW approaches BAe with a confidential bid to buy out Rover. This case places these developments within the context of the history of the British auto industry, Rover's heritage, evolution of the Honda-Rover partnership, and the rationale for BMW's interest in Rover. The case series describes subsequent developments.
A former consultant explains the reasons for his decision to leave a successful position in a prominent consulting company. As a result of stress on his family and personal life, and a growing dissatisfaction with certain aspects of his job (see James Reed, case number 9A95C025), he describes how he came to a decision to make a significant career transition. The role of self-assessment and the analysis of fit with potential opportunities is described as it pertains to this decision.