Monday, January 13, 2020, was David Calhoun's first day on the job as President and CEO of Boeing, Incorporated. Prior to Calhoun's first day, two separate Boeing 737 MAX planes had crashed, killing 346 people. In the wake of the second crash, all 737 MAX planes worldwide had been grounded. Something had gone terribly wrong with Boeing's best-selling airplane. Calhoun will need to investigate and evaluate Boeing's actions preceding and following the two crashes to identify a strategy that restores the company's reputation, repairs relations with its stakeholders, and returns the 737 MAX to worldwide service.
Social entrepreneur Kohl Gill founded LaborVoices in 2010 with the goal of using mobile phone technology to bring transparency to the global supply chain. Gill's vision was to build a company that would allow workers in supplier factories for major brand companies-initially in Bangalore, India, and later in other locations-to use their mobile phones to report and share information about factory conditions. This information could potentially be useful to a variety of groups: the workers themselves, nongovernmental organizations and unions that sought to improve working conditions in the global supply chain, factory managers who wished to attract and retain high-quality workers, monitoring and auditing organizations that wished to improve their information sources, and international brand companies that sought to assure compliance with their codes of conduct and to protect against reputational risk. The case describes the experiences and thought processes that led to Gill's business concept. It also provides information on labor conditions and supply chain dynamics in the textile and garment industry in southern India. At the end of the case, Gill is reviewing various business models and considering how to launch his social enterprise successfully.
How should a chief financial officer respond when he uncovers a serious accounting fraud? Richard Okumoto, the newly-appointed CFO of Electro Scientific Industries, Inc., learned that around midnight several months earlier, a group of managers, led by a man who later became CEO, had reversed an accrued liability associated with the anticipated cost of employee retirement benefits. This "midnight journal entry" had allowed the company to report a gain, rather than a loss, for the quarter. Okumoto believed that the reversal was improper and the company's earnings should be restated. When he approached the CEO, the general counsel, and the audit committee with his concerns, however, he was told to "just get past it." Okumoto had to decide how best to act on his conviction that the company had committed an unethical and illegal act, while minimizing the risk to himself and his future career prospects.
How do managers respond when confronted with the demands of activist stakeholders over whom they exercise no direct control? What strategies do managers adopt, and why? Which of these are most effective-and under what conditions? Increasingly, businesses today face difficult challenges in response to changing public expectations and newly emergent techniques of stakeholder influence. New communications technologies enable activists concerned about business behavior to mobilize supporters around the world in real time. Many firms conduct their work on a global stage, where damage to reputation in one location can quickly reverberate around the world. This article develops a typology of managerial strategies to respond to complex disputes with activist stakeholders. It argues that management strategies fall into four categories: wage a fight, withdraw, wait, or work it out. Which strategy is chosen is likely to vary according to: the firm's dependence on stakeholders for critical resources, the firm's power in the particular situation, and the urgency of the contested issue. Managers' effectiveness is, in large part, a function of their ability to assess these three conditions correctly.
Should a fast-growing, employee-owned solar electric company accept a buyout offer from a private equity investor? Could it do so without sacrificing its distinctive, high-involvement culture? Namaste Solar, a 55-person firm based in Boulder, Colorado, designed and installed solar electric systems for residential, commercial, non-profit and government customers. In 2008, the company had been growing at breakneck speed for the past four years, since government incentives for the purchase of renewable energy had created a market for solar electric systems in Colorado. Now, two investors had approached the firm with serious buyout offers. A buyout would bring a new infusion of capital to the firm, enabling it to expand more quickly and install more solar systems, and employees with vested shares would benefit from an attractive sales price. However, Namaste, from the outset, had been committed to building a democratic, high-involvement culture. Ownership was widely shared, and all employees, whether or not they held equity, were encouraged to participate in strategic decisions facing the firm. Many were concerned that selling the company would mean sacrificing the firm's carefully crafted culture. What was the best way forward for Blake Jones and the green energy company that he and two partners had founded?
Should a fast-growing, employee-owned solar electric company accept a buyout offer from a private equity investor? Could it do so without sacrificing its distinctive, high-involvement culture? Namasté Solar, a 55-person firm based in Boulder, Colorado, designed and installed solar electric systems for residential, commercial, non-profit and government customers. In 2008, the company had been growing at breakneck speed for the past four years, since government incentives for the purchase of renewable energy had created a market for solar electric systems in Colorado. Now, two investors had approached the firm with serious buyout offers. A buyout would bring a new infusion of capital to the firm, enabling it to expand more quickly and install more solar systems, and employees with vested shares would benefit from an attractive sales price. However, Namasté, from the outset, had been committed to building a democratic, high-involvement culture. Ownership was widely shared, and all employees, whether or not they held equity, were encouraged to participate in strategic decisions facing the firm. Many were concerned that selling the company would mean sacrificing the firm's carefully crafted culture. What was the best way forward for Blake Jones and the green energy company that he and two partners had founded?
How can a biotechnology start-up navigate a complex regulatory and stakeholder terrain to bring to market an innovative product with potentially significant public health benefits? This case focuses on the challenges facing Ventria Bioscience, a small biotechnology firm based in California. The company had developed an innovative technology for growing medical proteins useful in the treatment of childhood diarrhea in genetically modified rice. The company's efforts to obtain regulatory approval in California to commercialize its invention met with a firestorm of opposition from a wide range of stakeholders, including environmentalists, food safety activists, consumer advocates and rice farmers. The case presents the hurdles faced by Ventria as it has attempted to commercialize its invention in the context of the broader debate over the ethics of plant-based medicines. This case is suitable for an upper-division undergraduate or graduate course in entrepreneurship, small business, the management of technology or biotechnology. In such a course, it is best positioned in a discussion of the regulatory environment and stakeholder relations. Alternatively, the case may be used in a segment on technology or stakeholder relationships in a course in business and society.
