The legendary Harvard Business School Professor and disruptive innovation expert discusses the ideas in his latest book, The Prosperity Paradox: How Innovation Can Lift Nations Out of Poverty. He introduces the concept of 'market-creating innovations', which create new markets for people for whom either no products existed or existing products were unaffordable or inaccessible for a variety of reasons. These innovations transform complicated and expensive products into ones that are so much more affordable and accessible that many more people are able to buy and use them-and can transform communities. In the end, he shows that if you stay focused on serving 'non-consumers' with affordable solutions, opportunity will be vast.

With emerging-market giants such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China experiencing slowdowns, investors, entrepreneurs, and multinationals are looking elsewhere. They've been eyeing frontier economies such as Nigeria and Pakistan with great interest--and enormous trepidation. Can one find serious growth opportunities amid extreme poverty and a lack of infrastructure and institutions? The answer, the authors argue, is yes. The key lies in "market-creating innovations": products and services that speak to unmet local needs, create local jobs, and scale up quickly. Examples range from MicroEnsure, which has made insurance affordable for 56 million people in emerging economies, to Galanz, which has brought microwave ovens to millions of Chinese consumers previously considered too poor to buy such an appliance. What's more, the essentials of development can be "pulled in" by market-creating innovators--and over time, governments and financial institutions tend to offer their support.

After twenty years of growth unprecedented in the sports apparel industry, Under Armour finds itself with a new record to beat: making the leap from $5 to $10 billion in sales - a feat only accomplished to date by competitors Nike and Adidas. At the heart of this challenge is how Under Armour can maintain its brand's authenticity while adding new products that fuel future growth. The case traces the evolution of Under Armour's brand and describes how the company chose to extend or not extend its brand into adjacent categories and markets in the past. Now Under Armour needs to decide on their next steps. Should the company focus on its core markets? Should it stretch the brand into more adjacencies? Or should it consider something more radical, like app-related sales through subscriptions and wearable technologies?

Overview of theoretical approach of HBS MBA Course "Building and Sustaining a Successful Enterprise"; distinguishing theory based on correlation from theory based on causal driver.

With a young, urbanizing population, abundant natural resources, and a growing middle class, Africa seems to have all the ingredients necessary for huge growth. Nevertheless, a number of multinationals have recently left the continent, discouraged by widespread corruption, a lack of infrastructure and ready talent, and an underdeveloped consumer market. Some innovators, however, have succeeded by building franchises to serve poorer consumer segments; tapping the vast opportunity represented by nonconsumption; internalizing risk to build strong, self-sufficient, low-cost enterprises; and integrating operations to avoid corruption. The difference, the authors believe, lies in the choice between "push" and "pull" investment. MNCs seek growth by "pushing" current products onto emerging middle-class consumers. They retain some large portion of their existing cost structure and operating style, and thus set prices that limit market penetration. The winning strategy diverges from this approach in almost every respect. When innovators develop products that people want to "pull" into their lives, they create markets that serve as a foundation for sustainable growth and prosperity.

Executives should evaluate whether a business model innovation they are considering is consistent with the current priorities of their existing business model. This analysis matters greatly, the authors write, since it drives a whole host of decisions about where the new initiative should be housed, how its performance should be measured, and how the resources and processes at work in the company will either support it or extinguish it. Business models, the authors point out, "by their very nature are designed not to change, and they become less flexible and more resistant to change as they develop over time."Interdependencies between different elements of the business model grow over time, and the business unit develops increasingly ingrained approaches to solving problems. The authors describe the development of a business model across time as a journey whose progress and route are predictable -- although the time that it takes a business model to follow this journey will differ by industry and circumstance. In the authors'view, a business model, which in an established company is typically embodied in a business unit, travels a one-way journey, beginning with the creation of the new business unit and its business model, then shifting to sustaining and growing the business unit, and ultimately moving to wringing efficiency from it. Each stage of the journey supports a specific type of innovation, builds a particular set of interdependencies into the business model, and is responsive to a particular set of performance metrics. The authors argue that this road-map view of business model evolution helps explain why most attempts to alter the course of existing business units fail. Unaware of the interdependencies and rigidities that constrain business units to pursuing their existing journey, managers attempt to compel existing business units to pursue new priorities or attempt to create a new business inside an existing unit.

Firms have never known more about their customers, but their innovation processes remain hit-or-miss. Why? According to Christensen and his coauthors, product developers focus too much on building customer profiles and looking for correlations in data. To create offerings that people truly want to buy, firms instead need to home in on the job the customer is trying to get done. Some jobs are little (pass the time); some are big (find a more fulfilling career). When we buy a product, we essentially "hire" it to help us do a job. If it does the job well, we hire it again. If it does a crummy job, we "fire" it and look for something else to solve the problem. Jobs are multifaceted. They're never simply about function; they have powerful social and emotional dimensions. And the circumstances in which customers try to do them are more critical than any buyer characteristics. Consider the experiences of condo developers targeting retirees who wanted to downsize their homes. Sales were weak until the developers realized their business was not construction but transitioning lives. Instead of adding more features to the condos, they created services assisting buyers with the move and with their decisions about what to keep and to discard. Sales took off. The key to successful innovation is identifying jobs that are poorly performed in customers' lives and then designing products, experiences, and processes around those jobs.

For the past 20 years, the theory of disruptive innovation has been enormously influential in business circles and a powerful tool for predicting which industry entrants will succeed. Unfortunately, the theory has also been widely misunderstood, and the "disruptive" label has been applied too carelessly anytime a market newcomer shakes up well-established incumbents. In this article, the architect of disruption theory, Clayton M. Christensen, and his coauthors correct some of the misinformation, describe how the thinking on the subject has evolved, and discuss the utility of the theory. They start by clarifying what classic disruption entails-a small enterprise targeting overlooked customers with a novel but modest offering and gradually moving upmarket to challenge the industry leaders. They point out that Uber, commonly hailed as a disrupter, doesn't actually fit the mold, and they explain that if managers don't understand the nuances of disruption theory or apply its tenets correctly, they may not make the right strategic choices. Common mistakes, the authors say, include failing to view disruption as a gradual process (which may lead incumbents to ignore significant threats) and blindly accepting the "Disrupt or be disrupted" mantra (which may lead incumbents to jeopardize their core business as they try to defend against disruptive competitors). The authors acknowledge that disruption theory has certain limitations. But they are confident that as research continues, the theory's explanatory and predictive powers will only improve.