The "free" business models popularized in the digital world by companies such as Google, Adobe, and Mozilla are spreading to markets in the physical world. How should established companies respond? The authors have found that some are too quick to offer free products of their own. Many more either don't move quickly enough or simply fail to respond at all, even when they have the resources to win a head-to-head battle. Consider the reluctance of almost all U.S. newspapers to counter the attack on their classified advertising business from Craigslist. To determine the level of threat posed by a free-product rival, a company should assess the rate at which its own paying customers are defecting versus how quickly the entrant's user base is growing. Most incumbents can fend off the assault by introducing a better free offering and generating revenues and profits through up-selling, cross-selling, selling access to their customers, and bundling the free product with paid offerings. Embracing free strategies is not easy for managers at established companies. One obstacle is the profit-center structure, which makes it impossible to consider a product's revenues and costs separately. Another is the cost accounting system, which is not good for identifying the actual expense of generating additional offerings. To overcome these challenges, managers can push profit responsibility up, push revenue and cost responsibilities down to separate groups, and step back from the cost accounting system. They may find pricing flexibility they didn't realize they had.

How can companies break into attractive markets, where incumbents erect many barriers to entry? To answer this question, the authors studied organizations that successfully entered the most profitable industries in the United States between 1990 and 2000. When they dissected the strategies that worked best, one common theme stood out: indirect assault. Smart newcomers don't duplicate existing business models, compete for crowded distribution channels, or go after mainstream customers right away. Instead, they attack the enemy at its weakest points; then gain competitive advantage; and later, if doing so meets their objectives, go after its strongholds. Recent battles in the soft drink industry--where brands, bottling and distribution capabilities, and shelf space are incumbents' main advantages--are a case in point. When Virgin Drinks entered the U.S. cola market in 1998, it advertised heavily and immediately tried to get into the retail outlets that stock the leading brands. Virgin has never garnered more than a 1% share of the market. Red Bull, by contrast, came on the scene in 1997 with a niche product: a carbonated energy drink. The company started by selling the drink at bars and nightclubs. After gaining a loyal following through these outlets, Red Bull elbowed its way into the corner store. In 2005 it enjoyed a 65% share of the $650 million energy drink market. Successful entrants use three basic approaches in their indirect attacks. They leverage their existing assets and resources, reconfigure their value chains, and create niches. These approaches may appear to be simple, but their magic lies in their combination. By mixing and matching them, Bryce and Dyer say, enterprises can defy half a century of economic logic and make money entering highly profitable industries. The authors use Skype, Costco, Skechers, and many other companies to illustrate their argument.