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During the summer of 2022, carmaker BMW introduced postpurchase, subscription-based "functions on demand," and the online response was furious. Having purchased a car with functionalities preinstalled, consumers expect to use the functionalities as and when they wish and without additional charges. BMW was changing this norm and so became the object of derision. We live in an age of "x as a service" and amid a subscription economy, and electronics and software are making their way into all kinds of products-products that are connected to the internet at all times, controlled through apps on mobile devices, and subject to the product maker's "off" and "on" instructions. "Preinstalled functionality as a service" is now technologically possible, the economic pull of recurring revenue is enticing, and perhaps BMW should not be blamed: We are possibly at the threshold of a new way of thinking about durable products and their preinstalled bundle of functions. This article introduces the concept of preinstalled functionality as a service and characterizes how this business-model innovation changes the concepts of durable products, product lines, after-purchase add-ons, and functionality usage rights. I conclude by examining whether and how the innovation may be implemented.

In fewer than ten days during the summer of 2016, millions of smartphone users around the world went crazy over Pokémon Go, an augmented reality videogame app. If only all new high-technology products-and their investors-could enjoy such runaway success! Alas, the road to new technologies can be bumpy, and marketers of new high-tech products face numerous obstacles. Six perils await these marketers: significant market uncertainty, significant technological uncertainty, issues of compatibility within a product's complex multi-component system, struggles to orchestrate self-reinforcing network effects, challenges of navigating ecosystem complexities and competition, and inherent risks of making hard choices among multiple product-market options with significant path dependency. This article discusses these dangers and concludes with advice regarding steps marketers can and should take to make the journey to market less perilous.

The Grupo SALA case focuses on entrepreneur Humberto Rodriguez's venture based in Bogota, Colombia. Rodriguez saw an opportunity in the environmental-solutions space when the Colombian government decided to privatize public services. Rodriguez started his venture in 1997 in a 62-square-meter office with an investment of $100,000 by a U.S.-based investor. By June 2015, the time of the case, Grupo SALA operated in three areas-solid waste, dangerous residues, and water and sewer-and had grown at an average rate of 21.3% over the 2002-2014 period. The group drew on three foundations-entrepreneurship, technology innovation and regulatory management, and successful environmental management-and, with 3,270 employees working in eighteen companies, recorded Colombian pesos 256 billion in revenue in 2014 (US$128 million at 2014 conversion rate of 1 Colombian Peso = US$0.0005). After a quick introduction, the case takes the reader through the following six sections: (1) Rodriguez's personal background and approach to risk-taking and entrepreneurship; (2) a window into Grupo SALA's businesses, organizational structure, and ownership; (3) the group's opportunities transforming Colombian attitudes and behavior toward waste, the introduction of containerization, the incineration of hazardous waste, water treatment, and the eventual end game around sustainability and improved lives, spaces, and the environment; (4) Rodriguez's and Grupo SALA's approach to management; (5) the staging of a first "shark tank" to encourage ideas to fuel Grupo SALA's future growth; and (6) Rodriguez's questions for his group regarding the road ahead.

From razors and blades to printers and ink cartridges to smartphones and monthly usage charges to media devices and content, razor-and-blades pricing is commonplace. The argument for such a business model is compelling: entice consumers to adopt with a low initial price for the 'razor,' build up an installed base, and more than make up for the initial subsidy by charging a high price for replacement 'blades.' The problem is, many consumer enticement, customer lock-in, and competitive lock-out mechanisms look less and less tenable given modern-day developments such as the Internet, Google searches, social media, the hacker revolution, the 'maker movement,' rapidly improving technology, leaky supply chains, and global markets. This article characterizes the what, why, and how of razor-and-blades pricing; then examines the present-day tenability of such a pricing practice; and concludes with an impetus and a call for innovation-innovation in, perhaps, the pricing of and the purchasing arrangement for the initial razor; the value proposition from the razor and the razor-and-blades system; the architecture of the razor-and-blades system; and the delivery, especially in terms of customer experience, of value from the razor-and-blades system.

Every business enterprise touches and is touched by customers in different ways at different touchpoints: points of human, product, service, communication, spatial, and/or electronic interaction collectively constituting the interface between an enterprise and its customers. Like any good architect conceiving of and giving shape to a building or a space, the enterprise must conceive, design, implement, and manage these touchpoints with the central goal of developing a compelling customer experience at all touchpoints over the course of the entire relationship cycle. This article addresses this central challenge in three stages. First, it makes the case for a holistic approach to the totality of touchpoints across all parts of the enterprise and all stages of the customer relationship cycle. Then, it offers a methodology for drawing up customer touchpoint blueprints. Finally, it suggests five critical requirements for compelling touchpoint architecture.

