Reeling from the economic effects of closures wrought by the coronavirus pandemic, the Walt Disney Company (Disney) was at a pivotal junction. Even though COVID-19 case counts were rising in Florida, the state government had announced numerous reopening measures and guidelines for theme parks and resorts, indicating the state’s desire for businesses to start returning to “normal.” On May 21, 2020, the Universal Orlando Resort—one of Disney’s major competitors in theme parks—announced that it would be following the guidelines and reopening on June 5, 2020. Consequently, Disney had to decide when and if to reopen its Walt Disney World Resort, also based in Orlando, despite rising case counts.
The Procter & Gamble Company (P&G) was facing a proxy attack from Trian Fund Management, L.P. (Trian) after Trian declared a US$3.5 billion position in P&G, equivalent to a 1.5 per cent shareholding, in February 2017. The fund manager called for a reorganization of the company to improve its performance and for a seat on P&G’s board of directors for Trian’s co-founder Nelson Peltz. Over the next few months, both parties discussed Trian’s proposals, but the negotiations broke down in July 2017, and the conflict became public. Trian announced it would put its demands to a vote during the annual shareholder meeting in October. A month before the meeting, P&G CEO David Taylor had to make a recommendation to the board: should the company accept or rebuff Trian’s attempt at gaining influence?
In 2021, Rogers Communications Inc. (Rogers), one of the largest telecommunications companies in Canada, suffered a leadership crisis amid conflict between members of the Rogers family controlling the company. A decision by board chair Edward Rogers to oust chief executive officer Joe Natale triggered a chain of events that pitted Edward Rogers against his mother and two sisters (all board members). The company’s complex governance model, which consisted of a dual-class share structure and the Rogers Control Trust representing the majority shareholders on the company’s board, made it unclear who had effective decision-making power. In the light of this uncertainty, investors owning Rogers Class B non-voting shares had to decide whether to hold on to, sell, or purchase more shares.
In May, 2020, Rio Tinto PLC, a global mining company, blasted a 46,000-year-old Aboriginal site in the Juukan Gorge, an area in Western Australia. While Rio Tinto’s actions were legal, the company was nonetheless widely criticized for its blasting of the sacred site, which contained remains and artefacts dating back tens of thousands of years. Furthermore, investigations revealed that Rio Tinto had knowledge of the sacred nature of the site. Internal investigations also revealed that the company had earmarked the site as being important to the Aboriginal peoples. The reaction to the blast was swift and unforgiving.
NorLand Limited (NorLand) was a construction company based in British Columbia, Canada, with operations in Alberta, British Columbia, Quebec, and the United States. Having grown primarily by acquisition, the company was moving toward an ambitious goal: to achieve CA$500 million in revenues and CA$50 million in net operating income (NOI) by 2025—the 500-50-25 goal. The main questions facing Dave Reynolds, NorLand’s chief executive officer (CEO), and his leadership team revolved around not only expanding the business to achieve this target but doing so sustainably, while giving NorLand’s business units the latitude and freedom that had drawn them to join NorLand in the first place.
Masai Ujiri, the President and General Manager of the Toronto Raptors (Raptors), had an illustrious career on and off the basketball court; he had not shied away from making bold, even controversial, decisions; and he had led his franchise, the Raptors, to the National Basketball Association (NBA) Championship. Following the Raptors’ clinching the NBA Championship in 2019, Ujiri faced an altercation with an Officer in Oakland, California. At the height of his success, Ujiri explicitly called out his mistreatment because of his being a Black man, highlighting the racism prevalent against Blacks and minorities. Contemplating his future as an executive, Ujiri would need to decide whether to continue, and if so, how to marry the worlds of sport and activism, charting his own path for social change.
On January 13, 2019, the Gillette Company aired the advertisement “We Believe: The Best Men Can Be.” After the airing, both the company and its chief executive officer were subjected to backlash. The advertisement, launched amid the Gillette brand’s declining market share, addressed the #MeToo movement, sexism in the boardroom, and bullying, and asked viewers, “Is this the best a man can get?” Although the advertisement was intended to challenge men to end toxic masculinity and abuse, it became both the most liked and the most disliked advertisement in YouTube’s history. Six months after the airing, The Procter & Gamble Company, reported a US$8.3 million writedown in its Shave Care business, represented by the Gillette brand, leading some observers to wonder whether the polarizing reactions to the advertisement had led to the writedown. What was The Gillette Company’s fiduciary responsibility in the era of the #MeTooMovement? Should its chief executive officer and visionary of the controversial advertisement be fired? Should he be promoted for confronting such a serious societal issue? Or should no change be made in the corporate structure?
After the management of Magna International Inc. (Magna) tabled a proposal to shareholders in May 2010 to acquire all of Frank Stronach's Class B voting shares for approximately US$1 billion, vociferous opposition emerged, heavily criticizing the process by which the terms had been agreed on and the lack of information provided by the board. The Ontario Securities Commission ruled that Magna needed to provide more information to shareholders. In compliance with that order, Magna released an amendment that included a report from its financial advisor, its advisor’s advice to the Magna board, and PricewaterhouseCooper's evaluation of the deal. In late August 2010, a Magna shareholder needed to decide whether to keep or sell her shares, and wanted to understand what amount, if any, would have been appropriate for Stronach’s Class B voting shares. As a consumer conscious of the environmental, social, and governance aspects of a corporation, she was also concerned whether Magna’s board and special committee had applied good governance principles.