This case deals with the service operations and quality management issues faced by SMRT Trains, one of the rapid transit rail operators in Singapore. The trigger point for the case was the occurrence of two massive service disruptions on December 15, 2011 and December 17, 2011, respectively. Even though the rail line that faced the disruption had been in existence for over two decades, this was the first time that multiple disruptions of such massive impact (five hours or more of loss of service) occurred and impacted commuters widely across Singapore. The case delves into quality management, service operations and root cause analysis.

In 2002, Neo Sia Meng took over as Executive Director of Four Star Industries Private Limited founded three decades earlier by his parents. After joining the family business as Director in 1996, Sia Meng saw several local and foreign mattress manufacturers enter the Singapore market. This intensified the competition in the local market which was already seasonal and volatile. The increased competition resulted in a proliferation of product offerings from all the manufacturers. The local dealers who dominated the retail mattress market sought an exclusive range of in-house models from the local manufacturers. As Four Star depended heavily on the local dealers, it tried to accommodate their demands to increase its product range and service level. However, as Four Star substantially increased the variety of mattress offerings, its operations became chaotic, and matching demand with the correct inventory of mattresses became a significant challenge. The order fulfillment problems created significant pressures on the manufacturing operations and Sia Meng was worried that these operational problems might provoke some of his long serving employees to consider leaving the company. Sia Meng pondered the short and long term options for Four Star to move towards a responsive, but cost-effective operations model.

From 2001 to 2003, Singapore International Airlines (SIA) faced triple disasters: the 9/11 terrorist attacks, SARS epidemic and the Iraq war, which forced it to reduce capacity, reform and restructure its wages. Having managed costs like a tight ship, SIA found it difficult to negotiate wage restructuring and retrenchments with its unions. Operating in a rigid regulatory and business environment, the SIA management found it challenging to tweak the seniority-based wage system, and migrate to a more flexible and competitive compensation structure. With lower yield, high-cost branding and intense competition from the full-service global and low-cost carriers, the SIA management explored ways to balance its strategic elements, attain flexibility and sustain wage and cost competitiveness to earn double-digit returns for its shareholders.

In 2003, SIA faced difficulty in the negotiation of wage restructuring and retrenchments with its unions. The SIA management contemplated tweaking the Seniority-based Wage System and moving to a more flexible and competitive compensation structure.

In March 2008, Olam faced a rating downgrade by Merrill Lynch, which caused a dramatic plunge in its share price. The management of Olam needed to respond to Merrill Lynch's rating downgrade, manage the impact of shift in growth strategy on short-term performance and balance leverage with long-term sustainable growth.

The case documents an acquisition bid on Air Sahara by Jet Airways. To implement the merger, the two airlines formed a joint management group (JMG) and set March 2006 as the deadline for its completion. The deadline was later extended to June 2006. On 20 June 2006, a day before the expiry of the extended deadline, Jet Airways proposed a new price for the merger deal, leaving Air Sahara with two options: re-price the deal or allow it to expire.

The case documents how Naresh Goyal, chairman of Jet Airways (India) Limited founded the airline and related business group, and built the 'Jet Airways' brand from the early 1990s to 2004. Deploying new aircraft, maintaining young fleet, and focusing on passengers' convenience and service quality, he positioned the airline to the needs of Indian business travellers, garnered more than 40 percent market share and attained brand leadership by 2004. With prudent pricing, cost and yield management, Jet Airways enjoyed healthy profit margins of 20 to 30 percent since early 2000. On the back of strong profitability, market position, brand equity, and booming Indian capital markets and economy, the airline priced its 2005 public issue aggressively but investors' feedback on a red herring prospectus called for brand ownership, which it licensed from Jet Enterprises Limited, a group company promoted and owned by Naresh. The carrier appointed Mumbai-based auditors to value the brand and Jet Enterprises began registering the trademark globally. While Carl Saldhana, Chief Financial Officer, hoped that the auditors would arrive at a formula to value the brand and complete its transfer in six months' time, the trademark registration in some countries hit a snag.

The case documents how Naresh Goyal, chairman of Jet Airways (India) Limited founded the airline and related business group, and built the 'Jet Airways' brand from the early 1990s to 2004. Deploying new aircraft, maintaining young fleet, and focusing on passengers' convenience and service quality, he positioned the airline to the needs of Indian business travellers, garnered more than 40 percent market share and attained brand leadership by 2004. With prudent pricing, cost and yield management, Jet Airways enjoyed healthy profit margins of 20 to 30 percent since early 2000. On the back of strong profitability, market position, brand equity, and booming Indian capital markets and economy, the airline priced its 2005 public issue aggressively but investors' feedback on a red herring prospectus called for brand ownership, which it licensed from Jet Enterprises Limited, a group company promoted and owned by Naresh. The carrier appointed Mumbai-based auditors to value the brand and Jet Enterprises began registering the trademark globally. While Carl Saldhana, Chief Financial Officer, hoped that the auditors would arrive at a formula to value the brand and complete its transfer in six months' time, the trademark registration in some countries hit a snag.

The case delineates how Olam International Limited became a global supplier of 14 agro-products including cashew nuts, cocoa and coffee. As Olam embarked on a growth-by-acquisition model, in addition to its organic growth model, the company had to reassess the need to adjust its present risk management system. The Board's risk committee was tasked to deliberate on the matter.

In 2003, Philips Electronics Private Limited, Singapore launched Philips People Services (PPS), a shared services centre to provide various standardised human resource services. With PPS reducing the cost of business support function and improving decision-making related to recruitment and retention activities, the Head of PPS had to mull over a product division head's expectation of lower annual service fee.

Successfully adopting a fast food and self-service concept had allowed Komala's to serve customers at a quick pace, which helped to accomplish the business goals of offering a large product range, providing a superior ambience to customers, attracting skilled manpower and competitive pricing. However, its seasonal peak demand created capacity constraints and resulted in customers patronizing neighbouring restaurants.

The case describes how Starwood Hotels and Resorts Worldwide Inc. grew under the visionary leadership of Barry Sternlicht, its founder and CEO. It documents how Sternlicht acquired, financed and integrated two leading hotel brands - Westin and ITT Sheraton to become a globally diversified leading hotel chain. The company's newly appointed president of Asia Pacific was given the goal of boosting the share of operating profit from 10 to 25 percent by 2007.