Novartis's investment in the start-up Proteus Biomedical gave the pharmaceuticals giant access to a technology allowing for the implantation of ingestible sensors in medicinal pills and, with the help of the sensors, the collection and wireless transmission of drug-compliance data to healthcare providers for the review of pre-determined health vitals. One application of the technology was the improvement of drug compliance: if, for some reason, such "smart pills" were not taken as prescribed, patients could be reminded to comply with the recommended medication regime. The case, which is brief and based on public information, summarizes the nature and magnitude of the drug noncompliance problem, describes some of the competing solutions to address the problem, outlines Proteus's technology in this context, profiles the Proteus and Novartis enterprises, and concludes by characterizing the challenge in front of Novartis as it decides which pill(s) to make smart and how best to market the smart pill(s). The proposed thrust

The Barclay family, new owners (in July 2004) of the Telegraph Media Group in London, the United Kingdom, had acquired a great UK newspaper brand but an organization that has lost its customer focus and, by the time of the events described in the case series (2006-2008), an enterprise in an industry facing tectonic plate shifts because of digitization, the Internet, a 24x7 news and information cycle, the advent of citizen journalism, fundamentally changing reader and advertiser behavior and preferences, and a besieged centuries-old print-media business model. (All this without the additional pain of the 2008 global economic downturn and the consequent fall in advertising revenue.) While "change" was not new to the Telegraph Group (it has seen plenty since the Daily Telegraph was first published in 1855), the Barclay family and the Telegraph's new leadership and management team saw the business at a significant transition point with change an urgent imperative. The (A) case, the first of a five-part series, lays out the business and leadership case for change in the context of the Telegraph's 150-plus-year history.

The (B) case, second in a series of five, follows the (A) case which laid out the case for change in the context of the Telegraph's 150-plus-year history and concluded with the senior management's decision to start the change process with the editorial organization and to do so with a change of location from London's Docklands to a former trading floor by Victoria station in Central London. The (B) case describes the changes that would be necessary in the Telegraph's editorial function.

The (C) case, third in a series of five, characterizes the changes implemented in the Telegraph Media Group's editorial function as the group's senior management went about positioning the enterprise for a "giant stride in the media future." The case follows the (A) case, which laid out the case for change, and a follow-up (B) case, which described the editorial changes that necessary for the media group's transition from the 20th to the 21st century.

The (D) case, fourth in a series of five, closes a major loop left open in the preceding (B) and (C) cases, which focused on changes in the editorial organization and operations of the Telegraph Media Group: making the change, which was seen as an imperative in the (A) case, worthwhile by transforming the commercial organization, whose responsibility it is to bring revenue from advertisers and to look for other ways to "monetize" the Telegraph's considerable investment in digitization.

The (E) case, fifth and concluding case in a series of five, has a central message: Organizational leadership must be seen through the lens of "stewardship," and if managers must, as stewards, leave their enterprise in better shape and with a brighter future, then the work of change is never done. In that sense, change at the Telegraph Media Group is not yet done.

In this hypothetical case, 21-Speed Gizmos, Inc., a manufacturer of electronic bicycle components for the serious cyclist, must decide what price to charge for a new product. Describes the product and includes cost and demand information available for making the pricing decision.

In May 1992, Intel Corp., the leading supplier of microprocessors for IBM-compatible personal computers, announced the retail availability of OverDrive processors, a new line of performance upgrades for the Intel 486 series of microprocessors. The case chronicles the evolution of Intel microprocessors and math coprocessors. Next, it describes the genesis of the "speed-doubling" technique that is employed in the OverDrive Processor and it details the important implementation issues. The central questions are the following: How does a firm manage a product line in the context of rapid technological change? What are the consequences--for the end users, and hence the system and component manufacturers--of rapid product change? How does product upgradability help mitigate some of these consequences? How should Intel develop the OverDrive business? And how will this affect the company's mainline microprocessor business?

Describes the evolution of radio technology and business from the initial days of wireless telegraphy to the advent, growth, and establishment of amplitude-modulated (AM) radio manufacturing and broadcasting. Begins and ends with a description of a decision the Radio Corp. of America (RCA) has to make with respect to the introduction of a new, incompatible frequency-modulation (FM) technology. Illustrates the full spectrum of interests and obstacles a new and incompatible technology and/or product concept has to overcome before it can be accepted. Also useful for discussing how product concepts get established, how patent law works, how industries develop, and the role played by individuals with differing visions, tenacity, and ambitions.

Illustrates organizational and industry-wide inertia to a change that threatens the status quo. Also reinforces the message that those most willing to encourage change are either the proponents of change or those who are locked out from the existing system.

Describes the concluding and bitter fight between Armstrong and the established radio manufacturing and broadcasting industry over the new, incompatible, and yet irrepressible FM technology. Illustrates the struggle between a corporation and an established system and individual champions of change. In addition, underscores the tensions that can arise in the context of personal ambitions, uncompromising attitudes, personal relationships, and corporate interests.

This note, which is introductory in nature, provides a classification scheme for some of the more common examples of price discrimination. For each case that is discussed, the note characterizes the appropriate market segments, the alternative product "versions," and the differences in the firm's economics from one version to another.

Examines the economic tradeoffs affecting a firm's decision to offer one or more versions of a product to a segmented market. Also presents some arguments for and against product variety.

Examines the important economic considerations affecting a firm's price-quantity decision for a product. Begins with a discussion of the appropriate decision criterion. Next, it motivates the concept of a demand curve for a product and defines demand elasticity. Marginal analysis is used to establish the following necessary condition for optimal price and quantity: marginal revenue must equal marginal cost. Price-quantity determination in the presence of a resource constraint and competition is also discussed.

Spreadsheet supplement for case 191-072.