Supplement to the (A) case.

As founders of the software company Basecamp, Jason Fried and David H. Hansson were used to being the subjects of social media attention. Both maintained active and dedicated Twitter followings for their unique perspectives on management and life. But on April 26, 2021, Fried and Hansson found themselves in the spotlight for a very different reason: they had just publicly announced a new policy that would curtail the discussion of politics at work. The co-founders argued that this policy would prevent distractions and polarizing political differences that Basecamp employees could not hope to resolve amicably or productively. But just one day later, a number of their employees reached out to a journalist to report that Fried and Hansson were simply using their new policy to chill dissent about problematic practices within the company. The subsequent exposé yielded public outcry, and the co-founders were firmly in the crosshairs. In response, Fried held an all-hands meeting at the company to address the events, but tensions quickly escalated. Two hours into the meeting, one of his employees challenged Fried to publicly denounce another employee who had voiced an opinion on matters of racial bias and white supremacy that some viewed as deeply troubling. Basecamp, Fried had argued, could not afford to get distracted by talking politics at work. But could it afford not to?

In March 2020, the English Premier League football (soccer) season was suspended partway through due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Two months later the season remained in limbo, with a looming deadline to decide whether to attempt to complete the season or curtail it-and if so, how. These decisions had major implications for a number of key stakeholders, each with their own incentive structures. One key point of contention was whether to temporarily cancel the system of relegation (i.e., demotion) from the league for the bottom teams. This case investigates the process by which a decision was reached, considering the role of historical and social context in shaping the eventual conclusion.

Countless books and articles offer advice on avoiding missteps at the bargaining table. But some of the costliest mistakes take place before negotiators sit down to discuss the substance of the deal. That's because they often take for granted that if they bring a lot of value to the table and have sufficient leverage, they'll be able to strike a great deal. While negotiating from a position of strength is certainly important, many other factors influence where each party ends up. This article presents four factors that can have a tremendous impact on negotiation outcomes and provides guidance on what negotiators should be doing before either side starts worrying about offers, counteroffers, and bargaining tactics. Harvard Business School professor Deepak Malhotra advises negotiators to resolve process before substance, set expectations, map out the negotiation space, and control the frame. By following those steps, managers position themselves for success at the bargaining table.

In some industries, a weak labor market has left candidates with fewer options and less leverage, and employers better positioned to dictate terms. Those who are unemployed, or whose current job seems shaky, have seen their bargaining power further reduced. But the complexity of the job market creates opportunities for people to negotiate the terms and conditions of employment. Negotiation matters most when there is a broad range of potential outcomes. There are 15 rules for negotiating a job offer. One is "don't underestimate the importance of likeability," which means managing inevitable tensions in negotiation, being persistent without being a nuisance, and understanding how other people perceive your approach. Another rule is "make it clear they can get you." Indicate that you're serious about working for a potential employer, and don't discourage them from trying to win you by suggesting you have too many better options. You should also "be prepared for tough questions," like Are we your top choice? Don't lie or try too hard to please, lest you lose your leverage. And "consider the whole deal," including the job's perks, location, opportunities for growth, and flexibility in work hours-not just the salary. These and other guidelines can help you attain the terms and conditions of employment you want.

VC-entrepreneur partnership agreements often contain flaws that become highly damaging as the parties come up against issues of power, trust, and much more. Yet many of the flaws are systematic and predictable--and hence preventable. The author, a longtime consultant to the VC industry, outlines four recommendations for entrepreneurs sitting down at the table with prospective funders. Understand your leverage. Your leverage is not only a function of your alternatives; it has a lot to do with the VC's as well. Seek to understand them, and be prepared to educate the VC about why his exercising too much power could hurt both parties in the long term. (1) Maximize trust. Beneath all the financial projections, the VC negotiation is a process in which people are deciding whom they want to associate with for years to come. If the VC is vulnerable, use the opportunity to build trust rather than to take advantage. (2) Focus on value--not just valuation. Nonfinancial considerations such as control are also important. (3) Strive for understanding. Seemingly abstruse provisions can be highly consequential. And bear in mind that the choices a VC makes when negotiating can contain important clues about her assessments and expectations. Above all, when you're negotiating with a VC, think not only about what will look good in a press release today but also about what will help you create and capture value over the long run.

Contracts exist to foster trust, but they can actually do the opposite. Overly detailed contracts leave no room for spontaneous acts of kindness to create goodwill between parties; too-rigid contracts leave parties unable to respond to the unanticipated; and, strangely enough, incentives can end up being just plain insulting.

Michael Reich is having severe doubts about how he split the equity with his co-founders two months ago, when they completed a one-page "November Agreement." Since then, Michael has found an angel investor and has worked non-stop on the business, while one co-founder was off enjoying the winter break with his family and the other worked on lucrative consulting contracts for other companies. Michael has just sent his co-founders a proposal that would re-allocate the equity within their founding team, and all three founders are getting ready to reopen a negotiation they thought had been finalized.

Michael Reich is having severe doubts about how he split the equity with his co-founders two months ago, when they completed a one-page "November Agreement." Since then, Michael has found an angel investor and has worked non-stop on the business, while one co-founder was off enjoying the winter break with his family and the other worked on lucrative consulting contracts for other companies. Michael has just sent his co-founders a proposal that would re-allocate the equity within their founding team, and all three founders are getting ready to reopen a negotiation they thought had been finalized.