How can a biotechnology start-up navigate a complex regulatory and stakeholder terrain to bring to market an innovative product with potentially significant public health benefits? This case focuses on the challenges facing Ventria Bioscience, a small biotechnology firm based in California. The company had developed an innovative technology for "growing" medical proteins useful in the treatment of childhood diarrhea in genetically modified rice. The company's efforts to obtain regulatory approval in California to commercialize its invention met with a firestorm of opposition from a wide range of stakeholders, including environmentalists, food safety activists, consumer advocates and rice farmers. The case presents the hurdles faced by Ventria as it has attempted to commercialize its invention in the context of the broader debate over the ethics of plant-based medicines. This case is suitable for an upper-division undergraduate or graduate course in entrepreneurship, small business, the management of technology or biotechnology. In such a course, it is best positioned in a discussion of the regulatory environment and stakeholder relations. Alternatively, the case may be used in a segment on technology or stakeholder relationships in a course in business and society.
Could a small, employee-owned company meet its ambitious growth goals without compromising its high-involvement culture? LightWorks Optics, based in Orange County, California, made highly sophisticated optical components for defense aeronautics, space exploration, and commercial applications. Early in its history, LightWorks had set up an employee stock ownership plan, or ESOP, under which employees gradually built up equity in the closely held firm. In 2007, the three founders indicated that they hoped to sell their shares to the ESOP trust in a leveraged buyout in 2012. In order for that to happen, the company needed to improve its revenue and profitability significantly; that, in turn, would require that it bring in more contracts, especially ones requiring high-volume production. But, LightWorks had to pay attention to its core capabilities and what it could, and could not, do effectively. Moreover, the company prided itself on its culture of ownership-one in which all employees had a stake in the business and a voice in its decisions. Could the president, Dan Barber, and his top management team reach a consensus on how to expand production without losing the benefits of a culture of ownership?
In 2006, Hewlett-Packard (HP) admitted it had hired outside investigators to spy on members of its board of directors and journalists to uncover the source of several leaks of confidential board deliberations. The investigators used methods, including "pretexting" (using an assumed identity in order to access others' telephone records), which were possibly illegal and almost certainly unethical. This case uses company e-mails, internal reports, meeting minutes, and published memoirs and interviews to present various perspectives on HP's leak investigations, including those of its non-executive chairman, CEO, former CEO, board members, managers, and investigators. What problem was HP attempting to address? Did the board's behavior conform to accepted standards of good corporate governance? Were the investigation's methods ethical? What, if anything, should the company and its chairman, Patricia Dunn, have done differently? How could HP's new CEO, Mark Hurd, best assure effective governance and ethical behavior in the future?
Would it be possible for Google to enter China without violating its informal corporate motto, "Don't Be Evil?" In 2005, Google, Inc.'s top management team and board of directors struggled to decide if the company should enter China--and if so, how. Since 2000, the company had offered a Chinese-language version of its popular search engine hosted on servers outside China. However, Chinese users found this service slow and unreliable, and Google was rapidly losing market share, particularly to the Chinese firm Baidu. At the same time, the number of Internet users in China--and with them the potential for online advertising revenue--had been growing almost exponentially. Yet, serious ethical questions remained unresolved. China operated the most far-reaching and sophisticated system of Internet censorship in the world. Any Internet firm doing business there would have to filter content that the communist regime considered offensive. Moreover, the Chinese government had demanded that other U.S. Internet firms identify individuals who had used their e-mail or blogs to criticize the authorities, and at least one dissident had been jailed as a result. Was doing business in China compatible with Google's mission to make the world's information "universally accessible and useful?"
Should Hewlett-Packard cooperate with other firms in the electronics industry to develop a common code of conduct for suppliers? HP, a leading provider of personal computing, imaging, and printing products, had developed a comprehensive set of labor, environmental, and human rights standards for its suppliers. However, the company remained concerned about its reputational vulnerability and lack of supplier compliance. Ken Larson, HP's Manager of Corporate Social Responsibility, considered whether the company could best advance its interests through industry collaboration on a common code of conduct.
Was Premier, Inc., a hospital group purchasing organization (GPO), guilty of ethical conflicts of interest? Premier was a GPO for more than 200 affiliated not-for-profit hospitals and health care systems in the United States. A series of investigative articles in The New York Times, beginning in March 2002, charged Premier with multiple conflicts of interest. Among its allegations, the newspaper argued that seller-paid fees; investments by Premier and its executives in vendors; and investments by vendors in Premier-sponsored equity funds, research institutes, and conferences all biased the selection process for medical products and services. As a result, Premier did not always choose items of the best quality or value for its affiliated hospitals. Moreover, The Times charged, new products--particularly those developed by small firms--were effectively locked out, suppressing medical innovation and hurting patient care. Richard A. Norling, CEO, and other top executives of Premier faced the difficult task of formulating an effective response to the charges raised by The New York Times. Received the Emerson Center Award for the Outstanding Case in Business Ethics for 2004.