Michael Reich is having severe doubts about how he split the equity with his co-founders two months ago, when they completed a one-page "November Agreement." Since then, Michael has found an angel investor and has worked non-stop on the business, while one co-founder was off enjoying the winter break with his family and the other worked on lucrative consulting contracts for other companies. Michael has just sent his co-founders a proposal that would re-allocate the equity within their founding team, and all three founders are getting ready to reopen a negotiation they thought had been finalized.

Michael Reich is having severe doubts about how he split the equity with his co-founders two months ago, when they completed a one-page "November Agreement." Since then, Michael has found an angel investor and has worked non-stop on the business, while one co-founder was off enjoying the winter break with his family and the other worked on lucrative consulting contracts for other companies. Michael has just sent his co-founders a proposal that would re-allocate the equity within their founding team, and all three founders are getting ready to reopen a negotiation they thought had been finalized.

Initiatives to build and maintain trust with various stakeholders, including customers, employees, suppliers and investors, are at the top of the executive agenda at many organizations. But most companies don't really understand how to manage stakeholder trust effectively. In fact, the authors' research suggests that many trust-building initiatives and approaches that organizations invest in may be of questionable value. Others might actually be counterproductive. Managing stakeholder trust is difficult because there are many different stakeholder groups, each with its own particular needs and perspective. That is, trust is multidimensional, and it's not obvious which dimension executives need to focus on when dealing with any particular constituency. To answer such questions, the authors conducted a study of stakeholder trust in four different organizations. They analyzed the relevance (if any) of various factors: benevolence, integrity, managerial competence, technical competence, transparency and value congruence. In essence, the study asked what matters -- and to whom. Some of the results were unexpected, and a few were even counterintuitive, leading to the following key insights: Transparency is overrated; integrity is not enough; the right kind of competence matters; building trust with one group can destroy it with another; and value congruence matters across the board. The new framework challenges some existing beliefs and sheds light on areas that companies would be wise not to ignore. Indeed, as the authors illustrate, fundamental misunderstandings about stakeholder trust have tripped up corporations such as Coca-Cola, Google, Apple, Delta Air Lines, Mattel and Sprint. A deeper knowledge of stakeholder trust will help businesses reap numerous benefits, including improved cooperation with suppliers, increased motivation and productivity among employees, enhanced loyalty from customers and higher levels of support from investors.

Supplements the (A) case.

Supplements the (A) and (B) cases.

MBA student Monroe Davies is asked by a potential employer to determine his own compensation package. This case follows Jim Hummer, President and CEO of Whole Health Management and Davies through a unique recruitment process that raises questions of compensation and employee incentives, negotiation strategy, and human resources management.

In the heat of competition, executives can easily become obsessed with beating their rivals. This adrenaline-fueled emotional state, which the authors call competitive arousal, often leads to bad decisions. Managers can minimize the potential for competitive arousal and the harm it can inflict by avoiding certain types of interaction and targeting the causes of a win-at-all-costs approach to decision making. Through an examination of companies such as Boston Scientific and Paramount, and through research on auctions, the authors identified three principal drivers of competitive arousal: intense rivalry, especially in the form of one-on-one competitions; time pressure, found in auctions and other bidding situations, for example; and being in the spotlight - that is, working in the presence of an audience. Individually, these factors can seriously impair managerial decision making; together, their consequences can be dire, as evidenced by many high-profile business disasters. It's not possible to avoid destructive competitions and bidding wars completely. But managers can help prevent competitive arousal by anticipating potentially harmful competitive dynamics and then restructuring the deal-making process. They can also stop irrational competitive behavior from escalating by addressing the causes of competitive arousal. When rivalry is intense, for instance, managers can limit the roles of those who feel it most. They can reduce time pressure by extending or eliminating arbitrary deadlines. And they can deflect the spotlight by spreading the responsibility for critical competitive decisions among team members. Decision makers will be most successful when they focus on winning contests in which they have a real advantage - and take a step back from those in which winning exacts too high a cost.

A two-party negotiation between an Agent representing a new author and an Editor at a large Publishing Firm. The exercise involves a 1-issue, zero-sum negotiation concerning the advance on royalties that the publisher will pay to the author.

A two-party negotiation between an Agent representing a new author and an Editor at a large Publishing Firm. The exercise involves a 1-issue, zero-sum negotiation concerning the advance on royalties that the publisher will pay to the author.

Negotiators often fail to achieve results because they channel too much effort into selling their own position and too little into understanding the other party's perspective. To get the best deal--or, sometimes, any deal at all--negotiators need to think like detectives, digging for information about why the other side wants what it does. This investigative approach entails a mind-set and a methodology, say Harvard Business School professors Malhotra and Bazerman. Inaccurate assumptions about the other side's motivations can lead negotiators to propose solutions to the wrong problems, needlessly give away value, or derail deals altogether. Consider, for example, the pharmaceutical company that deadlocked with a supplier over the issue of exclusivity in an ingredient purchase. Believing it was a ploy to raise the price, the drug maker upped its offer--unsuccessfully. In fact, the supplier was balking because a relative's company needed a small amount of the ingredient to make a local product. Once the real motivation surfaced, a compromise quickly followed. Understanding the other side's motives and goals is the first principle of investigative negotiation. The second is to figure out what constraints the other party faces. Often when your counterpart's behavior appears unreasonable, his hands are tied somehow, and you can reach agreement by helping overcome those limitations. The third is to view onerous demands as a window into what the other party prizes most--and use that information to create opportunities. The fourth is to look for common ground; even fierce competitors may have complementary interests that lead to creative agreements. Finally, if a deal appears lost, stay at the table and keep trying to learn more. Even if you don't win, you can gain insights into a customer's future needs, the interests of similar customers, or the strategies of competitors.